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Abstract 
 
 
Rooted in the core injustices of climate change, climate finance is central to ongoing North-
South political contestation in the global governance of climate change and UNFCCC policy 
output, but has been given considerably less attention by scholars than mitigation and 
adaptation. This thesis uses a historical institutionalist approach to add to existing 
international relations and international political economy research into global 
environmental governance and justice, extending the application of historical 
institutionalism at the international level. With an emphasis on North-South political and 
justice divisions, the project examines the original institutional design of the UNFCCC in 
1992 and the subsequent development of four contested areas of the climate finance policy 
process until 2015, identifying evidence of coalition building, incremental change, path 
dependence, policy paradigms and other mechanisms whereby institutional rule structures 
rooted in the initial institutional design have affected actors' power, interests, ideas and 
behaviour. The thesis finds that in all four policy areas the UNFCCC’s initial policies and, 
in some cases, policy ambiguities, were shaped by developed countries’ material interests 
and normative perspectives. This gave advantages to developed countries that enhanced 
their political power within negotiations and affected the policy process in such a way that 
developing countries usually had to seek institutional change, while developed countries 
could reinforce existing rule structures. Examples of institutional change in the four areas 
are limited, and in most cases were in line with developed countries’ shifting objectives 
rather than indicating developing countries genuinely overcoming disadvantageous 
structures. Overall, the thesis demonstrates that institutional design and development are 
important factors perpetuating North-South contestation in the UNFCCC climate finance 
policy process and limiting the realisation of developing countries’ interests and priorities, 
and shows that historical institutionalism can offer useful new insight into global 
environmental governance institutions and the justice of their outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introducing the project 
Climate finance is at the centre of justice and political contestation in the global governance 
of climate change, since ‘who has to pay, how they have to pay and how much to pay for the 
mitigation of and adaptation to climate change’ are questions at the heart of the governance 
regime (Prys and Wojczewski 2015, p. 93) that directly reflect the North-South injustices 
central to the climate change problem. North-South division and its roots in justice concerns 
have characterised climate change politics and the climate finance policy process, but most 
mainstream international relations analysis approaches global climate governance with 
either a rationalist focus on co-operation and regime effectiveness or a constructivist focus 
on ideas and norms socialising states. Most research about the justice of climate governance 
considers governance processes in the context of broader systemic features and injustices 
and which actors can participate, rather than looking at the design and influence of 
institutions in detail over time. Largely missing from this landscape of scholarship is work 
that bridges these areas or approaches, bringing to the fore the way institutional design is a 
product of existing systems and inequalities and how subsequent institutional development 
has reinforced uneven power distribution and influenced the prominence of particular 
ideas, interpretations and interests over time. Despite its centrality to climate governance 
and justice, climate finance has been given considerably less attention by scholars than 
mitigation and adaptation. Consequently, with an emphasis on the prevalent North-South 
divide over climate justice, this thesis uses a historical institutionalist approach to explore 
how the design and development of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) climate finance regime has shaped actors’ power, interests, ideas and behaviour 
and the policy outcomes over time. 
A few scholars have pointed to the UNFCCC’s origins in an era when greenhouse 
gas emissions were seen as central to economic prosperity and development (O’Riordan and 
Jordan 1999), and suggested that institutional inertia within the UNFCCC has led to 
retention of initial problem framings and a territorial basis for considering greenhouse gas 
emissions, preventing UNFCCC policy effectively adapting to the changing geopolitical and 
economic landscape (Vogler 2016, pp. 30–31). In light of this, ‘to a very large extent, climate 
change politics over the last 20 years seems to have been all about the politics of the possible, 
what is acceptable within the parameters of mainstream political, economic and social 
thinking’ (Mickelson 2009, p. 422); the time is right to look back and use a historical approach 
to investigate what these parameters actually entail and how the design and development of 
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the UNFCCC itself has affected the governance processes and actor behaviour within. 
Having developed as a means to identify how the form and evolution of institutions shapes 
and constrains the behaviour of actors within them and the longevity of policy choices they 
produce (Thelen and Steinmo 1992), historical institutionalism is ideally suited to analysis 
of how institutional design and development has reflected and affected North-South 
injustices and power imbalances and influenced policy outcomes over time. In this 
endeavour, historical institutionalism’s focus on the construction, maintenance, and 
adaptation of institutions rather than the logic-driven motivation of particular preferences 
(Sanders 2008, p. 42) allows it to stand aside from debates between constructivism and 
rationalism in international relations. 
Global climate governance followed multilateral environmental agreements before 
it, taking the form of a high-level treaty, the UNFCCC, under which more detailed and 
prescriptive rules would be created at periodic intervals. The negotiating forum central to 
this regime brings almost all countries together to form policy; perspectives on justice and 
funding are at the core of the priorities and approaches that different countries bring to 
negotiations (Gupta 1999, Hoffman 2013). These differences have consistently fallen on 
either side of a North-South division (Parks and Roberts 2008, Streck and Terhalle 2013), 
and although the landscape of developing countries and their incomes and emissions has 
changed over the course of UNFCCC history (Ciplet and Roberts 2017), climate change 
remains ‘the archetypal North-South and rich-poor issue’ (Gupta 2015, p. 142). This is 
particularly true for climate finance, where the very basis of the policy area stems from 
North-South histories and encapsulates current inequalities; the injustices of climate 
change and countries’ perceptions of themselves as either contributors or recipients of 
finance shape the political bargaining and the struggle to achieve justice in global climate 
governance (Ghosh and Woods 2009).  
The prevalence of North-South division within UNFCCC climate finance indicates 
perspectives and histories that are essential to understand when embarking on a historical 
institutionalist analysis of this policy area and the institutional context in which it has been 
formed, since historical institutionalism is principally concerned with how institutions are 
both products of and go on to shape and constrain the preferences of actors in the relevant 
political sphere (Koelble 1995, O’Riordan and Jordan 1999). In doing so, historical 
institutionalism can help to reveal the mechanisms and micro-processes by which power 
inequalities were reflected in the design of the institution and have been subsequently 
reinforced or overcome at the policy level (Mahoney 2000). These processes are currently 
under-researched at the international level but have important implications in practical 
financial terms and for the pursuit of justice, since the huge sums of money involved in 
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climate finance mean the stakes are high for countries on both sides of the North-South 
divide and the regime has not yet produced policy sufficient to deliver climate finance in a 
manner and quantity that meets the needs articulated by developing countries and reflects 
their conception of justice (Ciplet et al. 2013). Furthermore, the central role of both power 
and ideas within historical institutionalism lends itself to a political environment where 
North-South divisions are prominent and deeply-rooted, and normative claims underpin 
both the problem itself and the governance process. 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis will examine in detail the creation of the UNFCCC climate finance policy area, 
the interaction between actors within the policy process and the progression of policy 
making over time, to illustrate the extent to which the design and evolving rules and 
structures that comprise the institution have influenced the way actors have behaved in the 
policy process and what the policy outcomes have been. The thesis will focus on the climate 
finance policy area because climate finance is both deeply rooted in injustice and North-
South politics and central to whether the climate governance regime as a whole reinforces 
or reduces those injustices. This North-South perspective and broader contestation over 
climate justice underpin the thesis, based on the notion that addressing the ethical and 
distributive aspects of climate change is a valuable endeavour and because climate finance 
has generated such controversy around the North-South axis that further investigation of 
this axis is vital for understanding the implications of climate finance policy making at the 
global level. 
In pursuit of these aims, the thesis is divided into three parts: Part I, ‘Reviewing 
Climate Finance, Justice, and Institutional Theory’, Part II, ‘Historical Analysis and 
Institutional Insight’, and Part III, ‘Research Findings, Discussion, Context & Conclusion’. 
Part I will situate the project within existing scholarship, introduce the theoretical approach 
and explain the research methodology. Within this, Chapter 2 will explore the justice and 
politics of climate finance, explaining how climate finance relates to the core injustices of 
the climate change problem and established perspectives on macro-level systems and 
North-South divisions, and using these to explain why climate finance is necessary and how 
this need has been addressed by the international community both within and beyond the 
UNFCCC. Key policy controversies within climate finance will be explained, incorporating 
an outline of how UNFCCC policy and the institutional architecture has been initiated and 
evolved. Chapter 3 will provide an overview of research into international institutions and 
environmental governance regimes across international relations and international 
political economy. It will then introduce historical institutionalism and explain how this 
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approach can add to existing understanding of climate justice and governance, why it is 
suited to the project’s aims and how its use here will go beyond previous applications of 
historical institutionalism, before setting out the key tools of historical institutionalism. 
Chapter 4 will explain how the project will be undertaken, including data sources and how 
institutional theory will be distilled into practical indicators to facilitate the temporal 
analysis and underpin documentation of the findings. 
Part II will document the historical institutionalist analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
in which four contested areas of climate finance policy making will be examined in detail 
from the process of negotiating the UNFCCC in 1990-1992 until COP-21 in Paris in 2015. 
These analytical chapters will present evidence of actor behaviour in the policy process 
combined with details of the policy output produced over time, identifying stability and 
change in institutional rules and structures and highlighting evidence of mechanisms that 
contributed to these patterns and affected the way in which actors interacted and policy was 
produced, with a particular emphasis on the North-South divide. Part III will summarise and 
discuss the findings and conclude the thesis. Chapter 8 will draw together findings from the 
analytical chapters in Part II, identifying similarities and highlighting mechanisms of 
institutional influence that can help to explain actor behaviour and policy outcomes over 
time. The chapter continues by discussing these findings, first by reflecting on the extension 
of historical institutionalism by applying it to the UNFCCC and showing how the thesis’ 
findings add to existing uses of this approach, and then by placing the findings in the 
broader context of North-South politics and climate justice, highlighting how the 
institutional research adds to other perspectives. Chapter 9 will conclude the thesis by 
summarising the project, highlighting its original contributions and setting out potential 
future research directions. 
1.3 Key contributions of the thesis 
This thesis chiefly aims to add a new dimension to scholarship on climate justice and 
governance by focusing on the design and development of the institution in which global 
climate finance policy is negotiated. The positioning and approach of this thesis is 
particularly relevant to how governance outcomes relate to the targets and demands 
articulated by developing countries, and their understanding of climate justice (Najam et al. 
2003, Stadelmann et al. 2010). Climate governance is commonly characterised as a 
battleground with Northern, developed countries on one side and Southern, developing 
countries on the other (Roberts and Parks 2007, Gupta 2015). International relations and 
international political economy scholars have shown that power, inequality, climate 
vulnerability, histories of development and unequal economic relationships all factor into 
  Page 19 of 265   
this characterisation (Roberts and Parks 2009, Okereke 2010, Brunnée and Streck 2013), but 
this thesis is motivated by a claim that a comprehensive understanding of experiences and 
outcomes of the climate finance policy process and the UNFCCC governance regime should 
also include knowledge of the role that institutional design and development has on the 
interaction and policy making that takes place. In this way, the thesis can help to enrich 
broader understanding of how North-South dynamics manifest themselves in global 
governance institutions and of the challenges and constraints faced by developing countries 
as they participate in global governance processes. 
The research novelty of this project has two major dimensions: firstly, addressing 
North-South politics and climate justice by focusing on the institutional design and 
structure of the governance regime. Much has been written about the politics and policy of 
climate finance and climate governance, in terms of the development of the governance 
regime and the politics within it (Jordan 1994a, Bodansky 2001, Gomez-Echeverri and Müller 
2009, Gupta 2014, Kuyper et al. 2018), and its role in facilitating co-operation between states 
in the international political arena (Victor 2006, Ciplet 2015, Falkner 2016). The implications 
of justice in interaction between different countries and in policy outcomes have been 
analysed (Paavola 2005, Okereke 2010, Falkner 2019), particularly distributional (Paavola 
and Adger 2006, Müller et al. 2009) and participatory dimensions (Richards 2001, Paavola 
2005). However, as yet the impact of the institution’s design and development itself in 
shaping actors’ preferences and interests and the way they are included in or excluded from 
the policy process over time have not been studied extensively. By engaging with this 
institutional angle, a historical institutionalist approach to climate finance and justice will 
open a fruitful avenue of research, adding new detail and perspective to how scholars and 
other researchers understand the politics and outcomes of the climate finance policy 
process and UNFCCC regime.  
Secondly, in using a historical institutionalist approach this thesis will make an 
original contribution by extending the application of historical institutionalism to the global 
climate governance regime. While historical institutionalism has grown in stature within the 
academy over the last 20 years, it has principally been used to analyse the development and 
functioning of national governments and bureaucratic ministries (Thelen 1999, Immergut 
and Anderson 2008). More recently, scholars in the field have begun to champion the 
application of historical institutionalism at the international level of governance 
institutions and its potential to add to existing international relations and international 
political economy scholarship (Fioretos 2011, Hanrieder 2014, Rixen and Viola 2016). 
Although there is a growing body of research involving historical institutionalism in 
‘contributions on state sovereignty and foreign economic policy, as well as research in 
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international security, international political economy, international law, and global 
governance’ (Fioretos et al. 2016a, p. 4), climate finance policy and the UNFCCC governance 
regime has not yet been the subject of detailed historical institutionalist study. This thesis 
will contribute to this burgeoning expansion of historical institutionalism at the 
international level, extending the theoretical approach by applying it to the UNFCCC, a 
treaty-based multilateral governance institution where negotiations take place every year 
and policy is produced almost continuously. As well as offering new insight into the 
UNFCCC climate finance policy process and its outcomes, this project can illuminate the 
potential of research applying historical institutionalism to international environmental 
governance regimes and the challenges involved. 
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2. The justice and politics of UNFCCC 
climate finance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
From the outset as climate change emerged as an issue of international attention and co-
operation, the question of who will fund the action necessary to respond effectively has been 
central to policy debates at all levels of governance. This question is deeply rooted in and 
has important implications for justice, since the contributions to the problem of climate 
change are highly asymmetrical, most notably on a North-South axis (den Elzen et al. 2013). 
There are many different types of action to mitigate and adapt to climate change that are 
both necessary and possible, and the money to fund them must come from somewhere. As 
a result, funding issues have been a part of climate policy debates across the UNFCCC’s 
remit, shaped by North-South inequalities of both contribution to the problem and current 
levels of wealth (Prys and Wojczewski 2015). More recently, as more and more empirical 
evidence about climate change has been gathered and more accurate forecasts generated, 
the scale of the finance required to undertake an effective global response has become better 
understood and the urgency of this response has increased (Gomez-Echeverri 2013). 
However, early hopes that international co-operation over climate change would bring about 
enormous transfers of money from the Global North to the South have not come to fruition 
(Patt et al. 2019, p. 556). To date, there has been little research into why a patchwork of funds 
and mechanisms has emerged from the UNFCCC climate finance policy process, with no 
clear basis to underpin policy and an increasing focus on private finance to meet what many 
consider to be developed countries’ moral obligations.  
The UNFCCC does not govern in isolation, and the way its Parties have addressed 
climate finance within its policy process is part of a broader landscape and history of 
governance systems and institutions, political interaction and power distribution, and 
injustices and inequalities. Particularly important is the history of international 
development funding and North-South relationships and divisions, which involve similar 
issues of vulnerability and poverty in the context of wider social processes and the 
relationship between individuals and the environment (Boyd 2014). These issues and 
histories highlight the ongoing prominence of injustices as a factor shaping how different 
countries perceive climate finance and the broader climate change problem (Pickering, 
Jotzo, et al. 2015); flows of finance are therefore necessary to generate and maintain 
developing countries’ confidence that developed countries will meet commitments of 
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financial and other support that have both moral and institutional foundations (Ballesteros 
et al. 2010). Despite the centrality of climate finance to climate justice and governance, few 
scholars have given it the sustained attention it deserves and connected climate finance 
policy negotiations and outcomes with histories of injustice and North-South political 
division. 
This chapter will introduce the justice and political dimensions of climate finance 
and the climate change problem, explain how the UNFCCC and its climate finance policy 
area fits into broader debates over justice and development, and outline how key finance 
policy controversies originated and have evolved. This will involve an examination of how 
injustice underpins the need for climate finance and associated moral obligations, and how 
climate justice scholarship has approached climate finance within the broader governance 
regime. This will lead to an overview of key issues that derive from donor and recipient 
countries’ concerns over how finance is obtained, delivered and monitored; these issues are 
central to political contestation within the UNFCCC policy process. To facilitate a detailed 
picture of the institutional context of this contestation, the chapter will also incorporate 
explanations of the design, functions and evolution of the climate finance area of the 
UNFCCC. The overall purpose of the chapter is to explain how justice issues and political 
contestation have been central to the climate finance policy process and demonstrate the 
need for deeper research into how and why the UNFCCC climate finance policy process has 
developed without resolving these contestations. 
2.2 Climate finance, justice and politics 
There is now a very strong scientific consensus that climate change is occurring, fuelled by 
greenhouse gas emissions from human activity (Oreskes 2004, Cook et al. 2013, Goldin 2013). 
The history of this human activity involves uneven economic development, with benefits 
from carbon-intensive activity accruing mostly in Northern countries while climate change 
will affect most Southern countries more severely (Roberts and Parks 2009). The costs of 
responding to climate change are projected as trillions of dollars and climate change is an 
extremely complex moral issue, with a multitude of factors involved in determining how to 
assign responsibility and share the financial burdens of responding. As a result, climate 
finance is at the heart of both the injustices of climate change and the North-South political 
contestation that has characterised the political process of co-ordinating a global response, 
as nations grapple with the inescapable questions of where funding should come from, how 
it should be provided and how much is required (Prys and Wojczewski 2015). The important 
North-South dimensions to these questions, and the political processes involved in climate 
finance governance institutions and policy processes, cannot be understood without first 
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establishing the need for climate finance and how this relates to the core injustices of 
climate change. After addressing these foundational aspects of climate finance, this section 
will set out how international relations and international political economy scholars have 
studied the justice of climate finance and its governance, before exploring the roots and 
prominence of the North-South division that characterises global climate finance 
governance. 
2.2.1  The need for climate finance 
The process of mitigating and adapting to climate change can be viewed as a burden or an 
investment opportunity, or both, but in all cases the costs involved are huge. These costs will 
be estimated as greater or lesser depending on the predicted impacts of climate change, the 
degree of transformation perceived as required or desirable, and the range of sectors 
included in the assessment (Olbrisch et al. 2011). A wide range of estimates have been 
produced by a variety of scholars, governments and international organisations, based on a 
variety of assumptions, definitions and criteria. In a widely-cited (Parry et al. 2009, Lemos 
and Boyd 2010, Purdon 2014) study, the UNFCCC (2007) estimated that US$200-210bn of 
investment would be required by 2030 to return greenhouse gas emissions to current levels. 
A study by McKinsey & Company (2009) into emissions-reduction pathways found that 
implementing every possible measure in pursuit of limiting temperature rise to 2°C would 
cost €530bn a year in 2030 and €810bn a year in 2050, again on top of business-as-usual 
investments that would happen anyway. Olbrisch et al. (2011) reviewed several studies, 
including those by the UNFCCC and McKinsey & Company mentioned here and others by 
the World Bank and International Energy Agency, and found that estimates for the level of 
investment required in developing countries for mitigation ranged between US$175bn and 
US$565bn in addition to investments that would take place anyway. The IPCC recently 
estimated that keep to a 1.5°C temperature rise will require around US$830 billion in 
additional annual energy-related investments (IPCC 2018, para. C.2.6), and other estimates 
range as high as US$3.5 trillion a year for the next 40 years to achieve a wholesale 
transformation of the energy economy across the world (Stern 2009a, IEA and IRENA 2017). 
In terms of adaptation, Parry et al. (2009) reviewed a range of earlier “first-
generation” studies, including Oxfam, the World Bank and UNDP. They found estimates for 
adaptation costs in developing countries ranging from US$4bn to US$109bn per year, again 
with a variety of presumptions and criteria, and noted that this wide range reflects the 
difficulty in formulating these estimates. The aforementioned UNFCCC study found that 
the cost of adapting to climate change would run to ‘several tens of billion’ dollars per year 
over and above existing levels of investment, with US$28-67bn required in developing 
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countries (UNFCCC 2007, pp. 125, 177). The World Bank (2010, p. xvi) found that the costs 
‘between 2010 and 2050 for adapting to an approximately 2°C warmer world by 2050 will be 
in the range of $70 billion to $100 billion a year’ and may well be higher once cross-sectoral 
impacts are taken into account. Fankhauser (2010) notes that the World Bank report takes 
the concept of adaptation further than other studies, to the point where pre-climate change 
levels of welfare are restored with no residual damage, and reports that Project Catalyst built 
on the UNFCCC report to produce (unpublished) estimates of US$13–25 billion (for 2010–
2020) and US$25–76 billion (for 2030). More recently, the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (2014) 
gave an assessment of US$70-100 billion per year, largely based on the 2010 World Bank 
study, and the UNEP (2015) has predicted that adaptation costs in developing countries 
could rise to 2-3 times these levels by 2050, even if warming is kept under 2°C. 
Moore (2012, pp. 191–192) goes into greater detail about the range of assumptions 
and conceptual differences that shape adaptation cost estimates, describing them as 
conflicts over normative perspectives. These shape assumptions about ‘placing values on 
people, species, and cultures that may be destroyed through climate change’, with specific 
reference to the degree to which a compensation framing is validated by scientific discourse 
and the priority given to efficiency and private adaptation within cost estimates. In the same 
vein, Bowen et al. (2017) estimate that financial transfers from the Global North to the Global 
South of around US$400bn a year by 2050 will be required to equalise spending on climate 
change responses across countries according to GDP. This is equalising in purely monetary 
terms, of course; the question of how to bring about a morally satisfactory degree of 
equalisation is at the heart of some of the most fervent disagreement in the short history of 
the climate change governance regime. 
2.2.2  Climate finance and broader climate justice 
The cost estimates detailed above illustrate the scale of funding necessary to implement an 
effective global response to climate change, but the need for climate finance is a product of 
the injustices central to the climate change problem and cannot be understood as simply a 
matter of economics. The core injustice of climate change is captured in the “double 
inequity” described by Füssel (2010). Firstly, climate change is having more rapid and severe 
effects in tropical regions, where most of the countries in the Global South are located (IPCC 
1990, 2013, 2014). Not only will the effects be more severe, but the poverty still experienced 
by many millions in the developing world makes individuals and communities more 
vulnerable to damage or suffering when temperature and precipitation patterns change or 
extreme weather events occur (Huq and Ayers 2007, Parnell 2014). Furthermore, developing 
countries are generally less resilient to climate change in terms of infrastructure, financial 
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and other resources, and the capacity of government institutions to create and implement 
policy responses (Adger 2003, Nurse and Moore 2005). This has extremely serious 
consequences for lives and wellbeing; climate change could increase the number of people 
living in poverty by between 35 and 122 million by 2030, with the greatest impact in sub-
Saharan Africa (FAO 2016, pp. 9–13).  
Secondly, the majority of developing countries made little contribution to bringing 
about the problem of climate change (Skolnikoff 1990, Botzen et al. 2008, den Elzen et al. 
2013, Matthews 2016). The longevity of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere means that 
emissions at one point in time contribute to climate change for tens and even hundreds of 
years into the future, which means the history of emissions becomes an important factor in 
assigning responsibility for dealing with present and future climate change. Although the 
exact proportions of each country’s contribution to greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere 
varies with methodological choices (Skeie et al. 2017), it has been established by numerous 
studies (Baumert et al. 2005, Höhne and Blok 2005, Botzen et al. 2008, den Elzen et al. 2013, 
Matthews et al. 2014, Ekholm and Lindroos 2015) that developed countries have contributed 
disproportionately greater greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere during their 
process of industrialisation. This pervasive aspect of the climate change problem is 
recognised in a concept widely referred to as “historical responsibility” (Page 2008, 
Humphreys 2014), which has formed the basis of numerous burden-sharing proposals, 
discussed further in the next section. 
An additional core dimension to climate justice is participation, since the global 
nature of climate change ensures that the equity and effectiveness of responses to it are 
bound up with global decision-making institutions and processes. Participation in these 
processes remains distinctly unequal, both because developed countries have long 
dominated the creation and operation of global governance institutions, and because 
developing countries have far fewer resources to devote to delegations and representatives 
in multilateral policy fora (Okereke 2018). There are many hundreds of international 
environmental agreements in place and hundreds more bilateral agreements (Mitchell 
2003); participation in this governance system places heavy demands on financial and 
human resources, particularly when many countries lack capacity to implement and enforce 
them (VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001, Najam et al. 2006, p. 36). When time, funding and 
knowledge of techniques to engage local populations in climate change and development 
planning are already limited (Bizikova et al. 2013, Castán Broto et al. 2015), increasing 
expectations for taking climate action compounds the potential that top-down international 
policy will make existing inequalities and injustices more severe. 
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Furthermore, communities, indigenous peoples and regions are affected by 
environmental issues like climate change in specific ways, yet have very little access to the 
global level of governance institutions where policies that govern the management of such 
environmental issues are decided (ISET 2010, Okereke and Charlesworth 2014), 
compounding major disparities in negotiation delegates from the Global North and South. 
Scholars have articulated the injustice associated with unequal access to and participation 
in governance processes (Müller 2001, Newig and Fritsch 2009, Grasso and Saachi 2011), and 
several argue that it is imperative that participation is made more inclusive and dynamic, or 
“democratised” (Schalatek 2012, Stevenson and Dryzek 2012a, 2012b, 2014, Carrozza 2015). 
It is in this wider context of distinctly unequal contributions to the climate change problem 
and experience of its effects, and a history of unequal access to governance institutions and 
processes, that climate finance policy and the UNFCCC policy process must be understood; 
if climate finance is a burden that must be borne, perspectives on sharing those burdens will 
inevitably influence states’ material interests and the attitudes they bring to policy 
negotiation (Lange et al. 2010, Grasso 2011).  
2.2.3  Climate justice and burden sharing 
Climate change presents a particularly fiendish challenge for philosophers and policy 
makers alike, because the breadth and extent of the changes that will be required to respond 
effectively to climate change will necessarily involve virtually innumerable individuals, 
industries and governments, entailing enormous cost and effort (Tol 2009). As 
understanding of these implications grew through the 1980s and 1990s, attention turned to 
how the financial burdens of climate change action should be distributed. Scholars quickly 
began to apply existing moral or legal principles to climate change, such as the “polluter 
pays” principle previously associated with traditional forms of environmental damage such 
as chemical spills, where the damage and the origin of the pollutants are more easily 
attributable than with climate change (O’Riordan and Cameron 1994). Philosophers have 
gone further, exploring the implications of historical responsibility and the moral 
foundations on which the international response should be built; along with the “polluter 
pays” principle, the “beneficiary pays” and “ability to pay” principles articulate varying 
perceptions of the past and current emissions that have caused climate change, and the 
wealth and other benefits that developed countries have accumulated as a result of carbon-
based industrialisation (Shue 1993, Caney 2005, 2010, Page 2008, 2011, Jamieson 2010, 
Meyer and Roser 2010, Moellendorf 2012). In the context of these principles and historical 
emissions, philosophers have also explored approaches to the communal nature of the 
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Earth’s atmosphere and how to divide future emissions between nations and populations 
(Neumayer 2000, Hayward 2007, Caney 2012). 
Other scholars have explored the implications of these moral debates and 
frameworks for global governance and how to apply them in policy, with a focus on which 
countries should bear the burdens of effort and funding, and the extent to which developing 
countries, already more vulnerable and less wealthy, should be expected to contribute 
funding and other efforts (Friman and Linnér 2008, Müller et al. 2009, Roberts and Parks 
2009, Ekholm et al. 2010, Schlosberg 2012, Sachs 2014, Pattanayak and Kumar 2015, 
Underdal and Wei 2015). Such work has been accompanied by policy proposals for assigning 
future emissions rights (Kanitkar et al. 2010, Baer 2013) and for applying principles of justice 
to questions concerning how climate finance should be obtained, handled and distributed 
(Dellink et al. 2009, Barrett 2013a, Vanderheiden 2015, Schalatek and Bird 2016). Developing 
countries, meanwhile, have long been concerned that the financial and other burdens of 
climate change action and low-carbon development will curtail their development (Pettit 
2004, Collier 2015). Constrained by unequal economic relationships and North-South power 
imbalances (Roberts and Parks 2009), countries in the Global South simply have not 
developed equivalent capacity in their governments and public sectors (Eakin and Lemos 
2006). This combines with poor socio-economic conditions and already-fragile ecosystems 
to leave them reliant on external assistance, usually from the Global North, to bolster their 
response to climate change alongside existing sustainable development efforts (Tuffa et al. 
2012). 
2.2.4  International political economy and climate justice 
International political economy approaches connect with both climate justice and finance 
by interrogating how links ‘between which actors are principally responsible for generating 
most harm and which benefit most from the wealth it generates, and those charged with 
delivering collective societal responses to the threat of climate change’ shape governance 
processes and outcomes (Newell 2015, p. 33). Political economists have argued that climate 
finance in developing countries ‘has the potential to transform traditional aid modalities’ 
(Tanner and Allouche 2011, p. 3), but the benefits of climate finance and the impact of 
existing international institutions that distribute funding are highly uneven (Newell and 
Mulvaney 2013). However, only a small number of scholars have directly addressed political 
economy perspectives on the UNFCCC climate finance policy process, integrating the 
connections between systemic ideologies and histories at the high level, and environmental 
problems and inequalities at the local level (Harmeling and Kaloga 2011, Tanner and 
Allouche 2011). There is a lack of investigation from these perspectives into how systemic 
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power imbalances have become part of the rules and structures within the UNFCCC, and 
how these internal structures shape the way policy reflects expectations of climate finance 
held by actors based on their positions as donors or those more responsible, and recipients 
or those less responsible. 
Stepping back, political economists have argued that the earlier and more extensive 
industrialisation and economic development in the Global North, which brought about the 
vast increases in greenhouse gas emissions that have caused climate change, stems from 
and has reinforced unequal economic and power relationships between countries in the 
North and South (Newell 2005, Roberts and Parks 2007, Okereke 2009). Scholars also point 
out that it is this economic history that leads environmental impacts to be experienced most 
severely by vulnerable communities in countries with the least state capacity to regulate 
business activity to prevent environmental damage (Martinez-Alier 2002, pp. 10–11, White 
2013). These histories and North-South divisions, with facets of injustice such as trade 
barriers (Garcia 2000, Gonzalez 2006) and colonialism (Agarwal and Narain 1991, Joshi 
2015), are captured in concepts such as unequal and combined development (D’Costa 2003, 
Bieler 2013) and ecological debt (Rice 2009, Roberts and Parks 2009). These are all 
contributory factors shaping developing countries’ perspectives on and expectations of 
climate finance and how it relates to justice (Gupta 1999, p. 202, Kandlikar and Sagar 1999). 
Political economists argue that these histories and perspectives are manifest in the North-
South division that has characterised UNFCCC climate finance negotiations since they 
began (Paterson and Grubb 1992, Gupta 1999, Williams 2005, Okereke 2010, Parks and 
Roberts 2010), but have not gone further to investigate mechanisms and institutional factors 
that contributed to these factors becoming so prominent and persistent over time. 
Climate change and injustice has also been addressed from the perspective of 
development studies and more recent political economy research into the climate and 
development intersection (Newell 2004, Naess et al. 2015). With southern governments often 
severely constrained in their ability to fund climate change activities (Rogers 2010), scholars 
stress the importance of considering policy at different governance levels (Adger et al. 2005) 
and the identification of existing path dependencies that are impeding widespread 
adoption of a resilience-based approach that can help integrate climate change into existing 
development assistance systems (Burch 2011, Carrapatoso and Kürzinger 2014, pp. 283–284). 
Global political ecology scholars have similarly begun to address the greater pace and scale 
that climate change is bringing to how people’s vulnerabilities are affected by and related to 
political and economic exclusion (Boyd and Juhola 2009, p. 798). In the context of broader 
histories and socio-political context, this has involved engaging with the role of power and 
control, actors’ positioning and social construction of environmental problems in shaping 
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how top-down governance systems are resistant to change (Armitage 2008). This perspective 
highlights the effects of actions and output at higher levels of governance on localised 
conflicts, vulnerabilities and environmental conditions, potentially exacerbating North-
South inequalities and power differentials (Newell and Bumpus 2012), but again there is a 
lack of research into institutional design and the development of policy structures and their 
influence on perpetuating these North-South inequalities. 
2.2.5  International relations, politics and climate justice 
Paterson (1996a, p. 181) highlighted relatively early that financial transfers from the Global 
North to the South must be integrated at the core of climate negotiations and forging 
political agreement. However, while these transfers and associated distributive justice have 
been part of the literature on politics and equity in the climate governance regime (Paavola 
and Adger 2006, Rübbelke 2011, Pittel and Rübbelke 2013, Prys and Wojczewski 2015), there 
has been relatively little detailed analysis of the climate finance policy process itself. 
Scholars have argued that a lack of ethical basis for climate finance and the influence of 
neoliberalism within climate governance has limited the realisation of initial expectations 
of these financial transfers (Okereke 2010, p. 468). While financial (and other forms of) 
assistance was integral to the differentiated responsibilities encapsulated in the common 
but differentiated responsibility principle (CBDR) (Matsui 2002), without clear institutional 
rules to operationalise CBDR, receipt of climate finance has been linked to developing 
countries accepting greater responsibility for taking action in response to climate change 
(Vogler 2016), consistent with recent moves to transform the UNFCCC system into one where 
sharing the burdens of the global response is determined by voluntary commitments made 
individually by each country, diluting the differentiation between developed and developing 
countries (Okereke and Coventry 2016). Such studies often indicate that institutional design 
and rules have influenced the political and justice implications of finance as an aspect of 
climate governance, but detailed study of these institutional mechanisms and the extent to 
which they have influenced policy outcomes has not been undertaken. 
More broadly, international relations scholars have argued that justice, or “equity”, 
must be acknowledged if effective co-operation between states over global environmental 
issues is to be forthcoming (Young 1989, Albin 2001). The philosopher Shue (1992) also 
notably argued that justice is unavoidable when states come together to negotiate on climate 
change. Incorporating justice or equity into international relations has not been 
straightforward, however; both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists traditionally see 
self-interest as the basis for state action and thus often put aside questions of identity- and 
interest-formation and ‘normative ambitions’, although some liberals do seek to incorporate 
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these processes (Falkner 2019, p. 2). Constructivists, meanwhile, have sought to explain the 
social construction of identities and interests and the discursive and intersubjective 
processes by which states derive meaning from a complex world and develop international 
governance regimes (Wendt 1992, Haas 2002, p. 74). While states might pursue particular 
conceptions of equity through their actions within institutions, and indeed scholars have 
explored the self-interested use of equity in climate negotiations (Lange et al. 2010), realists 
attribute state behaviour in relation to equity-related issues such as burden-sharing to 
rational intentions to “win” and avoid “losing” (Lacy 2005). In contrast, constructivists see 
normative structures as a foundational element of international relations through their 
influence on identity- and interest-formation, which naturally leads to actors seeking to 
express justice claims in the international political arena but also contributes to political 
stalemate when these claims conflict (Paterson 1996b, p. 185). 
The notion that different perceptions of equity contribute to political disagreement 
and stalemate within the UNFCCC has been a central theme of scholarship on climate 
justice and politics. A wide range of scholars have presented numerous conceptions of how 
justice should be incorporated into institutional processes and how the collective 
interpretation of justice principles should be adjusted to facilitate political agreement and 
more effective governance (Weisslitz 2002, Paavola 2007, 2008, Parks and Roberts 2008, 
Okereke and Schroeder 2009, Boyte 2010, Cameron et al. 2013, Zhang and Shi 2014). Other 
scholars have shown that, despite some acceptance amongst participants that different 
countries bear different responsibilities for climate change (Miguez 2002), the different 
conceptions of justice held by the North and South in general, and individual countries in 
particular, have proven impossible to align within UNFCCC negotiations (Okereke 2010). 
Much climate justice and politics literature focuses on the CBDR principle, which 
articulated an approach to equity in the UNFCCC Convention (Rajamani 2000, Okereke 
2008, Müller and Gomez-Echeverri 2009). Despite CBDR becoming prominent within 
academic discourse and negotiating rhetoric, the ambiguity of the principle itself and the 
institutional rules based on it have contributed to disagreement between developed and 
developing countries as they seek policy outcomes consistent with their varying 
interpretations and ability to exert power over other actors (Harris 1999, Mickelson 2000, 
Honkonen 2009, Bortscheller 2010, Deleuil 2012, Brunnée and Streck 2013). These scholars 
have not, however, investigated the influence of institutional design, structures and 
development on rules and interpretations within the policy process and the justice of its 
outcomes. 
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2.2.6  North-South division in the UNFCCC 
A broad history of colonialism, domination and exploitation characterises the North-South 
relationship and has shaped the last forty years of global governance negotiations (Engberg-
Pedersen 2011). These legacies and the associated inequalities of historical responsibility, 
disproportionate effects and participation in governance processes combine to imbue 
climate change with a strong sense of injustice that shapes the way developing countries 
relate to the problem and interact with developed countries (Bulkeley and Newell 2015, chap. 
2). This has evolved from ongoing debate over the relationship between protection of the 
environment and facilitation of development that dates back to the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment in 1972 (Okereke 2009). The North-South dynamic emerged in the 
process of creating the Convention, in which developing countries had to battle against the 
economic strength of donor countries and fight to secure the outline of a finance system 
that will protect their interests, while at the same time having to counteract attempts by 
developed countries to minimise the impact of North-South climate finance obligations on 
their domestic economies and draw developing countries into sharing responsibility for 
emissions cuts (Hyder 1994). 
Developing countries realised early on that the North’s focus on environmental 
issues distracted attention from poverty, food insecurity and the myriad other problems they 
face, and even challenged the basis of the development that was the primary means to solve 
these problems (Najam 2005). This challenge has led developing countries to pursue an 
agenda focused on their development priorities within environmental negotiations, with 
finance a key concern, and contributed to the formation of a longstanding negotiating 
coalition of developing countries primarily built on a Southern identity and perspective 
(Williams 2005). How to facilitate development in the South (and continued economic 
growth in the North) while reducing global emissions, and how to fund these simultaneous 
objectives, has been part of the discussion about burden sharing in climate change policy 
for over two decades (Baer 2013). The right to development has been suggested as a means 
to formalise the financial and development needs and expectations of developing countries 
in the face of global restriction on greenhouse gas emissions (Löfquist 2011), but some 
developed countries reject the notion (Roberts and Parks 2007, p. 25). 
Climate finance negotiations are rooted in this North-South division, which has 
been perpetuated across the UNFCCC and generated significant disagreement over how an 
international response should be organised (Parks and Roberts 2008, Hoffman 2013). 
Represented most prominently by the G77/China, which now has 134 members, developing 
countries have repeatedly highlighted the responsibility of developed countries as the 
reason why developed countries should take the lead on climate change mitigation and 
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transfer money and technology to developing countries to facilitate their adaptation and 
mitigation (Bodansky 1993, pp. 502–503, Hallding et al. 2013). Developing countries also 
argue that global governance must link climate change to sustainable development, human 
rights and key measures of human security (Okereke 2006, Klinsky and Winkler 2014). In 
doing so, developing countries point to evidence suggesting that climate change has the 
potential to reverse progress that has been made in reducing poverty in many parts of the 
developing world (Agrawala 2004, Mcmichael 2009, Stern 2009b, chap. 1), and ‘exacerbate 
existing interlinked problems of social inequality, ecological degradation, and conflict over 
natural resources’ (Boyd 2014, p. 342). 
Developing countries have not maintained or demonstrated aligned perspectives 
throughout the course of UNFCCC negotiations, however. From its earliest stages, the 
G77/China has featured tension or outright opposition between countries of the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). The former are very vulnerable to the effects of climate change and tend to support 
emissions reductions, while the latter are concerned with the economic impact of measures 
to respond to climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and often obstruct such 
measures (Vihma et al. 2011, p. 316). More recently, the economies and emissions of larger 
developing countries have grown markedly and their positions have diverged from each 
other and the G77; the G77 has advocated greater granularity in differentiation between all 
countries based on ‘current socioeconomic realities’ rather than a simple North-South split, 
and the Independent Association of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (AILAC) have 
pushed for ambitious climate change action at home and globally rather than waiting for 
Northern leadership (Ciplet and Roberts 2017, pp. 382–383). These divisions within the 
broader Southern coalition have usually concerned emissions reductions, a prominent 
recent example being the High Ambition Coalition formed during COP-21 in Paris in 2015 
that succeeded in introducing the 1.5°C temperature limit target to the Agreement. In 
contrast, the G77/China’s unity and the North-South division appear to be more resilient on 
the subject of finance even as developing countries such as China become finance donors 
themselves (Mauldin 2015, Dimitrov 2016, pp. 4–5). 
The more expansive framing of climate change and connection to development has 
been challenged consistently by a discourse that focuses on the scientific and technical 
aspects of the problem and potential responses, and excludes the ethical and wider systemic 
implications of the problem (Cohen et al. 1998). Developed countries have propagated this 
more technical framing and sought to emphasise their greater financial and technical 
capabilities, while avoiding extensive discussion of what levels and forms of financial 
transfers would result from comprehensive fulfilment of their moral responsibilities 
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(Bodansky 1993, pp. 502–503, 2001, Okereke 2009). In general, the Northern perspective has 
prioritised the “effectiveness” of governance processes and institutions, thereby minimising 
attention given to Southern development priorities and perpetuating the North-South 
division and developing countries’ perception of exclusion from global governance (Najam 
2005). 
The longevity and depth of North-South divisions within climate finance 
negotiations have led scholars to highlight links between the systemic inequalities that are 
so central to the climate change problem and the extent to which climate policy can reinforce 
or simply fail to address inequalities at both the global and the local levels (Lemos and Boyd 
2010), and illuminate the ways in which developed and developing countries’ approaches to 
policy discussions are likely to be affected by their worldviews and experience of these 
systemic inequalities (Parks & Roberts 2010). However, the ways in which these inequalities 
and differing perspectives have become part of institutional rule structures over time and 
contributed to the justice and politics of UNFCCC policy outcomes has not yet been studied 
systematically. As a broader trend of fragmentation amongst the Southern coalition in 
climate negotiations continues, this thesis can illuminate the evolving, or sustained, nature 
of Southern coalition within finance negotiations more specifically, adding to broader 
understanding of this aspect of climate politics. 
2.3 Development of climate finance policy and key 
 controversies 
Climate finance is a key part of the UNFCCC’s governance remit and a policy area where 
North-South dynamics are highly visible; ‘fights over provisions on finance within the 
international climate regime have always threatened to ‘break’ the outcome of the 
negotiations as a whole’ (Obergassel et al. 2015, p. 257). Since the very concept of North-
South flows of climate finance is based on principles of justice, the creation and 
implementation of policy necessarily involves debate and disagreement over how such 
principles should be interpreted and reflected. A deeper understanding of the place of 
climate finance at the heart of both the justice and politics of climate governance requires 
mapping of the key dimensions of controversy that have characterised the development of 
climate finance policy. Building on the justice issues and inequalities discussed in the 
previous section, this section will explore the broad landscape of funding for responses to 
climate change, explaining levels and forms of finance and how it is measured, the origins 
of the UNFCCC system in the more established and strongly-criticised development 
assistance system, and the key justice-related contestations within climate finance that have 
become threads within UNFCCC policy process. 
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2.3.1  Origins and structure of the UNFCCC and its policy process 
Building a picture of the climate finance policy process and its controversies requires an 
understanding of how the UNFCCC originated and the form it takes, and an understanding 
of climate governance as a focal point where the aims of and action on environmental 
protection and sustainable development met and, for many, came into conflict. It is from 
this nexus that climate finance policy commenced. A broad and complex landscape of 
climate governance has evolved all over the world at multiple scales in the 27 years since the 
UNFCCC was created (Adger 2001, Bulkeley and Newell 2015), but it remains at the centre 
of global climate governance (Lövbrand et al. 2017, Jordan et al. 2018), with its policies 
shaping the rules and objectives of the climate governance system as a whole (van Asselt and 
Zelli 2018). The UNFCCC’s creation followed a period of developing scientific consensus 
and understanding about the implications of climate change, within a broader landscape of 
increasing political attention to global environmental problems through the 1970s and 80s, 
stimulating initiation of a multilateral response (Bridgewater and Bridgewater 2005, 
Vanderheiden 2008, chap. 1, Gupta 2010, Harris 2013, chap. 1). Following a treaty on the 
ozone layer, the global climate governance regime was initiated at the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 alongside the UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Statement of Forest Principles. 
The UNFCCC as a governance institution consists of a framework treaty, which 
created a forum for bringing countries together to discuss and agree how to deal with the 
climate change problem, leading to production of subsequent “protocols” that contained 
policy and commitments to stimulate action in member countries (Parties). The convention-
protocol approach was used for the Vienna Convention on the ozone layer and subsequent 
Montreal Protocol of 1987, which was (and remains) seen as a particularly successful 
example of multilateral co-operation to deal with a global environmental problem, so it 
consequently influenced this choice of legal structure for climate change governance 
(Oberthür 2001, Ostrom 2008, Hale et al. 2013, p. 254). The treaty-based format of the 
UNFCCC means its policy process centres upon a negotiating forum where all Parties 
engage with each other; scholars have argued that the consensus-based format of this forum, 
which was pushed by developing countries in the interests of maximising their participation 
in the governance process, does provide less influential countries with a means to make their 
voices heard (Okereke 2018), but others have pointed out that this format can be both 
ineffective and unjust (Vogel 2014, p. 20) and means that ‘decisions thus reflect the will of 
the laggards’ (Kuyper et al. 2018, p. 345). 
Increasing political attention to environmental problems coincided with increasing 
attention to the relationship between human progress and the environment, which 
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contributed to emergence of the concept of sustainable development to encapsulate the 
need to consider the environment and future generations in management of the planet 
(Bodansky and Rajamani 2018). Sustainable development was intended to balance the 
different priorities of richer and poorer nations towards environmental protection and 
economic growth, while giving attention to the needs of future generations and the financial 
implications (Clark 1989). This was accompanied by calls to consider how institutions can 
centralise and coordinate the international response to global ecological issues by 
generating sufficient finance and changing behaviour in the context of fostering sustainable 
development (Brundtland 1989, Ruckelshaus 1989). The need for action by developing 
countries to reduce their vulnerability to the effects of climate change and increase their 
ability to recover, comes in addition to significant existing needs to reduce poverty, increase 
education and healthcare provision, and generally improve standards of living and life 
expectancy (Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai 2014). As a result, climate finance is required 
to allow developing countries to increase their resilience to climate change while at the same 
time pursuing low-carbon development (Okereke 2014). Different perspectives on 
sustainable development and environmental protection, largely with a North-South split, 
were prominent from the outset of negotiations leading up to creation of the UNFCCC 
(Davidson 1992, Dasgupta 1994, Hyder 1994, Rahman and Roncerel 1994) and developing 
countries integrated requests for “new and additional” financial resources into the policy 
positions they formulated from the earliest stages of negotiations over the institutional 
creation process (Goldemberg 1994, p. 176). 
2.3.2  Climate finance and the history of development assistance 
Planning, prioritising and funding action on climate change adaptation and mitigation in 
developing countries has developed as part of wider and ongoing discussions about 
achieving efficient, effective and equitable allocation of development assistance (Haites 
2011), so the climate finance policy process should not be viewed in isolation but instead as 
a product of and influenced by the development assistance system. Development in the 
Global South has been a field of research, policy and action since the 1950s, extending 
successful post-war reconstruction in Europe to ambitions to advance industrialisation in 
poor countries (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007a), underpinned by ethical arguments 
about philanthropy and responding to poverty and other inequalities of wealth, health and 
quality of life (e.g. Singer, 1972). However, development assistance has always had other 
purposes and objectives mixed in with “noble” intentions to facilitate the economic 
convergence of wealthier and poorer nations, such as continuation of influence in former 
colonies, the “race for influence” in the South that formed part of Cold War geopolitics, and 
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counteracting the most severe humanitarian consequences of structural adjustment policies 
imposed by donor-dominated global financial institutions (Severino and Ray 2009). 
While aid transfers exceed US$1 trillion since the 1940s and are widely perceived as 
constructive and successful in improving many areas such as child mortality, access to clean 
water, disease control, agricultural productivity and infrastructure construction (Therien and 
Lloyd 2000), recipient countries have long criticised the development sector from 
operational, conceptual and political perspectives. Development assistance is associated 
with debt crises in developing countries, imposition of “structural adjustment” and other 
top-down fiscal policies by donor countries and organisations, and a continued lack of 
success in bringing about sustained and sustainable growth across the Global South 
(Easterly 2007). Donors have always been concerned with ‘criteria for the allocation of aid 
among recipients, and the means for controlling its use’ (Chenery and Strout 1966, p. 726), 
and it is widely known that the North and other more recently-industrialised Asian 
countries did not achieve development through the policies and institutions that donors 
have consistently advocated or insisted upon (Chang 2003).  
This problematic history has fostered Southern distrust of Northern governments 
and institutions, with perceptions present long before the UNFCCC that the global system 
prevents rather than facilitates Southern development and that developed countries would 
use climate change to divert funding from development, the primary concern of developing 
countries, towards environmental protection (Nitze 1994, p. 196). The close connections 
between UNFCCC climate finance and the established network of international 
development institutions, with their historic reputation for dominance by more powerful 
developed countries and a lack of communication and co-operation when designing and 
implementing development policy, are a point of concern for many NGOs and developing 
countries in receipt of climate finance (Bird et al. 2011, Pashley 2015). Some scholars argue 
that climate finance perpetuates the current unequal development paradigm, allowing 
developed countries to preserve Southern resources to use for Northern consumption and 
bolstering neoliberal notions of human control over the environment (Mcmichael 2009). 
2.3.3  The finance gap 
While both the scientific and normative bases of climate finance calculations remain open 
to debate, it is clear that the need for finance in developing countries runs to hundreds of 
billions of dollars per year (see Section 2.2.1 above). In the context of these requirements, the 
amounts of finance pledged and delivered by developed countries within the UNFCCC have 
been a key area of contestation within the policy process, once again along North-South or 
contributor-recipient lines. Reported public climate finance flows from developed to 
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developing countries averaged only an estimated US$41 billion per year in 2013-14, 
although such estimates always come with the caveat that aggregated sums may not be 
accurate due to the difficulty of avoiding double-counting (UNFCCC Standing Committee 
on Finance 2016, p. 60). The difference between the funding flows in evidence and the levels 
required by developing countries has come to be known as the “finance gap” (Flåm and 
Skjærseth 2009, UNEP 2016). Overall, the broad landscape of climate finance has been 
assessed as inadequate to meet the goals of keeping global temperature rise under 2°C 
(UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance 2014, para. 173), and climate finance remains 
far below levels necessary to reassure developing countries that developed countries will 
fulfil the commitments they have made, let alone that developing countries’ needs will be 
met (Pickering, Jotzo, et al. 2015). Developing countries perceive developed countries as 
having repeatedly failed to live up to their past commitments on provision of development 
assistance, with funding promises reduced or conditions added; this behaviour has 
generated a lack of trust, leaving developing countries doubting that developed countries 
will behave differently with climate change finance (Ghosh and Woods 2009). 
Within the policy process, no quantified finance targets were adopted in the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997, even as clear emissions targets were adopted, and it simply reiterated 
expectations of financial transfers and incremental costs included in the Convention. 
Although climate finance remained at the heart of negotiations each year, it was not until 
the milestone COP-15 at Copenhagen in 2009 that clear pledges on levels of finance were 
agreed. The Copenhagen Accord (decision 1/CP.15, paragraph 8) committed developed 
countries to providing US$30bn of “Fast Start Finance” in the 2010-2012 period, balanced 
between mitigation and adaptation, and to ‘a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion 
dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.’ These concrete figures 
were widely seen as a significant step forward for climate finance (Prys and Wojczewski 
2015), even as the COP itself failed to live up to extremely high expectations and was derided 
as a political failure (Bodansky 2010, Dimitrov 2010, Carter et al. 2011). The Paris Agreement 
(decision 1/CP.21, Annex) completed at COP-21 cemented a new post-2020 climate 
governance regime, founded on agreement in the Copenhagen Accord that all countries 
would be engaged in mitigation and adaptation action and moving past the strict North-
South differentiation of expectation from the Kyoto Protocol (Falkner et al. 2010, Okereke 
and Coventry 2016). Under this new regime, each country submits a voluntary Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC), setting out commitments according to their chosen form, 
baselines and timelines. The NDC system has little to ensure that finance pledges will be 
sufficient to meet the needs of developing countries, match any view of equity, let alone a 
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Southern perspective, or actually be delivered (Hedger and Nakhooda 2015, Kharas 2015, 
UNEP 2015, Ellis and Moarif 2016, Peake and Ekins 2017). 
2.3.4  Finance sources 
In examining the finance gap and potential methods or mechanisms for overcoming it, 
several scholars (Fankhauser et al. 2016, Bowen et al. 2017) report the limitations associated 
with public or governmental sources. In order to understand the significance of this, it is 
necessary to outline the landscape of funding sources and channels. Bilateral public 
funding involves financial transfers directly from one government to another or distributed 
directly to projects by state development/aid agencies. Multilateral public funding involves 
governments transferring money to multilateral development banks (MDBs) and dedicated 
climate change-specific funds, which go on to make distribution decisions themselves. 
MDBs and bilateral finance institutions (development banks set up by single nations) 
account for the majority of public climate finance flows, with bilateral flows for both 
mitigation and adaptation reaching US$23bn and multilateral flows through MDBs over 
US$14bn in 2013 (Buchner et al. 2015). In comparison, the OECD (2015) reports that the GEF, 
the Adaptation Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the main funds within 
the UNFCCC system at the time, distributed around US$1bn in 2013, giving a clear 
indication of the smaller scale of flows within the UNFCCC system. The UNFCCC policy 
process must be considered in the context of the broader climate finance system dominated 
by MDBs and bilateral agencies that have a reputation for being donor-dominated, 
ineffective in distribution of funds, and lacking transparency and representation from 
recipient countries in their governance and operation (Tan 2008, Lemos and Boyd 2010, p. 
103), but the mechanisms whereby these influences shape institutional development and 
the UNFCCC policy process have not been studied in depth. 
Private sources of finance involve flows that do not originate from governments or 
state agencies. There are vast asset reserves held all over the world, which can be channelled 
into investments or MDBs by businesses and portfolio investors such as pension funds. 
Many developing countries and NGOs focus on public sources of finance as the only means 
for developed countries to meet obligations to account for their historical responsibility and 
meet demands for climate justice (Knoke and Duwe 2012, p. 23). However, public finance 
accounts for a decreasing proportion of overall climate finance flows while private sources 
are increasing (Buchner et al. 2017) and there is considerable discussion of the further 
growth potential of private climate finance (Reyes 2012, Frisari et al. 2013, Stadelmann et al. 
2013, Pauw et al. 2015, Cseh 2019). Across the climate finance sector, the increasing drive to 
harness private sources is often associated with leveraging co-benefits that involve some 
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involvement of public bodies and/or money alongside private investments (Reyes 2012, 
Bulkeley and Newell 2015, pp. 55–56). In the absence of an agreed definition of or criteria 
for UNFCCC climate finance, developed countries have embraced private sources as part of 
articulating their commitments to provide climate finance within the UNFCCC policy 
process (Stadelmann et al. 2013). Developed countries are increasingly highlighting 
“realistic” limits to public finance from developed country governments, and the associated 
push towards expanding the investment opportunities available to and taken up by private 
and institutional investors has become a prevailing trend both within the UNFCCC policy 
process and across the broader climate finance landscape (Persson 2011, p. 4, Buchner et al. 
2017).  
This trend may reflect political and financial realities, but it highlights the challenge 
of using climate finance as a tool for furthering international justice (Barrett 2013b); private 
finance raises questions about the fairness of who provides the finance, how benefits are 
distributed and how decisions are made (Keenan et al. 2019, p. 3). Private sources of climate 
finance are associated with a perspective that prioritises amounts over the fulfilment of 
moral obligations, and the primary role of profit in private climate finance makes it 
controversial to the many developing countries and NGOs who consider that climate finance 
should primarily be driven by public finance in order to meet the restitutive justice 
obligations generated by historical responsibility for climate change (Müller 2008a, Pauw et 
al. 2015, Weikmans and Roberts 2016). A Southern perspective seeking to prioritise and meet 
the needs of the most vulnerable nations and communities may be wary of finance with 
profit generation as its core function (Richardson 2009, p. 616, Pereira et al. 2013), 
particularly since private finance has been criticised ‘for unclear accountability 
mechanisms, opportunities for elite capture, and limited capacities to provide consistent 
and sustained funding flows over time’ (Keenan et al. 2019, p. 2). These contrasting 
perspectives on finance sources and justice, and developing countries’ experience of 
operational inequalities and unequal North-South/donor-recipient relationships and 
power, are brought by states into negotiations (Roberts 2009), but the mechanisms whereby 
UNFCCC institutional design and development has reinforced the inequalities or overcome 
them is not yet understood. 
2.3.5  Defining and tracking climate finance 
With the finance gap a product of contrasting North-South perspectives on what levels of 
climate finance are necessary and possible, it is natural that establishing exactly how much 
climate finance is flowing from the global North to the South should be of concern to both 
Northern and Southern countries, albeit from different perspectives. This is easier said than 
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done, however, and central to the challenge is the difficulty of deciding exactly what climate 
finance is. At the most basic level, ‘a flow of climate finance should reduce emissions or 
strengthen adaptive capacity and resilience’ (Bodnar et al. 2015, p. 5). It is necessary to move 
beyond this and find a more detailed definition of climate finance for use in an operational 
context because climate finance must be tracked and measured so donors, recipients and 
other governance and civil society stakeholders can manage what types of and how much 
climate finance should be and are already flowing, and so those that pledge funding can be 
held to account (Stadelmann et al. 2011). 
The UNFCCC is in a central position from which to oversee funding flows and, in 
theory, has the authority to require the provision of information, sufficient standing to 
publish accurate findings, and the ability to reproach those determined to have provided 
insufficient finance. However, a definition of climate finance has never been agreed within 
UNFCCC policy (Gomez-Echeverri 2013, p. 635, Pickering, Jotzo, et al. 2015, p. 41) so 
monitoring and accountability of this nature, based the question of how to define climate 
finance, is a central and unresolved area of contestation within UNFCCC climate finance 
(Lombo et al. 2016, Gupta and van Asselt 2019) that has ‘contributed to a continuous erosion 
of trust between Parties in international climate negotiations’ (Weikmans and Roberts 2019, 
p. 97). Definitions that underpin climate finance play an important role in determining in 
whose interests policy concerning such monitoring and accountability functions is formed, 
and how UNFCCC finance policy engages with broader questions of justice.  
Climate finance can include finance obtained from public sources, i.e. national 
budgets, from private funds or investments, and from collaborations between public sector 
and private funds (Buchner, Falconer, et al. 2011, p. 1). These categories can be further broken 
down into many sub-categories covering a diverse range of contributors (Gomez-Echeverri 
2013). In addition, climate finance can be delivered in different ways; funds can be provided 
as grants without expectation of repayment, or as loans with various repayment 
requirements. Recipients would expected loans to be offered on terms more favourable for 
them than commercial loans, but the degree of “concessionality” varies and is the subject of 
considerable debate, as is the question of whether loans of any type are appropriate when 
climate finance is viewed from the perspective of restitutive justice (Baudienville 2009). 
Accounting differences are also relevant, since funding only the additional costs over and 
above business-as-usual spending (incremental costs) will lead to different amounts being 
counted than when the total costs of projects is included (Olbrisch et al. 2011). Funding 
objectives are also important, with debate over whether any spending that has meaningful 
co-benefits for climate change should be considered valid, or only finance explicitly 
targeting climate change (Bodnar et al. 2015). 
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Seeking to determine which parts of the increasingly diverse landscape of climate 
finance should be included in UNFCCC policy highlights the differing perspectives on the 
role and nature of climate finance taken by developed and developing countries; the 
relationship between these perspectives, the behaviour of countries in the policy process, 
and the outcomes produced by climate finance policy process is not yet clear. Many in the 
Global South argue that climate finance is, implicitly or explicitly, compensation for causing 
the climate change problem, invoking historical responsibility and the perception that 
finance is an obligatory part of rectifying the damage developed countries have caused 
(Williams 2005, Grasso 2011). From this perspective, climate finance flows must be judged 
on whether they can be considered to constitute part of the restorative acts expected by 
developing countries (Schalatek 2012). Alternatively, if climate finance is a voluntary or 
altruistic gesture of support for less wealthy countries rather than a response to specific 
obligations generated by historical responsibility for climate change, the overall sums 
transferred are more significant than the source, motivation and concessionality of climate 
finance. The justice implications of this complex policy area have not been resolved within 
the UNFCCC and considerable contestation remains surrounding the role and expectations 
of different types, sources and delivery mechanisms of climate finance in meeting developed 
countries’ climate finance responsibilities (Pauw 2017). 
2.3.6  Additionality 
From the outset of climate governance, developing countries have raised concerns about 
whether flows labelled or presented as climate finance are additional to existing 
development assistance, Official Development Assistance (ODA – development assistance 
reported within the OECD system), foreign direct investment, and other North-South 
funding that would occur without the presence of climate change (Stadelmann et al. 2011). 
This debate is encapsulated in the term “additionality”, which is seen by developing 
countries as a conceptual safeguard to provide assurance that redistribution of wealth from 
the Global North to South as part of the global response to climate change should play a net 
positive role in the pursuit of global justice and wider poverty reduction and development 
goals (Halimanjaya 2015). The differentiation between ODA and climate finance is not 
straightforward, because there is great potential for overlap between climate change and 
development objectives and they are not mutually exclusive in terms of projects and 
initiatives that receive funding (Klein et al. 2007). Lack of clear rules and policy to govern 
additionality has led to a resulting lack of trust between developing countries and developed 
countries over funding commitments, which has remained a consistent part of the UNFCCC 
climate finance policy process (Roberts et al. 2010, Stadelmann et al. 2010). 
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The connection between climate finance and development assistance is increasingly 
significant as consensus grows that actual and potential impacts of climate change must be 
integrated systematically into development activity (Adger et al. 2003, Birkmann and von 
Teichman 2010, Carrapatoso and Kürzinger 2014); many scholars argue in favour of 
“climate-resilient development” and “mainstreaming” climate change into development 
policy at the local (Beg et al. 2002, Swart et al. 2003, Klein 2010, Castán Broto et al. 2015) and 
global levels (Cohen et al. 1998, Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007b, 2007a, Ngwadla 2013, 
Klinsky and Winkler 2014). The connection between development and climate change 
adaptation means adaptation is often the focus for this integration (Huq et al. 2005, Ayers 
and Dodman 2010, Rogers 2010, Ensor 2011, Smith et al. 2011, Nagoda 2015). In this 
complex policy environment, the overlap between and momentum towards integration of 
development and climate change planning means that a set of rules or guidelines for how 
to navigate determination and monitoring of additionality, as well as baseline figures from 
which to calculate subsequent finance flows, are increasingly important for evaluating the 
benefits developing countries receive from climate finance and whether it meets their needs 
(Deutschke and Michaelowa 2006, WRI 2010). 
Reallocating existing ODA to climate finance can mean that overall levels of 
redistributive funding decrease or that climate finance commitments involve a reduction in 
ODA (Roberts and Weikmans 2017). Reallocation of funds can also affect patterns of receipt, 
because in the search for emissions reductions, finance that might have gone to the poorest 
countries can instead be given to larger, more industrialised developing countries with more 
straightforward and/or larger-scale projects available (Halimanjaya 2015). However, the 
OECD’s ODA system, which tracks much of the development assistance provided by 
developed countries, allows ODA funding flows to be labelled as climate finance where the 
projects have a climate change-related component or benefit (OECD-DAC 2011), with 
guidelines for use of the markers but no precise methodology to ensure accuracy and 
consistency (OECD 2011). This means that the donor countries’ own reporting system mixes 
development and climate change funding and prevents rather than facilitates transparency 
and verifiability (Schalatek 2010). Many developing countries reject the inclusion of climate 
finance in ODA reporting, arguing that since climate finance represents developed nations 
fulfilling moral or treaty obligations it should be categorised separately to development and 
other redistributive finance (Stadelmann et al. 2010, p. 4).  
An important component in the additionality debate comes from the broader history 
of development funding, where a target for minimum development assistance contributions 
of 0.7% of developed countries’ gross national income (GNI, more recently gross domestic 
product (GDP) is used) annually has been articulated by the UN General Assembly several 
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times since 1970, and reiterated in several subsequent meetings and treaties and as part of 
the Millennium Development Goals (WRI 2010). This target has gained considerable 
prominence among campaigners and NGOs, and developing countries see it as essential 
from both moral and practical perspectives (Eyckmans et al. 2013). However, Clemens and 
Moss (2009) argue that the 0.7% target constitutes a relatively arbitrary compromise based 
on what was considered politically feasible, that it bears little relation to a modern 
understanding of the global economy or the development process, and that it bases aid 
targets on the size of developed country economies rather than the needs and circumstances 
of recipient countries. Furthermore, developed countries have always remained in control of 
their own development assistance contributions, and none actually committed themselves 
to the 0.7% target until 2005, and even this was only offered by a small number of European 
governments as successive US administrations remained “averse” to such targets (Clemens 
and Moss 2009). The 0.7% target remains largely unfulfilled (Ayers and Huq 2009, Van Bilzen 
2015). 
Despite the many problems with the 0.7% target, it is commonly understood as a 
basis for additionality (Schalatek 2010, p. 6) and developing countries argue frequently in 
the UNFCCC policy process that only climate finance above the target should count as 
additional (Brown et al. 2010), but most developed countries consider this too difficult to 
meet since they do not currently reach the 0.7% commitment (Tirpak et al. 2010). Although 
guidelines are evidently needed, agreement has never been reached amongst the donor 
community within or beyond the UNFCCC, let alone amongst both developed and 
developing countries, on definitions or criteria to determine when funds are additional, and 
against what baseline additionality should be judged (Ballesteros et al. 2010, Weikmans and 
Roberts 2019). There remains little guidance and regulation to govern how climate finance 
should be differentiated from general ODA, with no firewalls in place to ensure that existing 
levels of ODA are preserved, and that all North-South climate finance constitutes additional 
transfer of wealth (Brown et al. 2012). This ongoing situation is clearly in line with a 
Northern-focused conception of justice in climate finance, highlighting the voluntary 
nature of contributions where donors control finance flows and seek to avoid definite moral 
obligations deriving from historical responsibility for climate change.  
2.3.7  Funds and mechanisms 
The various funds and mechanisms within the UNFCCC climate finance system are referred 
to as the financial mechanism, which was initiated in the Convention. The number and 
design of these funds and mechanisms, their governance and operations and the levels of 
finance they deliver have been the subject of ongoing and vociferous contestation in the 
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policy process. The most recent fund, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), is intended to deal with 
the majority of UNFCCC climate finance from now on, but the operation and oversight of 
the financial mechanism and its component funds remains greatly disputed within 
negotiations. Various scholars have reviewed the UNFCCC funds and the financial 
mechanism as a whole, arguing that various aspects of its governance, structure, operations 
and accountability must be improved to be both effective and equitable (Möhner and Klein 
2007, Müller and Gomez-Echeverri 2009, Gomez-Echeverri 2010, Afful-Koomson 2015). 
Despite the ongoing contestation within negotiations and criticism from without, and the 
significance of the financial mechanism’s structure and operation to any assessment of the 
justice and effectiveness of the UNFCCC system, there has not been a systematic 
investigation of the development of the financial mechanism and the impact of layers of 
policy and other institutional factors over time on how its funds have been created and 
overseen.  
Reinforcing the relevance of prior histories and systems of development assistance, 
operation of the financial mechanism was initially entrusted to the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), an existing fund set up in 1990 by the World Bank at the instigation of donor 
countries, with a remit covering a wide range of environmental problems (Young 2002b). 
Even from its earliest operations, developing countries raised concerns about donor 
dominance of the World Bank, potential conflicts of interest associated with the World 
Bank’s role as GEF manager, and concerns that the GEF was beyond COP control and 
oversight (MacIlwain 1993, Fairman 1994, Gupta 1997, Vogler 2016). Concerns continued 
about the accountability of the GEF and the ‘business-like’ approach and ‘economistic vision 
of development’ used by the World Bank (Young 2002b, pp. 6–8, Gomez-Echeverri and Müller 
2009), in line with developed country preferences and the prevailing neoliberal economic 
system. Concerns have also been raised about inadequate levels of adaptation funding and 
delivering disproportionate funding to countries with lower rates of poverty (Huq 2002, 
Möhner and Klein 2007, Mitchell et al. 2008). 
Linking back to the nexus of sustainable development and environmental protection 
that was a core component of the North-South division that characterised the origins of 
climate governance (see 2.3.1 above), the GEF created a distinction between global and local 
benefits from climate change action, which led to a prioritisation of funding for mitigation 
actions rather than adaptation, with the former of more priority to developed countries and 
the latter to developing countries, as well as obscuring the responsibility held by developed 
countries to fund both areas (Gupta 1997, p. 101). Developing countries’ interaction with the 
GEF proved difficult: ‘institutional relations among implementing agencies and 
Participants have been vague and fluid during the pilot phase; lines of accountability have 
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been imprecise; and investment criteria have been difficult to understand’ (Reed 1993, p. 
201). Since then, COP oversight and guidance has struggled to deal with complaints that ‘a 
genuine barrier to the operationalization of GEF projects is the long and complex procedure 
that has to be gone through before a project concept can reach the implementation stage’ 
and that the GEF has inadequately scrutinised its operations (Ravindranath and Sathaye 
2002, p. 189).  
Despite the numerous and varied concerns raised by developing countries about the 
functions and governance of the GEF, it was given operational control of two new funds 
created at COP-7 in Marrakesh in 2001. The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and Least 
Developed Countries Fund (LDC Fund) were both given adaptation-focused remits, in line 
with developing country pressure (Ciplet et al. 2013). However, in practice the SCCF and LDC 
Fund have remained subject to accusations of donor dominance over their design and 
operation, echoing concerns about the GEF itself (Mace 2005, Tanner and Horn-
Phathanothai 2014). For example, GEF methods to determine the proportion of project costs 
that the LDCF and SCCF would fund (the incremental costs) led to larger projects receiving 
a greater share of funding support, and the potential for developing countries to have to act 
strategically to maximise funding (Möhner and Klein 2007, p. 15). Contributions to both 
funds are voluntary and its funding has remained significantly lower than would have been 
necessary to meet the needs of developing countries (OECD 2011, UNFCCC 2016). 
The Kyoto Protocol was the first protocol to be agreed under the UNFCCC framework 
in 1997. Developed countries sought various mechanisms that would allow flexibility in 
meeting their emissions reduction commitments (Bodansky 2001); of these flexible 
mechanisms, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is relevant to climate finance 
because it has created a flow of funds into developing countries for climate change 
mitigation projects. The CDM works with credits, known as “certified emissions reductions”, 
which are generated by the creation of emissions reduction projects in developing countries 
and, once certified by an accrediting body, can be sold to developed countries for offsetting 
their emissions reductions obligations. The CDM has proven to be a consistently 
controversial scheme, however, with numerous studies arguing its governance has been 
ineffective and inequitable and the geographic distribution of its funded projects is uneven 
(Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007b, Wara 2007, Okubo and Michaelowa 2010). 
Furthermore, CDM outcomes vary depending on the extent to which projects include 
community preferences and address capacity building needs (Mustalahti et al. 2012), and its 
projects have been accused of reinforcing local inequalities (Newell and Bumpus 2012). 
Overall, the CDM is widely seen as failing to deliver benefits to the poorest and most 
vulnerable and to facilitate sustainable development more broadly (Olsen 2007, Boyd et al. 
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2009), and the additionality of its funding over ODA is uncertain (Deutschke and 
Michaelowa 2006). 
The Kyoto Protocol also created the Adaptation Fund. Initially placed under GEF 
oversight, the Adaptation Fund was only operationalised after the Kyoto Protocol came into 
force in 2005 and, in a notable departure from prior UNFCCC’s other funds, has its own 
management board with representation from all regions, the LDCs and Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS), thereby avoiding many of the governance issues associated with 
the GEF (Ayers and Huq 2009). The fund is primarily funded through a 2% levy on emissions 
reduction credits issued to CDM projects, giving it a non-discretionary source of funds, 
again in contrast to the voluntary GEF, LDCF and SCCF (Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai 
2014). The Adaptation Fund has pioneered more direct access to its funding, which allows 
qualified institutions within a recipient country, such as finance ministries, to deal directly 
with the Adaptation Fund rather than needing to go through an international organisation 
such as an MDB, with high administrative costs (Müller 2013, Yamineva and Kulovesi 2013). 
Bound up with efforts to close the finance gap, developing countries have made vocal calls 
for direct access to climate finance as a means to get around problems familiar from 
development funding and gain greater control over obtaining and distributing climate 
finance (Brown, Bird, et al. 2010, Harmeling and Kaloga 2011). In contrast to the 
controversial CDM, the Adaptation Fund has had the most positive reaction of the various 
UNFCCC funds, with commentators suggesting its innovative governance implies greater 
integration of justice principles and developing country preferences (Grasso 2011). Others 
have suggested that the fund can be regarded as a model for international adaptation 
financing (Horstmann and Abeysinghe 2011, p. 416), although, as ever, the justice and 
effectiveness of the fund’s operations have not been without room for improvement (Persson 
and Remling 2014, Remling and Persson 2015). 
The US$100bn pledge at COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 was made alongside the 
creation of a new multilateral fund to “mobilise” and distribute the funding. After early 
promise of an equitable operationalisation process with representation from developed and 
developing countries and NGOs, discussions became dominated by political disagreement 
and by divergent visions of the identity and focus of the new fund (Prys and Wojczewski 
2015). Principles of CBDR and historical responsibility were sidelined and a proposed no-
objection clause, which would have given groups adversely affected by potential GCF-funded 
projects a voice within the organisation, was moved out of the GCF governing body (Bracking 
2015, Vanderheiden 2015). Northern perspectives dominated the creation of operational 
rules concerning private sector and other sources of climate finance, funding of full or 
incremental costs, distribution of funding, and the appropriate use of loans rather than 
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grants to deliver climate finance (Bird et al. 2011, Klein and Möhner 2011, Yamineva and 
Kulovesi 2013). Other scholars have pointed out that a lack of definitions for “climate 
finance” and “private finance” remains an obstacle to constructive agreement within the 
GCF’s governing body (Fridahl and Linnér 2016).  
2.4 Conclusion 
Responding to climate change is sure to entail enormous financial costs, and there are 
myriad normative, political and practical challenges involved in generating and distributing 
such large sums of money. This chapter has shown that questions over distribution of these 
financial burdens and governance of finance flows are central to the injustice of the climate 
change problem itself, and the policy questions that the climate governance regime has 
engaged with since its inception. The North-South rift that has been a consistent feature of 
climate finance negotiations echoes the roots of climate injustices in historical North-South 
economic and political relationships and inequalities. Developing countries have 
demonstrated a common drive for increased finance and the recognition of developed 
countries’ historical responsibilities within finance policy, but developed countries have 
pushed back and sought to limit such normative claims and their associated financial 
liabilities. Some international political economy and international relations scholars have 
explored the role of justice perspectives and debates within climate change politics, 
particularly in terms of North-South power dynamics and the role of equity as a factor in 
facilitating political agreement. However, few have engaged systematically with climate 
finance and with the development of institutional structures over time as a factor connecting 
justice and political activity and outcomes. 
Rather than a systematic needs- or recipient-focused system integrating with 
sustainable development aims and programmes, the UNFCCC climate finance system has 
incorporated many of the features and institutions of development assistance that recipient 
countries, NGOs and others strongly criticise as favouring donor countries’ interests and 
perceptions of justice. UNFCCC policy has also remained inadequate to generate and deliver 
quantities of climate finance in forms and with conditions that match the needs articulated 
by developing countries and reflect their conception of justice (Ciplet et al. 2013). Although 
some scholars have made reference to donor influence and linked North-South policy 
contestation to longstanding issues from the development sector and broader political 
systems, the ways that these existing issues and power dynamics became such a core feature 
of the climate finance policy process and the reasons that these influences have been so 
persistent over time have not been studied systematically through the course of the 
UNFCCC’s development. Sharma (2017) has argued recently that the lack of clarity on 
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definitions, requirements and expectations of climate finance, additionality, conditionality 
and sources is likely to persist in the new regime cemented by the 2015 Paris Agreement. 
The influence of institutional factors on the climate finance policy process and the justice 
of its outcomes remains a live issue and one where a historical perspective can add fresh 
and valuable insight as the climate governance regime continues to evolve. The next chapter 
will introduce and explore this historical perspective.  
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3. Historical institutionalism theory and 
application 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 showed that climate finance is central to understanding both climate justice and 
the ongoing political disagreement along North-South lines that has characterised climate 
governance since its initiation. There is considerable evidence of the broader development 
assistance system leaving a strong legacy within the UNFCCC policy process and its finance 
mechanism, UNFCCC policy has not closed the finance gap that has persisted in the face of 
growing understanding of the levels and urgency of climate finance required to meet 
developing countries’ needs, and the governance process has failed to facilitate resolution 
of contested issues within climate finance that are central to developing countries achieving 
climate justice as they perceive and define it. These factors all point to the significance of 
the design and development of the UNFCCC and its policy process when considering the 
justice and adequacy of global climate finance governance, something hinted at by climate 
governance scholars suggesting that global climate policy is constrained ‘by the path 
dependency of prior decisions’ (Adger et al. 2011, p. 759). However, the mechanisms by which 
institutional design and layers of policy within the UNFCCC institution reinforce (or reduce) 
power inequalities and development-related paradigms, and the nature and extent of these 
influences, have not been systematically examined within climate politics and justice 
literatures. 
In the context of this gap in literature and the research challenge it highlights, 
showing how historical institutionalism can facilitate a thorough and informative 
examination of institutional factors in UNFCCC climate finance requires an understanding 
of how scholars have previously addressed global environmental governance institutions. 
The considerable scholarship in this area stems from the complexity and global or cross-
border nature of many forms of environmental change and problems, which makes them 
impossible to address properly without involving multiple countries (Young 1990). Historical 
institutionalism can add valuable new insight by capturing a broader range of motivations 
than rationalist and constructivist approaches to international relations and exploring the 
interaction of ideas and material interests within an institutional context, rather than 
separately, combining this with attention to the founding moments of institutions and the 
broader systemic context in which they were formed (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). A historical 
institutionalist approach provides a distinct set of conceptual tools and mechanisms for 
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investigating the complex ways in which change and continuity mix and the dynamics of 
institutional development over time, examining how political authority is reinforced and 
how actors and structures interact (Fioretos 2011, Rixen and Viola 2016).  
This chapter will first set out how political study of international institutions has 
developed, focusing on the key debate between the rationalist and constructivist approaches 
and outlining how scholars have used these approaches, and international political 
economy, to investigate international institutions and global environmental governance. 
The chapter will continue by explaining the origins of historical institutionalism and its 
potential to contribute new insight into how international governance institutions function 
and how institutional founding and development has played a role in shaping interaction 
between countries and the policy outcomes they have negotiated within the UNFCCC 
climate finance policy process. The chapter will then go into greater detail about key 
dimensions and tools involved in using a historical institutionalist approach. Finally, the 
chapter will explain the limited existing uses of historical institutionalism to investigate 
international institutions and environmental governance, to which this thesis will add by 
extending historical institutionalism to the study of a treaty-based institution such as the 
UNFCCC. 
3.2 Overview of institutional research 
To understand the relevance, utility and novelty of a historical institutionalist approach to 
the justice and politics of climate finance and governance, it is first important to understand 
how scholars have studied institutions at the international level and both their key 
contributions and the limitations that historical institutionalism can help to overcome. 
Starting at the very beginning, institutions in the social world are various configurations of 
conventions, norms and rules that guide how humans expect each other to behave. 
Institutions in this expansive sense may be formal or informal, but either way the guidance 
they provide brings a degree of stability to human interaction in different situations or 
communities (Vatn 2015). Political institutions usually give their constituent practices and 
rules a formal, and often legal structure, with defined decision making processes and, often, 
some kind of enforcement mechanism to determine and apply the relevant sanctions 
(Heywood 2000, p. 93). 
The rules, politics and outcomes of international institutions have been studied by 
scholars for generations and from various perspectives. This section will introduce these 
perspectives and debates, exploring neoliberal institutionalist research into how state 
interaction is facilitated by regimes, their effectiveness and interlinkages in an increasingly 
complex and interdependent governance landscape within the anarchic international 
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system, and constructivist research into the role of ideas in shaping institutions and how 
institutional norms guide the behaviour of actors. The section will then outline international 
political economy research focusing on global economic structures and inequalities and 
their influence on uneven power distribution and governance outcomes. By incorporating 
ideas, interests and broader systemic influences, historical institutionalism’s analytical 
framework for studying the role of institutions themselves and their creation, development 
and influence over time, sits aside from and can add fresh insight to neoliberal 
institutionalist analysis of environmental governance regimes in facilitating co-operation 
between states and the constructivist focus on ideas and socialisation of states, and can add 
a new layer to international political economy analysis of how global environmental 
governance fits into broader political and economic systems and inequalities. 
3.2.1  International relations and institutions 
The initial institutional focus of international relations scholars was on formal 
international organisations that were created in the years after World War II, such as the 
UN and IMF, but this subsequently evolved into the study of governance regimes after events 
with OPEC and the US gold standard led many to question the focus on formal institutional 
structures in the 1970s (Martin and Simmons 1998, pp. 736–737). Regimes are a broader 
concept than formal international organisations, constituting norms and rules that affect 
state behaviour, rather than just the task-based bureaucracies of international organisations 
(Young 1994, pp. 3–4). While the term “regime” is still used when referring to a specific 
governance institution, “institution” has become the more common term within 
international relations scholarship (Martin and Simmons 2012, p. 328). Realist (or neo-
realist) scholars were sceptical about institutions as a factor in shaping and constraining co-
operation between states, focusing on states as the key actors in international politics, the 
rational and self-interested basis of their action, and the distribution of power as the causal 
factor in shaping their strategies (Strange 1982, Mearsheimer 1994).  
This rationalist basis for state behaviour was shared by neoliberal institutionalists, 
but they took a more optimistic perspective and sought to explain why states co-operate and 
create institutions within an anarchic political system (Stein 1982, Keohane 1988, p. 381). 
This influential approach emerged within international relations in the 1980s and was 
prominent throughout the latter years of the Twentieth Century (Higgott 2008, p. 616). 
Neoliberal institutionalists initially focused on how mutual interests and building trust 
could facilitate co-operation amongst states as the potential grew for both conflict and co-
operation derived from increasing international economic interdependence (Keohane 1984, 
pp. 5–7). In a widely-cited definition that encapsulates this optimism, Young (1994, p. 15) 
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highlights the role of international institutions as rules of the game that are ‘capable of 
resolving conflicts, facilitating cooperation, or, more generally, alleviating collective-action 
problems in a world of independent actors.’ Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states 
have an interest in using institutions to gain mutual benefit through co-operation, increase 
transparency to reduce the likelihood of defection, and to maximise their access to 
information, thereby overcoming some of the barriers to co-operation that realists highlight 
(Keohane and Nye 2000, Koremenos et al. 2001, Keohane 2002).  
Constructivists, a contrasting branch of international relations theory, see global 
politics differently, focusing on ‘the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument 
in politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or “intersubjective” ideas and 
understandings on social life’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, p. 392). Constructivists 
consider interests in the context of social structures and affected by identity, ideas and 
norms, as opposed to the rational interests assumed by realists and neoliberal 
institutionalists; changing ideas and norms can therefore affect how states conceive of their 
own identities, interests and choices within governance regimes and in relation to problems, 
policy goals and other states (Hopf 1998, Haas 2002). Constructivists consider ideas as 
important as material factors in shaping political interaction, and see institutions and 
global governance regimes as mechanisms for building consensus over problem definition 
and significance, and generating and diffusing ideas and norms that will guide the 
behaviour of states and other actors accordingly (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999, O’Neill 2009, Coleman 2013). 
Although not the first to suggest it, Fioretos (2011) has been influential in arguing 
that historical institutionalism can complement more traditional constructivist and 
rationalist approaches to international relations. Neoliberal institutionalism has moved to 
incorporate rational choice institutionalism, and the constructivist critique of this rational 
approach has incorporated insight from sociological institutionalism, but historical 
institutionalism has remained outside this central debate within international relations 
(Rixen and Viola 2016). Rather than focusing on one of these sides to provide the dominant 
mode of action, historical institutionalism can incorporate power, interests, ideas and 
norms as factors shaping the way that states create institutions to address collective action 
problems, facilitating a cohesive interrogation of the way founding moments shape the 
distribution of power within institutions, how institutions shape which ideas are credible 
and influential, and which options and strategies are available to actors. It is important to 
remember that historical institutionalism cannot be used as a general theory to explain all 
political activity at the international level, since it is clearly focused on institutions, and 
often requires or benefits from other perspectives in seeking to explain the foundational 
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circumstances of new institutions (Zürn 2016). However, historical institutionalism can take 
social scientists beyond assumptions that institutions originate and change to meet 
functional requirements, and assess the consequences of institutions over time as they 
become independent causal forces that affect the political environment (Pierson 2004). 
3.2.2  International relations and environmental governance regimes 
Neoliberal institutionalist scholars began to apply their rationalist perspectives to global 
environmental problems in the 1980s, led initially by Young (1982, 1989, 1990). This school 
has focused on how institutional rules, and the manner in which they build trust and 
stabilise expectations, can help to overcome barriers to intergovernmental co-operation, 
including transaction costs of negotiating complex environmental treaties and enforcing 
compliance, the uncertainty associated with lack of information and imperfect future 
projections of environmental change, and the strategic considerations associated with 
bargaining, varied preferences and access to information (Young 1989, Barrett 1994, 
Frischmann 2003). Emphasis is placed on what kind of regimes are necessary for securing 
co-operation on environmental governance (Victor 1991, Barrett 2003, Dietz et al. 2003) and 
evaluating the effectiveness of the institutions that are built on the co-operation they 
facilitate (Haas et al. 1993, Young 1994, Victor 1998, 2006), echoing the focus of neoliberal 
institutionalism beyond environmental governance (Simmons and Haggard 1987, Levy et al. 
1995). 
Neoliberal institutionalists within international environmental politics have moved 
into a ‘postrealist consensus which holds that international institutions do matter’, but a 
focus remains on demonstrating why institutions matter and establish which kinds of 
regimes are most effective (Zürn 1998, pp. 619–620, Mitchell 2006, Cumberlege 2009), and 
how regimes affect state behaviour and environmental problems (O’Neill 2009, p. 14, 
Breitmeier et al. 2011). Young, for example, sought to move the research agenda on from 
questions of causality, performance and design to more dynamic and innovative study of 
how environmental governance regimes fit together, overlap and operate at multiple scales 
(Young 2002a, pp. 19–20, Mitchell 2013). More recently, scholars have argued that climate 
governance has moved beyond a single institution or regime and now climate change is 
being governed by a transnational network of various types of institutions at multiple scales, 
termed the “regime complex” (Okereke et al. 2009, Keohane and Victor 2011, Abbott 2012, 
2014, Widerberg and Pattberg 2017). 
A core argument of neoliberal institutionalism is that environmental regimes reduce 
transaction costs of state co-operation by ‘relieving parties of the need to return to the 
bargaining table’ every time there is a change to an element of the agreement that underpins 
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the regime, such as new scientific information or a change to the cost of mitigation measures 
(Frischmann 2003). However, this game-theoretic approach seems to overlook the reality of 
multilateral environmental agreements such as the UNFCCC, where the nature of multiple 
negotiations each year means that policy making, and therefore the need for bargaining and 
consensus, is almost continuous, albeit usually at a level below that required for ratification 
by member state governments (Brunnée 2006). Looking beyond neoliberal institutionalist 
theorists, many international relations and global environmental governance scholars have 
made reference to environmental governance regimes based on a forum that brings all 
member countries together on a one-country, one-vote basis (Ervine 2007, Brenton 2013, 
Brunnée and Streck 2013, Ciplet et al. 2015). However, while some scholars have advocated 
design principles or changes to regime structures that can facilitate more effective, fair, 
legitimate and transparent regimes (Lockwood et al. 2010), there remains a gap in 
understanding how institutional rule structures are created by the accumulation of layers of 
policy on top of the institution’s original design, and how this influences state behaviour 
and the realisation of preferences over repeated rounds of bargaining and policy making in 
a one-country-one-vote forum. 
Multilateral environmental agreements often include provisions or mechanisms to 
support the environmental or behaviour change objectives of the regime, including financial 
assistance requirements as well as capacity building and technology transfer programmes 
(Bridgewater and Bridgewater 2005, Falkner and Buzan 2019, p. 140). These kinds of clauses 
have been interpreted by international relations scholars as strategic “side payments”, often 
directed towards developing countries to secure their buy-in to the new governance regime 
and ongoing participation and compliance, in the absence of a hegemonic power that forces 
support (Frischmann 2003, Falkner 2005, Martin and Simmons 2012). However, within the 
UNFCCC, climate finance has developed into a key pillar of the institutional structure that 
is often seen as a linchpin within negotiations, with policy making just as extensive as the 
mitigation and adaptation elements of the regime (Sterk et al. 2011). Some international 
relations scholars have identified finance as a key factor in the disagreement and political 
stalemate that have plagued UNFCCC negotiations as developed countries seek to avoid 
overly-burdensome finance commitments (Falkner et al. 2010, p. 256, Gomez-Echeverri 
2013). Realists have argued that finance is a key material interest of states, and therefore 
central to the power politics within negotiations (Brenton 2013). Others have focused on the 
role of finance in building agreement amongst states necessary to secure a comprehensive 
climate treaty (Streck 2012, p. 54), echoing traditional perceptions of finance as an 
inducement for political participation in a governance regime. 
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As the UNFCCC matures as a governance regime, emphasis within it has moved 
from agreeing on the scope of the climate change problem and the policy options with which 
to respond, to implementation of policies and mechanisms, leading to a renewed 
prominence for finance (Gomez-Echeverri 2013, p. 636) and an opportunity to move beyond 
international relations studies that concentrate on the behavioural aspects of regime 
formation and the logic behind the behaviour of actors within environmental regimes 
(Kütting 2000, p. 5). With over two decades of negotiations to scrutinise and unravel, the time 
is right to examine how the institutional form that forged international co-operation on 
climate change has reinforced power distribution, key ideas and inequalities from prior 
political systems, and has influenced actor behaviour in a policy process that has failed to 
overcome key contestations on finance and remains subject to considerable criticism. 
3.2.3  International political economy and global environmental 
governance 
As climate governance has evolved and become ever more complex, a greater range of 
disciplinary diversity has been evident in analysis of governance systems and structures at 
different scales, and moving beyond international relations’ traditional focus on the state 
(Bulkeley 2010). Scholars using various critical theoretical viewpoints have queried and 
challenged the international order and the policies it produces, interrogating complex 
systems that connect the environment, economy and politics, and underpin power 
imbalances and injustices present in both these global systems and the climate governance 
regime (Wapner 2008). Paterson (2000, p. 40), for example, argues that ‘the politics of global 
environmental problems should be understood as phenomena internal to the logics of four 
main, interrelated, power structures of world politics: the state system; capitalism; 
knowledge; and patriarchy’; international co-operation and state identities and behaviour 
are shaped by these macro-level structures and their influence on power distribution.  
Several studies have examined the role of global economic structures in shaping 
international institutions, with Okereke et al. (2009) arguing in the context of non-nation 
state actors in the climate governance regime that Gramscian theory can help reveal the 
influence of dominant neoliberal structures and how they affect climate change problem 
definition and constrain the strategies available to actors. This echoes Newell and Levy’s 
(2002, p. 86) earlier assertions that global governance regimes are embedded in ‘broader 
economic and discursive structures of the global capitalist economy’. Newell and Levy (2002) 
examine the role of businesses in forming governance regimes but seek to link micro-level 
issue areas with macro-level international governance structures, arguing that actors (firms, 
in this case) use power strategically to achieve economic goals through interaction with 
economic and political structures. Other scholars have linked climate justice to global 
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structures, such as Dawson (2010), who addresses the roots of climate change in the global 
capitalist and neoliberal order and suggests demands for climate justice will increasingly 
conflict with and challenge these structures, arguing that many organisations involved in 
environmental conservation and governance have failed to integrate perspectives of 
communities most affected by the damaging results of industrial activity. 
Focusing on climate justice as a concept and a movement, Grear (2014, p. 104) 
articulates the risk that the pursuit of climate justice may be absorbed into existing uneven 
global economic and political structures since the concept is ‘vulnerable to co-option in the 
service of ‘business as usual’’. Making reference to neo-Gramscian conceptions of 
hegemonic global structures, Bernstein (2000) has focused on norm selection and evolution, 
incorporating material interests and power in causal explanations for how social structures 
and ideas shape the behaviour of agents and development of environmental governance. 
While offering useful insight into the institutionalisation of particular norms into the social 
structure within which actors conceive of their identities and interests, these areas of 
literature do not look systematically within institutions to examine how institutional design 
and development over time may reflect ideas or preferences advocated by particular actors 
or coalitions and contested by others, and how actors respond differently to the presence of 
rules and norms that reinforce or are contrary to their conceptions of justice and/or their 
material interests. Historical institutionalist analysis can target this gap by looking at 
institutional creation and micro-processes that lead to reinforcement and alteration of 
evolving rule structures, including the way in which they reproduce or diffuse particular 
features of macro systems, thereby avoiding some of the structural determinism possible 
with Marxist, functionalist, and systems-theory approaches (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). 
3.3 Positioning and applying historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism has developed within political science alongside sociological 
institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. Collectively, these “new 
institutionalist” approaches developed as a response to what some political science scholars 
perceived was too great a focus within the discipline on the role of individual agency during 
the 1960s and 1970s (Munck af Rosenschöld et al. 2014). “New” institutionalists were 
influenced by moves by economics scholars such as Arthur and North to give attention to 
history and institutions (Arthur 1988, 1989, North 1990, Dugger 1995), and from the study of 
political institutions by rational choice theorists such as Fiorina (1995). In an important 
early work, Thelen and Steinmo (1992) explained that historical institutionalists were 
seeking to explain political outcomes by studying the influence of institutions on the way 
power is distributed amongst actors, the values and attitudes held by actors, and the 
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observable behaviour they exhibit. This drew from assertions of the interdependence 
between social and political institutions (March & Olsen 1984) and corresponding efforts to 
‘identify the ways in which the formal and informal rules of the game in political and social 
life influence political behaviour’ (Pierson 1994, p.596). 
The overall claim of historical institutionalism is that the way in which institutions 
are arranged and function is a product of the past, and also constrains the preferences of 
actors and the choices available to them in the present and future (O’Riordan and Jordan 
1999). Engaging with the passage of time and patterns of political history is the first layer, 
but in a dynamic manner not restricted to simply charting the course of events and outcomes 
in the political world. Key to this dynamic analysis is institutional design and development 
since, for historical institutionalists, a thorough understanding of the political world 
requires taking account of the fluctuating and multifaceted processes involved in the 
creation, maintenance and evolution of institutions over time (Fioretos 2011). Institutions 
are ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction’ (North 1991, p. 97), so the manner in which they constrain actor behaviour has 
important implications for the use and distribution of resources and the resolution of 
collective action problems. This is particularly relevant for global environmental problems 
in general, and climate finance in particular, because institutional rules and constraints 
influence which interests are protected and how benefits and burdens are distributed among 
actors (Vatn 2015). 
This section will introduce historical institutionalism, explaining how it can 
facilitate an approach that balances the rationalist focus on material interests as drivers of 
behaviour and the importance given to ideas and norms as influences on identity and 
interests by constructivist and sociological perspectives. This balance allows an analysis 
particularly suited to climate finance since normative justice claims are at the heart of the 
problem and policy debates, but money and burden-sharing mean that states’ material 
interests are similarly at the forefront. With key policy controversies threading throughout 
the history and evolution of the UNFCCC’s negotiations, the retrospective analysis offered 
by historical institutionalism can identify how the passage of time disrupts and constrains 
institutions and actors in the political world. First, the section will position historical 
institutionalism in relation to the two other “new” institutionalisms, rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, and explain the core of the historical 
institutionalist approach. Relatively little historical institutionalist analysis has been 
undertaken at the international level, so the section will draw on key elements from existing 
historical institutionalist theory to facilitate this project, namely initial institutional design, 
power and interests, institutional stability and change, and the role of ideas, before outlining 
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the opportunities and challenges of using historical institutionalism at the international 
level. 
3.3.1  Positioning historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism developed to challenge existing assumptions about human 
behaviour being driven by deliberate choices, as was and remains common in political 
analysis (March and Olsen 1984), and differs from rationalist approaches to institutions in 
its greater attention to how preferences are formed, and in particular the role of institutions 
in shaping and constraining preferences (Koelble 1995, p. 232). This contrasts with realists 
and neoliberal institutionalists, who see institutions ‘as effects of state action, not part of 
the basic structure’ (Paterson 1996b, p. 132). The coalitions and bargaining that are so core 
to policymaking processes, including UNFCCC climate finance with its history of intense 
negotiations, numerous blocs and strong North-South divisions, must be considered within 
the context of how actors’ behaviour is stimulated and constrained by structural influences 
on problem definition and policy options (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Stepping back, 
institutions can distil features of the national or international system in which they sit, in 
terms of ideology, objectives and other shared understandings (Thelen and Steinmo 1992), 
which are central to understanding justice and UNFCCC policy outcomes since the power 
inequalities, problem definitions and injustices involved pre-dated the formation of the 
institution and pervade the wider environmental and development governance landscape 
in which the UNFCCC was created. This can be seen, for instance, in the influence that the 
design of and norms from prior multilateral environmental agreements such as the 
Montreal Protocol had in the creation of the UNFCCC (Green 2009). 
Rational choice institutionalism is also part of the “new” institutionalism school, but 
is closer to neo-classical economics and is associated with North and other organisational 
economists, as well as with neoliberal institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). Actors’ 
preferences are seen as stable and they make logical decisions in line with these preferences 
and perceived consequences; institutions are collections of formal rules and procedures that 
reduce the transaction costs of repetitive interaction, shaped by actors as a reflection of and 
means to advance their interests (DiMaggio 1998, O’Riordan and Jordan 1999). Rational 
choice institutionalism emphasises the role of strategic behaviour in determining outcomes, 
noting the importance of actors’ expectations about each other’s behaviour and suggesting 
that ‘what prevents the actors from taking a collectively-superior course of action is the 
absence of institutional arrangements that would guarantee complementary behavior by 
others’ (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 945). This ties in with much international relations 
scholarship and the extensive literature on strategies and state behaviour within 
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negotiations over a collective response to climate change. However, the dynamic and 
changing nature of state interests and behaviour highlights the tendency for rational choice 
institutionalism to assume too much about preferences on the basis of current institutional 
arrangements, and to overlook the way the longevity of institutions and multifaceted nature 
of actors’ preferences complicates the relationship between structure and agency (O’Riordan 
and Jordan 1999). 
Sociological institutionalism is the third “new” institutionalism, and its proponents 
‘emphasise the social and cognitive features of institutions rather than structural and 
constraining features’, sharing similarities with constructivist approaches but providing a 
more substantial theoretical framework that seeks to identify what the social structure 
actually is, and arguing that this social structure is global in nature and ontologically 
primary, permeating ‘all aspects of political and social life in all states within it’ (Finnemore 
1996, pp. 326–327). Sociological and historical institutionalisms are similar in both 
emphasising the role of social norms and political ideas in shaping the behaviour of actors 
(Finnemore 1996). In terms of institutions, however, historical institutionalists differ by 
considering that institutions influence which ideas and shared understandings are 
important and will form the basis of new institutions, rather than the reverse; subsequently, 
ideas or claims about problems and policy options that gain prominence and legitimacy 
within an institution can persist even in the presence of other ideas which may later seem 
more legitimate (Fioretos 2011). Institutions ‘embody rules that encapsulate values, norms 
and views of the world’, meaning they reflect the social and political world in which they are 
located and consequently influence the policy processes within them (O’Riordan & Jordan 
1999: 82). 
Historical institutionalism is ‘grounded in the assumption that a historically 
constructed set of institutional constraints and opportunities affects the behavior of 
political actors and interest groups involved in the policy process’ (Béland 2007, p. 21). In 
seeking to identify these constraints and opportunities, historical institutionalists are 
particularly concerned with how macro-level systems and structures shape the power that 
actors hold and the ideas and paradigms that are prevalent at the historical moment when 
new institutions are created, since these factors influence the initial rules and form of new 
institutions (Farrell and Finnemore 2016). Historical institutionalism can then facilitate 
study of whether activity and processes within institutions over time are shaped or 
constrained in line with initial conditions, or provide a “black box” wherein actors, 
individually or in coalitions, facilitate institutional change away from the ideas, paradigms, 
injustices and power distribution that characterise broader global systems. As Hall (2016, p. 
32) puts it, historical institutionalism seeks to identify the ‘impact on political action of the 
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social, economic, and political structures in which actors are embedded at a particular time 
or place’, and consider ‘how events not only affect the immediate outcome of interest but 
also restructure the institutional or ideological setting in ways that condition outcomes in 
later periods of time.’ 
Remaining distinct from both rational choice institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism, and separate from the rationalist/constructivist debate within 
international relations, historical institutionalists ‘conceptualize institutions as sets of 
regularized practices with a rule-like quality in the sense that the actors expect the practices 
to be observed; and which, in some but not all, cases are supported by formal sanctions’ (Hall 
and Thelen 2009, p. 9). Historical institutionalists see mutual expectations as the heart of 
institutions, noting that actors depend on institutions to negotiate the transactions and 
interactions of daily life; in the political context, actors turn to institutions to build the 
mutual expectations that facilitate resolutions of conflict and management of collective 
action problems (Hall 2016). Historical institutionalists examine how institutions are 
formed and which actors benefit from their existence, since institutions may be designed in 
a way that supports one interest against another or prioritises certain values or normative 
perspectives (Vatn 2015). This involves identifying how the structural features and policy 
paths formed at the point of institutional creation reflect the interests of dominant actors 
or those that prevailed in the institutional design process (Hotimsky et al. 2006). Hall (2016, 
p. 40) captures this process in his description of “social coalitions” composed of actors 
powerful in the relevant area, which he argues are vital for understanding institutional 
design since coalitions are the creators of institutions, and then institutions ‘persist only as 
long as they retain an ample supporting coalition, even if the composition of that coalition 
changes over time’. 
Encouraged most prominently by Fioretos (2011), several authors (Farrell and 
Newman 2010, Chwieroth 2013, Hanrieder 2014) have begun to apply historical 
institutionalist approaches to the study of international politics and international 
institutions, and a small number of scholars have engaged specifically with environmental 
governance regimes and the UNFCCC (Prys-Hansen and Franz 2015, Nasiritousi and Linnér 
2016). Hanrieder (2014, pp. 324 & 326) has championed historical institutionalist research 
into international organisations, arguing that the focus on ‘institutional friction between 
formal rules and material power’ is particularly relevant for the turbulent power dynamics 
of international organisations with a one-country-one-vote structure (of which the UNFCCC 
is one), and can fill gaps left by previous approaches to international relations, such as 
principal-agent analysis, which have struggled to illuminate the role of rules and power 
relations that affect what happens within international institutions. The recent volumes 
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edited by Rixen, Viola and Zürn (2016) and Fioretos (2016b, pt. 6) have added significantly to 
the breadth of historical institutionalist study of international politics and attest to its 
potential as an approach to assessing the impact of the global institutional landscape on 
international affairs. 
3.3.2  Power and interests 
Historical institutionalists consider that institutional design influences how power is 
distributed and which interests are prominent within the policy process, and also shapes the 
extent to which policy choices reflect actors’ interests (Immergut 1998, O’Riordan and Jordan 
1999). While not discounting the role of self-interested rationality, a dominant perspective 
in international relations study, historical institutionalism differs from rational choice 
perspectives by considering the role of institutional design and rules alongside deliberate 
strategic action to maximise interests when seeking to explain why choices have been made 
(Steinmo 2008). Mahoney (2000, p. 521), suggests that institutional design can lock in power 
asymmetries from the beginning, resulting in a self-reinforcing structure that favours the 
interests of those that held greater power when the institution was created. Power in this 
context can entail greater access to decision-making processes, ability to set the agenda or 
confer legitimacy on problem definitions or policy options, or states being influenced by 
institutional structures to recognise the power of other states (Immergut 1998, p. 18). The 
attention historical institutionalism gives to the distribution of power is a key reason that 
its perspective on institutional influence is relevant to assessments of asymmetries of power 
within negotiations that reinforce broader injustices, since much injustice is related to the 
greater power held by some actors over others (e.g. Schroeder 2010). 
Hall (2016, p. 37) argues that actors have multiple goals, to which variable weights 
are attached in the context of particular decision situations, and Immergut (1998, p. 7) notes 
that the interests that actors choose to express are a subject for analysis in themselves. 
Consequently, historical institutionalist analysis involves identifying the way institutional, 
ideological and social factors influence how preference weights are applied by actors (Hall 
2009) and how actors’ interests are expressed in political behaviour, with a focus on the 
relationship between that expression and the institutional structure in which the relevant 
actors are embedded. Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 939) argue that institutions shape the identity, 
self-image and preferences of actors; in the UNFCCC context, O’Riordan and Jordan (1999) 
have pointed out that the nature and design of institutional structures stems directly from 
the time before climate change became a politically salient issue and when ever-increasing 
emissions were universally considered integral to economic development and human 
progress. With climate finance, the perpetuation of a model of developed countries’ 
  Page 64 of 265   
voluntary giving to developing countries (Roberts 2009), for example, raises important 
questions about the extent to which the institutional structure reinforces this view and has 
shaped Northern and Southern countries’ perceptions of policy options. 
Scholars of climate justice and multilateral negotiations have explored unequal 
power dynamics and North-South relations within the UNFCCC and wider political 
economy (Okereke 2010, Brunnée and Streck 2013), but the mechanisms by which power 
inequalities were reflected in the design of the institution and have been subsequently 
reinforced or overcome at the policy level are under-researched. Williams (2005, p.50) has 
argued that in addition to developing countries’ places within the global power structure, 
study of developing country interests within environmental negotiations should include the 
influence of ideas, norms and institutions; his brief account of the UNFCCC suggests the 
creation of the institution did much to generate the North-South division that has 
characterised negotiations since then. There have been studies of bargaining tactics within 
climate change negotiations as developed and developing countries seek to advance 
preferences and secure their interests, with some arguing that the framing adopted by 
developing countries has prevented the formation of coalitions with sufficient strength to 
overcome developed countries’ power advantage (Richards 2003), suggesting that Hall’s 
(2016) emphasis on coalitions within an institution (see 3.3.4 below) may bear empirical fruit 
in the UNFCCC context. 
3.3.3  Institutional stability and path dependence 
Historical institutionalists consider that actors design both policies and institutions to be 
difficult to change, which can bind future actors, including the policymaker themselves, into 
particular paths of policy and institutional design even when interests change considerably 
over time (Pierson 2000). Powerful actors, which Thelen (2004, p. 286) reminds us must be 
specified, are often influential in creating institutions in particular ways that reflect their 
interests. Subsequent points at which policy choices are made must be contextualised 
‘within a broader temporal framework that takes into account the feedback effects that have 
defined the conditions within which specific policy and institutional choices are being 
made’ (Thelen 2004, p. 288). In other words, the initial institutional design, the extent of its 
subsequent reinforcement and the evolving distribution of power within an institution 
affects how it will influence policy decisions that actors make. In turn, these effects shape 
the stability of an institution, since if power distribution remains the same and prior 
decisions have reinforced the initial institutional design, actors are less likely to deviate 
from the prevailing structural features of policy. This is the theoretical basis for historical 
institutionalism’s focus on institutional design; it is vital to understand the stake that actors 
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have in reinforcing the power distribution and policies (Fioretos 2011) and the way 
institutional design helps to reinforce coalitions of actors that help to keep the institutional 
arrangements stable (Hall 2016). 
Historical institutionalism has long been associated with path dependence, a tool 
used to identify the repeated reproduction of a particular policy path or institutional 
features amongst the layers of small choices made by policy actors over time (Djelic and 
Quack 2007, Immergut and Anderson 2008, Rayner 2009, Fioretos 2011). By focusing on the 
mechanisms behind this reproduction, it becomes possible to measure institutional change 
or stability over time at a macro level and explain why observed macro level changes or 
stability have occurred, rather than simply describing what has happened (Pierson 2000; 
Duit 2007). Self-reinforcing sequences or path dependence are often based on the presence 
of positive feedbacks, developed in institutional economics literature most frequently as 
increasing returns (Bardhan 1989, Krugman 1991, Arthur 1994, David 1994, Boschma and 
Lambooy 1999). According to this view, after a random, or contingent, initial event or 
circumstance, an institutional pattern is adopted and its continued existence delivers some 
benefit or positive externality that makes it more and more difficult to alter the relevant 
pattern of behaviour or policy (Mahoney 2000, Page 2006). For example, administrative costs 
reduce and knowledge about a policy structure and operation increases the longer the policy 
remains in place (Woerdman 2004). Often the delivery of these benefits is viewed in 
utilitarian terms related to cost-benefit analysis and rational choice, focused on the lock-in 
of relatively inefficient policies or institutional arrangements instead of more efficient 
alternatives (Foray 1997, Mahoney 2000, pp. 508–509). 
Bennet and Elman (2006, p. 256) argue that ‘in political life, however, the question of 
‘‘efficiency’’ is less clear cut, as distributional issues loom large and the relevant question is 
often not whether an institution is efficient but for whom it is efficient or beneficial.’ The 
ability of some actors or coalitions of actors to implement institutional rules to their benefit 
can generate an important source of positive feedback; the presence of advantageous rules 
and norms both helps and incentivises actors to reinforce them and to create new ones 
within the institution that further reinforce or increase their advantage and the structure 
that provides it (Pierson 2004, p. 36). In UNFCCC climate finance negotiations, where North-
South inequality and power dynamics have characterised the policy process, historical 
institutionalist analysis will help to identify in which policy areas and institutional 
arrangements positive feedbacks are present and how associated micro-processes have 
reinforced the interests and power of coalitions or particular actors with a stake in 
preserving institutional or policy continuation.  
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Thorough historical institutionalist analysis must also look beyond the institution 
in question to help explain stability, since ‘the institutional matrix consists of an 
interdependent web of institutions and consequent political and economic organizations’ 
(North 1991, p. 109). Policy choices can encourage the creation of networks that reach beyond 
one particular institution and connect it with other institutions, further reinforcing 
expectations and increasing the cost and disruption involved in changing the policy path 
(Pierson 1994). These “network co-ordination effects” bring benefits to actors and coalitions 
within the institution in question who wish to preserve the status quo (Hall 2016). For 
example, this may be a factor in the ongoing links between the UNFCCC and the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee, which regulates the ODA system and speaks on behalf 
of developed countries on the subject of their broader climate finance contributions, and the 
similarities between UNFCCC and OECD-DAC voluntary and self-defined systems. 
3.3.4  Institutional change and coalitions of actors 
Institutions are never completely static, and exist in a state of perpetual interplay between 
human behaviour and choices and wider foundational components of society such as 
economic systems and cultural values. Historical institutionalism is often associated with 
punctuated equilibrium models, which emerged early in institutional scholarship (Collier 
and Collier 1991, Thelen and Steinmo 1992). In these models, critical junctures break 
through stable social and political systems and established path dependent policies, 
creating the only opportunities for major institutional reform (Pierson 2004, pp. 134–135). 
These critical junctures are the points where analysis can reveal how and why institutional 
change occurs, although change does not always follow when a juncture opens (Capoccia 
and Kelemen 2007). Once a new policy or institutional design is chosen, a new equilibrium 
is established and it becomes progressively more difficult to deviate from this path 
(Mahoney 2000, p. 503). Critical juncture approaches have been criticised for an inability to 
deal adequately with observed institutional and policy change, and for lacking theoretical 
tools to explain when established paths are disrupted or broken (Hira and Hira 2000, 
Greener 2002, p. 164). Critical juncture models ‘tend to distinguish sharply between periods 
of institutional creation and periods of ‘stasis’’ (Thelen 2003, p. 19) and focus on exogenous, 
significant shocks as the junctures that stimulate change (Pierson 2004, p. 135), thereby 
‘encouraging us to conceive of change as involving the “breakdown” of one set of institutions 
and its replacement with another’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, p. 7). 
While some scholars have refined and clarified the critical junctures approach 
(Hogan 2006, Capoccia and Kelemen 2007), perspectives that consider that ‘most 
institutional change is incremental rather than totally reconstructive or destructive’ (Levi 
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1990, p. 415) and that junctures are ‘rarely so “critical” and often limited to a single policy 
domain’ (Hall 2016, p. 41) are more prominent now. Much historical institutionalist 
literature seeks to explain institutional change by identifying mechanisms that contribute 
to this incremental change over time, in a deliberate effort to go further than identifying 
path dependence and historical constraints on choices and institutional development when 
seeking to understand institutional influence in the political world (Thelen 1999, 2004, 
Streek and Thelen 2005a, Béland 2007, Mahoney and Thelen 2009).   
As a relatively new institution with a treaty-based format that involves creation of 
new layers of policy every year, a model of institutional change that can account for 
incremental and internally-generated change is more applicable to the UNFCCC than a 
punctuated equilibrium model that requires significant and exogenous shocks to explain 
conditions where actors can re-shape the institution. Building on their earlier work (Streek 
and Thelen 2005b), Mahoney and Thelen (2009, pp. 15–16) delineate four types of gradual 
institutional change: displacement, or gradual removal of existing rules and introduction of 
new ones; layering, or amending existing rules or attaching new rules on top; drift, or the 
changing impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment; and conversion, or the 
changed application or interpretation of existing rules driven by actors strategically 
manipulating institutional ambiguities. These mechanisms can help to illuminate how 
political contestation over small alterations or additions to institutional rule structures or 
their interpretation over time can gradually reshape international political and economic 
institutions, or accumulate and lead to more radical changes (Fioretos et al. 2016a, pp. 13–
14). 
Historical institutionalists also draw attention to the effects of institutional design 
and development on the preferences of actors for retaining or changing institutional 
structures. Unlike rational choice perspectives in which the effects and advantages of 
institutional structures are discounted, historical institutionalists highlight ‘the extent to 
which people gain or lose access to the advantages (or disadvantages) they associate with 
past designs, including those that confer positions of privilege that translate into forms of 
enduring influence’, as a key factor in the calculations actors make when confronted with 
new realities and decisions over whether to facilitate incremental or more substantial 
institutional change (Fioretos 2011, pp. 373 & 376). In contrast to a rational choice 
perspective, where a marginal benefit will lead to a significant shift in preferences, historical 
institutionalism suggests that the accumulation of sufficient advantage to outweigh those 
lost from the ending of existing arrangements will be necessary to bring about institutional 
change (Fioretos 2011, p. 375). 
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Bringing these processes together, Thelen (2004, pp. 290–291) argues that, while 
institutions do ‘affect the interests and strategic options available to various groups’, 
institutions are not simply static and remain constantly open to challenge and political 
contestation, and ‘changes in the political coalitions on which they rest hold the key to 
understanding significant shifts over time in the form institutions take and the functions 
they perform’. Hall (2016) builds on this notion of coalitions, as mentioned previously, in 
this case arguing that while gradual ‘reform from above’ may well be continuous within 
institutions, a coalition of sufficient strength is required to bring about more significant 
institutional change. While this might involve gaining support for abandoning established 
policies and agreeing on reforms, Vatn (2015) suggests that existing institutional 
configurations and rules can suppress the ability of actors to articulate their interests and 
succeed in having them accepted as legitimate concerns or grounds for change within the 
political process. This is required to overcome the power held by actors or coalitions with a 
stake in preserving the advantage they gain from the prevailing institutional structure. This 
conception of interplay between small-scale changes that preserve actors’ positions within 
an institution, and the building up of discontent, legitimacy and momentum to overcome 
the power of established coalitions that have shaped the existing institutional structure, 
appears to be a much closer fit with the consistent North-South dynamics commonly 
associated with the UNFCCC. However, the micro-processes involved in the widespread 
stability and few instances of institutional change initially observable in the history of 
UNFCCC climate finance and the way institutional changes relate to and affect actors’ 
preferences remain in need of systematic examination. 
3.3.5  Ideas and policy paradigms 
Historical institutionalism recognises the importance of ideas, since actors use them to gain 
prominence in the political discourse that forms the basis of policymaking processes within 
institutions and ‘ideas serve as mobilizing forces for collective action by social groups that 
want to create or change institutions’ (Sanders 2008, p. 42). Institutions are the key to 
understanding how ideas are turned into policies by actors, with recognition that the 
development and use of language is a core part of this process (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). 
Attention to ideas by historical institutionalists has focused on how ideas become embedded 
in institutions, and how institutions and policy paradigms influence which new ideas 
matter, in contrast to constructivist or historical sociology perspectives that prioritise the 
role of ideas in influencing institutions and actor behaviour (Fioretos 2011). Policy 
paradigms are an important manifestation of ideas within the social world and, once they 
have become part of the structure of an institution, can play an important role in 
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constraining the range of policy options that actors will perceive as available to them 
(Campbell 2002). However, the institutionalisation process may not be straightforward; 
Hotimsky, Cobb and Bond (2006) argue that defining and responding to common-pool 
problems such as climate change is dominated by political, economic and cultural frames 
that influence actors’ behaviour and often prevent a shared understanding of the problem 
from emerging.  
In an early contribution, Hall (1993, p. 279) defines policy paradigms as ‘a framework 
of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments 
that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to 
be addressing.’ In turn, this socially-constructed framework underpins policies and shapes 
policymakers’ beliefs about what the policies they create will or are intended to achieve (May 
1992). Overarching policy paradigms shape goals and problem definition within the policy 
process and can become integrated into the institutional design and structure itself; in the 
context of these paradigms, policy actors must choose which policy instruments they are 
going to use and how to fine tune them once in place (Greener 2002). In the climate change 
context, several authors have argued that the neoliberal paradigm that prevails within the 
political economy of international climate politics influences policy, for example in the 
preponderance of market-based solutions in UNFCCC policy (Kline 2001, Paterson 2011). 
Similarly, others argue that the prioritisation of economic growth is another paradigm that 
underpins the climate change regime, although this paradigm is challenged by advocates of 
prioritising environmental protection (Anderson and Bows 2012). By analysing the 
reproduction of paradigmatic ideas within the patchwork of small choices by actors within 
UNFCCC climate finance negotiations, this project can add to existing research by scholars 
such as Bernstein (2000) and Okereke (2008, 2010), who have argued that overarching 
neoliberal structures place ideological constraints on actors within climate governance, 
thereby conferring power within particular institutions on actors who benefit more broadly 
from the configuration of these structures. 
Hall (1993, p. 280) also argued that conflicting opinions from experts leads to contest 
over which sources should be considered authoritative within the policy process; this takes 
place within relevant policy paradigms, which affect how policymakers see the world and the 
problems they need to deal with, and thus how scientific or technical information and other 
ideas should be interpreted and acted upon. With a prominent global problem such as 
climate change, some scientific and policy information is widely known, but significant 
uncertainty remains about how medium and long term impacts will develop and therefore 
about the consequences of policy choices. In his constructivist account, Haas (2004, p. 575) 
argues that path dependence in the policy process is more likely in such circumstances, 
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since outcomes and preferences are uncertain. In addition (p. 585), these circumstances 
reinforce the significance of the initial configuration of power, knowledge and formal 
institutional properties which, in combination with the overarching policy paradigm, shape 
states’ perceptions of problems, potential solutions and willingness to adhere to 
commitments, which all feed into path-dependent behaviour. Mechanisms of policy 
stability such as path dependence should be considered within paradigms, in order to 
extend our understanding of how the institutional design of the UNFCCC has shaped actors’ 
behaviour alongside the signals, reward and penalties that policies themselves provide 
(Pierson 2000). 
In the UNFCCC, the overall paradigm based on the expectation that wealthy 
countries should provide climate finance to poorer countries has not been seriously 
challenged (Crump and Downie 2015, p. 157, Lombo et al. 2016, p. 6), but uncertainty around 
the amount of finance that will be “adequate” to reach the goals of the UNFCCC and meet 
the needs of developing countries (not necessarily the same thing), has been a consistent 
source of political contestation within the policy process (Flåm and Skjærseth 2009, Gomez-
Echeverri 2013). This is consistent with Mahoney and Thelen’s (2009, p. 11) assertion that 
‘competing interpretations of one and the same rule can mobilize quite different coalitions’ 
into ‘movements seeking particular interpretations of the ambiguous or contested rules of a 
given institution.’ However, it is unclear to what extent actors and coalitions within the 
UNFCCC policy process have been restricted by path dependence that has reinforced other 
key ideas and policy paradigms established in the Convention, and to what extent actors 
have been able to use policy to reinforce their favoured interpretations of early policy or alter 
existing interpretations of policy. Potential policy paradigms shaping actors’ expectations 
and the range of policy options viable within the policy process include the prominence of 
voluntary commitments, connections between equity and differentiation principles and 
which countries are required to contribute climate finance, and the mechanisms through 
which finance should be provided. 
3.3.6  Application of historical institutionalism to the UNFCCC 
The preceding sections have shown that historical institutionalism is positioned outside the 
rationalist/constructivist debate central to international relations inquiry into institutions, 
incorporating ideas and power as factors in how institutions reflect the circumstances in 
which they are created and reproduce structural advantages that particular actors derive 
from initial institutional design. In addition, historical institutionalism focuses on micro-
processes that can help to identify how macro-level structures that concern international 
political economy scholars become built into the rules and design of institutions. While the 
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moves by Fioretos (2011) and others to expand the use of historical institutionalism at the 
international level have been outlined above, before proceeding it is important to 
understand the limited research so far undertaken into multilateral environmental 
agreements and the governance regimes based on them, and the UNFCCC in particular. 
Scholars are only beginning to uncover the extent to which institutional design, structures 
and path dependence have affected the development of UNFCCC policies, presenting an 
important opportunity for this thesis to contribute to furthering the application of historical 
institutionalism to the international level and provide a novel approach to understanding 
the justice and politics of UNFCCC climate finance policy. 
Existing historical institutionalist work on environmental and climate change 
policies has mostly asserted the significance of institutions in shaping and constraining 
policy at the domestic level (Woerdman 2004, Hotimsky et al. 2006, Duit 2007, Knox-Hayes 
2012). Others have found evidence of path dependence in domestic policy processes 
(Verbong and Geels 2010, Garrelts and Lange 2011, Libecap 2011), and even argued that 
deliberately generating path dependent policies is necessary for creating an effective long-
term response to climate change (Levin et al. 2007, 2012). Of the few scholars who have 
addressed the UNFCCC itself, Castro et al. (2014) focused on path dependence and 
negotiating blocs in negotiations, while Munck af Rosenschöld et al. (2014) argued that 
various institutional factors including power and path dependence prevent swifter and more 
effective action on climate change. Nasiritousi and Linnér (2016) used path dependence and 
a historical institutionalist lens to analyse the influence of institutional rules governing the 
involvement of non-state actors in the UNFCCC, while Prys-Hansen and Franz (2015) used 
a historical institutionalist lens to examine institutionalisation of developing country 
mitigation commitments, incorporating a focus on discourse and interpretation of 
institutional norms to explain how stasis gave way to gradual change in policy. This limited 
scholarship demonstrates the significant opportunity taken by this thesis to extend research 
into the role of institutions themselves in the processes that create global climate finance 
policy, with a particular focus on how the institutional context shapes the way North-South 
inequalities and injustices are reinforced, or overcome, within the UNFCCC policy process. 
Looking more broadly, the potential of a historical institutionalist approach to offer 
timely and valuable insight is supported by various global environmental governance 
scholars highlighting the need for investigation into the institutional design and policy 
processes relevant to climate change governance. Paavola and Adger (2005: 365), for 
example, assert that ‘the institutional approach suggests that more attention ought to be 
given to processes and procedures in environmental decision making in order to guarantee 
adequate learning and fair representation of affected parties and legitimacy of 
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environmental decisions.’ Keeney and McDaniels (2001: 999) suggest that a ‘better 
understanding is needed of the practices, advantages, and shortcomings of current 
institutions, both international and national, in order to make and implement appropriate 
decisions.’ Paavola (2005, 2007), with reference to new institutionalist perspectives, argued 
that environmental and climate governance should be considered as attempts to resolve 
environmental conflicts, in order to characterise institutional function as achieving social 
justice rather than economic efficiency. He also suggests that attention should be given to 
the ‘functional and structural tiers, organization of governance functions, and the 
formulation of key institutional rules as the central aspects of the institutional design of 
governance solutions’ in order to examine the social justice implications of governance 
institutions more effectively (Paavola 2007, p. 101).  
The most significant challenge with institutionalist theories in the context of the 
UNFCCC is the treaty-based nature of the institution, which contrasts with bureaucratic 
government ministries or formal, bureaucratic international organisations such as the IMF. 
While the UNFCCC has a medium-sized secretariat, to which some scholarly attention has 
been directed (Siebenhüner 2008), its policy process takes the form of a forum where all 
member countries (Parties) come together to negotiate. As a result, the principal-agent 
theory and analysis that has traditionally been the basis for research into membership-
based international organisations such as the IMF and WHO, for example (Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999, Hawkins et al. 2006), and the historical institutionalist study of “sticky” 
domestic public policy processes such as pensions and welfare (Hudson and Lowe 2009, 
chap. 9, Kuipers 2009), are not are not directly applicable models for the UNFCCC case. The 
challenge of the UNFCCC case is an important opportunity to extend the application of 
institutionalist theory; as Farrell and Finnemore (2016, pp. 575–576) argue: ‘applying 
historical institutionalism to non-standard [international] institutional environments 
would help establish the scope conditions of historical institutionalism’s existing toolbox’. 
One significant advantage of working with the UNFCCC is that it has a clear and 
recent point of creation. This means that literature concerning this creation is relatively 
abundant and accessible, facilitating a thorough analysis of the landscape of power 
relations, established norms and other institutions existing at the time, as well as the 
broader global systemic context. Such information forms a key part of historical 
institutionalist analysis, since this school considers initial conditions to be one of the main 
formative aspects of how institutions go on to shape and be shaped by actor behaviour over 
the subsequent life of the institution (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999). Actors often reproduce 
the logic and scripts that exist in other institutional settings when building new institutions, 
even if this is not “efficient” (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, p. 5). The ability to access a 
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significant quantity of information from the process of institutional development will 
enable historical institutionalist examination of how the initial configuration of the 
UNFCCC reflected distribution of material resources and has continued to shape politics 
and authority, and has been a potential cause ‘behind preferences and patterns of political 
contestation’ (Fioretos et al. 2016a, p. 9). 
3.4 Conclusion 
Historical institutionalism offers an alternative to existing theoretical approaches that focus 
on human behaviour being driven by deliberate choices (March and Olsen 1984), 
incorporating rational self-interest alongside institutional formation and the influence of 
rule structures in its approach to understanding how actors make choices (Steinmo 2008). 
Similarly, historical institutionalism incorporates ideas and ideology by considering that 
institutional rule structures ‘encapsulate values, norms and views of the world’, meaning 
they reflect the social and political world in which they are located and consequently 
influence the policy processes within them (O’Riordan & Jordan 1999: 82). Incorporating 
insight from the core motivating factors of neoliberal institutionalism and rational choice 
institutionalism on the one hand and constructivism and sociological institutionalism on 
the other, historical institutionalists consider how institutions’ founding contexts and 
development over time have shaped actors’ goals and the strategies they use to achieve them 
within the political world, illuminating structural influences on attitudes and behaviour 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992). The historical institutionalist approach is valuable to a study of 
justice and unequal North-South relationships within global governance because it accepts 
that actors have multiple goals and interests and seeks to identify how institutions affect the 
formation of preference weights and influence the value-laden perspectives on political co-
operation that actors bring to policy processes (Hall 2016). 
Various scholars have encouraged and begun the application of historical 
institutionalism to international institutions and one-country-one-vote forum-based 
models such as the UNFCCC (Fioretos 2011, Hanrieder 2014). Scholars have explored the 
role that ethical issues, power and North-South histories play in climate politics, but this 
project brings a fresh perspective by using historical institutionalism and will extend its 
application at the international level. The project will investigate how institutional design 
reflects and reinforces uneven power and influence and broader ideas and injustices, seek 
evidence of the micro-level processes that shape actors’ preferences about the way 
institutions are designed and develop, such as social interaction, the development and 
exchange of ideas, and the use of language to persuade, and in turn how the design of 
institutions and layering of policy influence interests and decisions and the effects that they 
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have later in time (Fioretos 2011). Taking a historical view can identify self-reinforcing 
processes that ‘may magnify power imbalances over time’ (Pierson 2004, p. 48) and define 
‘the conditions within which specific policy and institutional choices are being made’ 
(Thelen 2004, p. 288). This temporal approach to studying the UNFCCC policy process is also 
novel within international relations and environmental governance literature, further 
demonstrating the potential of a historical institutionalist approach to contribute valuable 
new insight to how climate finance policy has developed since 1992. The next chapter will 
detail the method in which this analysis will be undertaken and a tailored set of indicators 
that will be used to operationalise historical institutionalism theory. 
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4. Project design and methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The typical approach to historical institutionalist research involves analysis of substantial 
amounts of policy documentation to build up a picture of how events and behaviour have 
evolved over time. Within this, the researcher seeks to identify evidence of mechanisms that 
affect power distribution, influence the prominence and legitimacy of ideas and problem 
definitions, and contribute to institutional stability and institutional change, using 
historical institutionalist tools such as positive feedbacks, increasing returns, path 
dependence, policy paradigms and coalitions of actors. This evidence can then be used to 
explain periods of stability where policies have changed little or have retained key features 
over time, or to explain how and why actors deviated from existing institutional structures, 
expectations and policy paths to bring about instances of institutional change. This chapter 
will explain how the historical institutionalist approach was tailored to the specific 
circumstances and objectives of this project, setting out the mode of analysis used, including 
the objectives and the range of mechanisms and processes that the analysis sought to 
identify. Then data sources will be outlined, as well as the specific steps that were undertaken 
to gather and analyse historical processual data concerning UNFCCC policy and 
negotiations, with the aim of producing temporally constructed narratives that facilitated 
thorough and systematic examination of the extent to which institutional design and 
development have shaped actor behaviour and policy outcomes over time. 
4.2 Mode of analysis 
Most historical institutionalist analyses take the form of a temporally constructed narrative, 
using information on policy and institutional developments to demonstrate how 
institutional design has persisted and/or a policy path has been created and reinforced 
(Gerring 2011, p. 1135). When considering the UNFCCC as the research focus, this approach 
needs some adjustment in order for historical institutionalism to be useful in analysis of an 
institution in which re-negotiation of policy is constantly taking place. Each year the 
UNFCCC holds one main and several intermediate rounds of negotiation, and produces 
official policy after each main annual round (COP), so it is not possible to discuss UNFCCC 
policy in the same way as one might a piece of domestic legislation, which, once enacted, sits 
static on the statue book until amended or replaced. To make sense of the multiple layers of 
UNFCCC policy and provide a sound basis from which to look for periods of stability and 
change, this project will make use of qualitative analysis of institutional design and the 
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process of policy development. There are no comprehensive criteria that can conclusively 
confirm institutional change or stability (Duit 2007, p. 1099) and the causal complexity 
underlying outcomes in a political environment such as the UNFCCC makes constructing 
knowledge statements challenging; in this context qualitative research in a case study format 
is a useful approach even when only one case is studied (Bennett and Elman 2006, p. 251). 
As Sydow et al. (2012, p. 162) explain, policy paths are socially constructed 
phenomena that it is not possible to measure objectively, so qualitative study facilitates 
investigation of how actors have behaved and been influenced by institutional structures, 
and ‘how actors and incidents on different levels are related to each other’. It is the complex 
landscape of and nuances within statements and negotiating positions that are the key to 
identifying how policy paths and actor behaviour have been influenced; it would be very 
difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from statistical analysis of the simple presence of 
key words, such as “finance” or “new and additional”, or a binary measure of which countries 
were for or against particular proposals. The very question here is what actors’ statements in 
negotiations and policy wording as a whole, including the presence or absence of such key 
words and the context in which they are used, tells us about how policies are related to other 
actors, prior choices and institutional design. Only by taking this cohesive, longitudinal 
qualitative approach can the way actors present their ideas, interests and priorities over time 
be tracked, and consequently the micro-processes that reinforce or modify the influence of 
institutional structures be identified (Hall 2016). 
A historical review also makes it difficult to use participatory methods in a practical 
and meaningful manner. The time period is long and there are at least five key phases of 
negotiations, so any meaningful contribution offering insight into changes and stability of 
negotiations and structures over time would have required a significant number of 
interviewees. Identifying a sufficient number of negotiation participants involved in each 
phase and representing a variety of countries, planning and conducting the interviews 
potentially in numerous countries, and processing and integrating the interview data would 
have constituted a significant methodological component and added considerable 
additional time to the project. In addition, participants in negotiations, particularly from 
developing countries, are likely to report that developing countries have struggled to achieve 
their objectives or have experienced limitations on their bargaining power within 
negotiations, since this is well-documented and forms a key part of the motivation for the 
project. The aim of using a historical institutionalism approach is to reveal features of the 
institutional design and development that have shaped the experience of participants 
within, thereby providing a new angle and insight that will add to existing analysis and 
observation of the North-South dynamic within negotiations and the experiences of 
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participants over time, adding to our understanding of why participants experienced what 
they experienced and why the North-South division has remained prominent. 
Qualitative analysis in this thesis takes the form of a longitudinal case study using 
processual data from negotiations and policy output, with the UNFCCC as the subject. In 
terms of the UNFCCC as an institution, there is a clear temporal boundary to the beginning 
of the case study, since the founding treaty was signed in 1992 following a series of organised 
negotiations under the UN. Analysis covering the period from creation of the Convention to 
the Paris COP-21 in 2015 is a long time, but will allow the greatest depth of analysis possible 
and is necessary to fully investigate the process whereby institutional design and initial rule 
creation led into ongoing policy development, and ultimately facilitates comment on the 
influence of institutional factors in policy making that includes the most recent milestone 
in the regime’s progression, cemented at Paris. The significance of COP-21 means it 
provides a natural temporal boundary to end the case study. Based on its centrality to 
negotiations as a whole and the justice of climate governance more specifically, the focus of 
the project on climate finance has been explained above. In practical terms, when UNFCCC 
policy covers a wide range of themes and areas, the focus on climate finance makes a 
detailed assessment of how the UNFCCC functions possible within the time and space 
constraints of this project. 
First, all relevant sections and references to climate finance policy were extracted 
from official COP policy documents. Then the relevant ENB issues for the COP meetings 
were searched using a consistent set of key words to identify commentary about and 
statements from Parties relevant to climate finance. These were extracted and matched with 
corresponding sections of final policy from the official UNFCCC documents. Party 
submissions and other processual documentation on relevant policy topics referenced in 
either the ENB issues and UNFCCC policies were obtained and used to add additional 
evidence to official policy output and ENB commentary. Supplemented by secondary 
research and other external commentaries on negotiations from NGOs, for example, these 
multiple sources allowed a form of triangulation in the absence of viable quantitative or 
multiple methods. The objective was to identify evidence from matched data that initial 
institutional design and subsequent structural influences have shaped actors’ interaction in 
the policy process and the outcomes from it, building up a detailed picture of policy 
development and institutional functioning that facilitates generation of a temporally 
constructed narrative offering an insight into the role of institutional rules and actor 
behaviour within the UNFCCC. A detailed step-by-step plan for undertaking the analysis is 
set out below. 
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4.3 Mapping initial conditions 
Central to historical institutionalism is beginning empirical analysis by mapping the initial 
conditions of the institutional context that is the subject of analysis. This historical starting 
point is important because the processes involved in institutional influence on actor 
behaviour are sensitive to initial conditions; Steinmo (2008, p. 165) explains that by 
‘deepening and enriching their understanding of the historical moment and the actors 
within it’, historical institutionalists ‘are able to offer more accurate explanations for the 
specific events that they explore’. To understand the actions of political actors, ‘one must 
take cognizance of the historical development of the institution, and the original, distinct 
culture and problems in which it arose’ (Sanders 2008, p. 39). In other words, the initial rules 
created at the origin of the institution can provide an insight into how actors, in the context 
of the existing political and institutional landscape, shaped creation of the new institutional 
structure. Likewise, these initial conditions can lock in particular coalitions and power 
distribution, affecting behaviour within the institution for some time as actors seek to work 
within or disrupt institutional constraints; ‘for those who are disadvantaged by prevailing 
institutions, adapting may mean biding their time until conditions shift, or it may mean 
working within the existing framework in pursuit of goals different from—even subversive 
to—those of the institution’s designers’ (Thelen 1999, pp. 385–386). 
Given the significance of initial conditions and institutional creation, historical 
institutionalist analysis must give attention to how initial institutional design has gone on 
to affect the way actors approached the relevant problems through policy creation and how 
the initial institutional rules reflect and/or create particular power dynamics and 
relationships between actors. In the UNFCCC case, it is the Convention that underpins the 
institutional environment and the literature review established that several key controversial 
areas from the broader arena of development and climate finance were reflected in the 
Convention. Historical institutionalism suggests that this will have contributed to ongoing 
policy design and actor behaviour, and this thesis has sought to identify this influence and 
how it has reinforced injustice and North-South power inequalities. Accordingly, analysis 
of the UNFCCC Convention and the influences on its formulation were an essential first 
step in this project’s methodology. 
4.4 Indicators of institutional influence 
Historical institutionalist research involves ‘explaining real world outcomes, using history 
as an analytic tool’ and engaging with ‘the ways in which institutions shaped political 
outcomes’ (Steinmo 2008, p. 157). In line with this objective, the bulk of the research in this 
thesis involved processing appropriate source material to facilitate the search for evidence 
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that policy actors have been influenced or constrained by the layers of rules and structures 
that have built up over time within the UNFCCC, particularly in terms of power distribution, 
coalition building, incentives and expectations, and policy choices. Part of this involved 
looking for self-reinforcing rules (formal policies or logics of appropriateness) or self-
reinforcing behaviour (e.g. learning effects, alteration of actors’ expectations), or a 
combination of the two (Duit 2007, pp. 1102–1103). In other words, this means using 
information gathered about the policy process over time to pinpoint sequences of events 
that show either formal policies or actors’ behaviour within an institution reproducing 
institutional rules, thereby both being influenced by and reinforcing institutional structures 
that themselves reflect particular problem definitions, priorities, solution preferences and 
shared understandings. Hotimsky et al. (2006) point out that actor behaviour can also be 
influenced by logics of consequences based on formal rules and assessments of costs and 
benefits, and by logics of appropriateness where actors are guided by what they deem as 
legitimate and how they perceive other actors’ expectations. 
In the context of these various logics of behaviour it is important to acknowledge the 
role of power within the social context of an institution, and consider when actors have 
power to shape the policy agenda or manipulate shared understandings and the behavioural 
expectations they generate, in an effort to reinforce or alter institutional structures and 
advance their own interests. In turn, the effect of such manipulation on the disruption or 
maintenance of institutional arrangements must also be queried (Hotimsky et al. 2006). 
Underpinning this analysis was the search for evidence of institutional reinforcement 
and/or change and the relationship between such observed changes and policy paths and 
expectations already in place. Incremental change was the most likely form of change; since 
the UNFCCC remains intact as the site of global climate governance (albeit with other sites 
of governance emerging at multiple scales, see section 3.2.2 above), a critical juncture where 
the institution was replaced with another has obviously not occurred. Historical 
institutionalists claim that ‘aggregate outcomes need to be understood in terms of the 
actions and behavior of individuals behaving strategically’ (Thelen 1999, p. 377), so tying the 
various threads of institutional influence together into a temporally constructed narrative 
was necessary to identify and understand this strategic behaviour and how it leads to the 
aggregate outcomes. To guide the research, specific mechanisms that can indicate 
institutional influence on actors and policy outcomes are outlined below: 
 
• Evidence that the behaviour of actors has been stimulated and constrained by 
structural influences on problem definition and policy options (Thelen and Steinmo 
1992). 
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• Evidence that institutional design and rules reflected power asymmetries, problem 
definitions, ideology, objectives and shared understandings present in the prevailing 
national or international system, and subsequent reinforcement of these structural 
features and policy paths (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999, Hotimsky et al. 2006). 
o Evidence that institutional design locked in these power asymmetries and 
other features, benefitting particular actors and resulting in advantageous rules 
and norms that reinforce these benefits (Mahoney 2000, Pierson 2004). 
• Evidence of “social coalitions” of actors that drive the creation of institutions and are 
vital to their ongoing stability, even if the constituents of the coalitions change. In turn, 
evidence of coalitions trying and/or failing to gather sufficient strength required to 
bring about significant institutional change (Hall 2016). 
• Evidence of institutional, ideological and social factors influencing how preference 
weights are applied by actors (Hall 2009) and how actors’ interests are expressed in 
political behaviour. 
o Evidence that institutional rules and structures have shaped the identity, self-
image and preferences of actors (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
• Evidence of networks reaching beyond the UNFCCC and connecting it with other 
institutions, benefitting particular actors or coalitions while further reinforcing 
expectations and leading actors to make choices in line with the relevant policy, as well 
as increasing the strength of coalitions required to alter relevant policy paths (Pierson 
1994).  
• Evidence of critical junctures where exogenous or endogenous events disrupt the 
stability of the institution and established policy paths, creating opportunities for 
major institutional reform (Pierson 2004).  
• Evidence that institutional configurations and rules have suppressed the ability of 
actors to articulate their interests and succeed in having them accepted as legitimate 
concerns or grounds for change within the political process (Vatn 2015). 
• Evidence of overarching policy paradigms, which have shaped goals and problem 
definitions within the policy process and have become integrated into the institutional 
design and structure itself (Greener 2002). 
o Mechanisms of policy stability should be considered within paradigms, in 
order to extend our understanding of how the institutional design of the 
UNFCCC has shaped actors’ behaviour alongside the signals, reward and 
penalties that policies themselves provide (Pierson 2000). 
• Evidence that uncertainty about medium and long term impacts of climate change 
affected the initial configuration of power, knowledge and formal institutional 
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properties and, in combination with the overarching policy paradigm, shaped states’ 
perceptions of the climate change problem and potential solutions, and their 
willingness to adhere to commitments (Haas 2004). 
• Evidence that competing interpretations of institutional rules have mobilised different 
coalitions into movements seeking particular interpretations of these rules in policy 
making (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). 
4.5 Data sources 
Taking a historical view requires a long time-period for inquiry, but UNFCCC negotiations 
and policy are well-documented and UNFCCC documentation is largely publicly available, 
providing primary sources covering the entirety of the period in question. The full range of 
data sources that were used for the qualitative analysis is set out here: 
4.5.1  Official COP output 
The key primary source for analysis of how the UNFCCC itself has evolved was official policy 
documents produced at each annual COP meeting, beginning with the 1992 UNFCCC 
Convention itself then continuing in 1995, before which no COP was held because the 
UNFCCC was being ratified. These documents detail the policies agreed by UNFCCC Parties 
across the spectrum of UNFCCC governance, and therefore represent the official output of 
the institution. This can be construed as the rules created by the institution that detail what 
is expected of Parties and how policy areas will function. Content includes the official 
institutional link between the COP and GEF, guidance from the COP to the GEF and other 
funds created subsequently, the governing instruments of the Adaptation Fund and GCF, 
and specific climate finance commitments and instructions, as well as myriad other 
references to climate finance contained within other policy areas such as guidance for 
national governments’ communications to the UNFCCC and deforestation policy. The detail 
and specificity vary, but this is the highest level of policy and covers all Parties, so granularity 
in terms of implementation by each national government is not included. 
4.5.2  Earth Negotiations Bulletin 
Official COP output is vital to show what policies have been agreed by Parties and how 
institutional rules are developing, but these documents cannot tell us how that agreement 
has been reached or reveal the process of negotiation. In order to go beyond COP output, 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) commentaries offer the best available insight into 
negotiation processes. The ENB is a balanced and independent service produced by the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), a Canadian non-profit 
organisation. ENB staff produce a 2-4 page summary and commentary immediately after 
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each day of UN environment and development negotiations, including UNFCCC 
negotiations, and a longer summary at the end of each meeting. The service began as an 
NGO joint initiative at the 5th preparatory meeting in advance of the 1992 Earth Summit, 
when the Convention was signed, and has continued ever since (IISD 2017). The ENB records 
used for this project cover main annual UNFCCC COP meetings, multiple meetings of states 
under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and Subsidiary Body for Science and 
Technology Advice (SBSTA) where policy is developed and brought to the COP meetings. In 
addition, meetings under the AWG-LCA and ADP processes that led to COP-15 in 2009 and 
COP-21 in 2015 respectively, and various other informal or intercessional meetings are 
included. 
UNFCCC negotiations are not minuted or transcribed, but the ENB offers a detailed 
and consistent commentary that gives some insight into the positions taken by different 
countries, key points of disagreement and how negotiations progressed in advance of the 
final policies articulated in official COP output. This insight is vital, since historical 
institutionalist analysis involves seeking evidence of whether and how actors have adapted 
to each other and to institutional rules, and whether and how previous policy has shaped 
expectations and negotiating positions, for example in terms of how developing country 
actors alter their demands or choose language that indicates they have adapted to 
institutional rules. The ENB has been used as an authoritative source of information about 
negotiations by numerous scholarly publications (e.g. Müller, 2006, p. 6,12,16,23-24; Betzold, 
2010, pp. 138–140; Winkler and Beaumont, 2010, p. 644,646; Rietig, 2014, pp. 381–384; Pauw 
et al., 2018, p. 24), and more centrally in a small number of other analyses of UNFCCC 
negotiations, such as Castro et al. (2014), to provide detailed insight into the policy process. 
4.5.3  Party submissions and other UNFCCC documentation 
Parties are able to submit documents to the UNFCCC before and during meetings, providing 
a means to articulate their perspectives or make proposals on how policy should be drafted. 
With official policy the result of multi-Party negotiations and Parties only having limited 
time to state their positions within negotiations, submissions from Parties can give an 
indication of policy positions that may go beyond what is captured in the ENB. These are a 
less comprehensive primary source, since the number of submissions and the particular 
Parties that make them is highly variable at each stage and topic of policy making. In 
addition, discussions under the SBI and SBSTA were sometimes referred to as policy was 
developed leading up to a COP or to reveal policies that were negotiated but then not adopted 
officially at a COP and therefore not in COP reports. For the purposes of this analysis, Party 
submissions and SBI/SBSTA reports were used to add additional insight into Party 
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positioning to supplement ENB commentary, in relation to existing policies and 
institutional rules and norms, the strategies they use when presenting their positions, and, 
crucially, the articulation of policy proposals and the language they use. Whenever relevant 
party submissions or SBI/SBSTA reports or other UNFCCC documents are mentioned in the 
ENB or official policy documents, or identified through other secondary sources, they were 
obtained from the UNFCCC’s document portal. 
4.5.4  Secondary literature and UNFCCC reports 
Secondary literature is particularly important for analysis of institutional design. The 
UNFCCC was created in a process lasting from around 1990 until the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, when the Convention was signed. There 
was obviously no prior institutional policy, and ENB commentary did not begin until later 
in the process, but it is vital to get an insight into the process of creating the UNFCCC as the 
basis for the institutional processes under examination in this project. As a result, books, 
news reports and peer-reviewed literature take on a greater significance for this stage of 
analysis because they offer the only means to get this kind of insight that is coeval to the 
design process itself. Throughout the period under analysis, however, secondary sources 
commenting on or analysing events in negotiations and policy output from the UNFCCC 
offer additional insight into the behaviour of actors and their policy choices, thereby adding 
an additional layer of richness to the temporally constructed narrative. In some cases, 
secondary literature is produced for or published by the UNFCCC, such as notable 
assessments of climate finance flows.  
4.5.5  Breakdown of sources and documents 
In the context of the UNFCCC institution, this project has made use of official negotiation 
reports and policy documents in combination with ENB commentary and Party submissions 
to ensure the most comprehensive basis from which to assess both institutional rules and 
actor behaviour adapted in line with such rules. The table below details all the documents 
that were analysed. A detailed list of UNFCCC and ENB documents can be found in 
Appendices I & II at the end of the thesis. 
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Document Source Availability 
UNFCCC Convention (4.5.1) UNFCCC  Available on UNFCCC website 
UNFCCC COP reports 
(4.5.1) 
UNFCCC  All available on UNFCCC 
website 
Daily Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin commentaries 
from COPs and other 
UNFCCC meetings (4.5.2) 
International Institute 
for Sustainable 
Development  
Available on IISD website for 
the UNCED and UNFCCC 
meetings dating back to INC-
11 in 1995 (before COP-1) 
Submissions by Parties and 
other UNFCCC procedural 
documents (4.5.3) 
UNFCCC Relevant submissions and 
other documents can be 
obtained from UNFCCC 
document portal 
Secondary sources and 
other UNFCCC reports 
(4.5.4) 
Library and other 
scholarly sources, NGO 
and research 
organisation websites. 
N/A 
 
4.5.6 Process 
Gathering processual data will involve several stages: 
 
1. Source material: The UNFCCC Convention document and both contemporary and later 
commentary on the treaty and the two-year process of its design under the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee set up by the UN General Assembly. 
Objective: Systematically identifying policy clauses and wording related to 
institutional design generally and to climate finance specifically. This includes the 
foundation of the financial mechanism and selection of the GEF but also other, less 
immediately significant sections that are linked or refer to, or have potential 
implications for, how actors will relate to each other. 
Process: Manually reading through the Convention document and extracting 
clauses identified as relevant to climate finance and institutional design. 
 
2. Source material: UNFCCC reports from annual climate negotiations (COPs) since 1995 
and negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) once these began in 2005. Official COP 
and CMP reports contain the high-level policies agreed by all UNFCCC Parties, which 
set expectations of action that Parties should take, underpin the creation, 
implementation and oversight of policies by UNFCCC sub-bodies, and guide creation 
of subsequent policy. 
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Objective: Analysis of Articles (policies) and other sections relevant to climate 
finance, to create a comprehensive catalogue of UNFCCC climate finance policy output. 
This output is a vital part of the institutional “rules” that form the structure in which 
actors are operating and an accurate and comprehensive collection of data is essential 
to identify continuity and change in policy design and how policy output reflects what 
actors and coalitions seek to achieve. 
Process: Work through the policy documents manually, copying or summarising 
relevant sections/paragraphs of policy into Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. After 
completing each document, check for missed references or paragraphs by searching for 
these key words: “financ” (to cover finance and financial), and “fund” (to cover fund and 
funding). 
 
3. Source material: Daily commentaries from COPs and other intermediate UNFCCC 
meetings produced by Earth Negotiation Bulletin, part of the independent International 
Institute for Sustainable Development. These documents are the closest to meeting 
minutes that is available for UNFCCC negotiations and conferences. A 2-4 page report 
is produced each day for UNFCCC COPs and intermediate meetings, dating back to the 
UNCED and recommencing with INC-11 before the first COP in 1995, and a longer 
summary report is produced for the final day of each meeting. 
Objective: Analyse commentaries for relevant information concerning how different 
states negotiated climate finance policy. The key aim with these documents is to look for 
evidence of which actors are successful in achieving their policy goals, how coalitions 
formed and functioned, how restricted actors are in their choice of policy and how layers 
of policy have influenced North-South (or other) negotiating dynamics. Such evidence 
can then be placed in the context of policy output and development, facilitating analysis 
of actor behaviour in relation to institutional rules and thereby identify mechanisms of 
institutional influence and events leading to institutional reinforcement and change. 
Additionally, of interest will be evidence that states appealed directly to justice 
terminology or principles and demonstrated normative positions during negotiations. 
Process: Reading through each document was impractical for the volume of 
documents/pages that need to be reviewed (615). Instead, searching using this set of key 
words allowed for as comprehensive a review as possible to be performed: 
• “financ” (to cover finance, financial and financial mechanism, as well as public 
finance and private finance) 
• “fund” (to cover fund/s and funding, LDC Fund and Adaptation Fund, public 
funding and private funding) 
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• “GEF” 
• “GCF” 
• “SCCF” 
• “LDCF” 
• “cost” 
• “support” 
• “resource” 
• “assist” (to cover assist and assistance – often used as a catch-all for finance, 
capacity building and technology transfer) 
• “hist” (to cover historical responsibility/ies) 
• “MOI” (acronym for “means of implementation,” a term used to refer to financial 
and other forms of support in later stages of negotiations). 
As with any manual process, it is possible that some relevant statements were not 
captured but this large set of keywords covered the vast majority of ways that climate 
finance is referred to within the negotiations. 
 
4. Source material: Submissions by Parties to UNFCCC COPs and other meetings and sub-
bodies, reports from SBI/SBSTA negotiations and other UNFCCC documentation. 
Parties are often invited by the COP or sub-bodies to provide input to the policy process 
through dedicated submissions, which vary in length and detail from one paragraph to 
several pages. Parties can make individual submissions or joint submissions with other 
members of a particular bloc or other Parties with whom they have aligned on the issue 
in question. SBI/SBSTA reports detail policy development and sometimes policies are 
agreed at these meetings but do not become official policy output. Whenever relevant 
submissions, SBI/SBSTA reports or other UNFCCC documents are mentioned in official 
policy or ENB commentary (with sufficient information to obtain them from the 
UNFCCC website’s document portal – usually a document code) they were included in 
data gathering. 
Objective: To identify additional evidence of how Parties have approached policy 
formation and the influence of previous policies. 
Process: Manual analysis of submissions and matching relevant position 
statements or proposals to policy output and ENB commentary. 
 
5. Source material: Secondary sources such as academics, media outlets, research 
organisations and NGOs. There are many such sources that document events within 
UNFCCC negotiations and analyse policy developments and how states have interacted. 
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Objective: To obtain additional insight into negotiations, Parties’ policy positions 
and negotiating dynamics, including North-South relationships. 
Process: Any relevant output obtained was incorporated into data gathering. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how this project has gathered data and will use historical 
institutionalism to perform qualitative analysis of the origins and development of the 
UNFCCC climate finance policy between 1992 and 2015. A range of primary and secondary 
sources were used to gather data and facilitate the application of a historical 
institutionalism approach to a global governance regime where repeated rounds of 
negotiation make it different from more bureaucratic or governmental institutions that are 
the traditional focus of historical institutionalism. Identifying key theoretical mechanisms 
indicates how historical institutionalism provides theoretical tools for building up 
temporally constructed narratives that examine how the institution was designed, how actors 
have behaved, and how layers of policy have built up over time. Within these narratives, the 
objective is to identify micro-processes that show how institutional rules and structures have 
influenced actor behaviour and policy output. Key to the analysis is how coalitions of actors 
have formed and interacted with each other in the policy process, in the context of the initial 
institutional design and the subsequent evolution of rules and structures that have 
reinforced particular power distribution or policy preferences. In doing so, legacies of North-
South power imbalances and the wider development assistance sector can be identified and 
traced over time, adding valuable new insight to the existing understanding of how political 
contestation over climate justice and key elements of climate finance policy have shaped 
outcomes of the UNFCCC climate finance governance process. The analysis using the 
approach set out here will commence in the next chapter. 
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5. Voluntary climate finance and the 
assessment of needs 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Throughout the UNFCCC’s development, political decisions driven by donor countries’ 
perceptions of what is feasible have dominated finance policy and dictated the US$100 
billion funding pledges that are the pinnacle of UNFCCC climate finance policy, and 
climate finance flows remain inadequate for meeting the needs of developing countries for 
taking action in response to climate change (Ciplet et al. 2013, pp. 56–57). Consequently, the 
policy process is characterised by contestation over how to get developed countries to 
commit to providing funding and how to ensure that these commitments are fulfilled 
(Pendleton and Retallack 2009). The political or power dimensions of donor influence over 
the UNFCCC climate finance policy process have roots in the strong connections between 
climate finance and the broader development assistance system (Haites 2011, Gupta 2014), 
which was formed largely under the control of developed countries and according to their 
willingness to provide finance, and is associated with considerable Southern distrust of 
Northern governments (Young 2002b). This history of distrust and associated injustice 
affects the UNFCCC policy process, as developing countries are influenced by histories of 
inequity and react to years of unmet expectations of climate finance (Bulkeley and Newell 
2015, p. 49, Flannery 2015, p. 86). Developed countries, meanwhile, are influenced by the 
unwillingness of their taxpayers to dramatically increase financial flows to developing 
countries over and above existing aid budgets (Pendleton and Retallack 2009, p. 23). 
Historical institutionalists assert that institutional design reflects the broader 
systemic environment in which institutions are formed (Thelen and Steinmo 1992), which 
in this case is the history and uneven power distribution of the development assistance 
system. Others argue that policy paradigms shape how actors perceive the problem an 
institution is seeking to address (Hall 1993); here there is clear North-South split, with 
developed countries seeking to voluntarily mobilise finance independently of a clear needs- 
or ethically-based framework, and developing countries seeking to ensure that finance is 
adequate to meet their needs and account for developed countries’ historical responsibility. 
Historical institutionalism suggests that these ideas or problem definitions are likely to 
mobilise groups of actors to preserve or re-shape the UNFCCC’s institutional structure 
(Sanders 2008). In addition, there is still considerable uncertainty surrounding the 
calculation of what will be required to fund the global response to climate change, and 
  Page 92 of 265   
thereby meet the needs of developing countries and fulfil the objectives of the UNFCCC 
(Bouwer and Aerts 2006). This kind of uncertainty is likely to reinforce initial power 
distribution and contribute to actors’ perceptions and preferences in the policy process 
(Haas 2004). 
Donor control over finance flows, and a potential policy paradigm based on this 
premise, is a significant thread throughout the history of climate finance and North-South 
division in the policy process. Investigating mechanisms that have led to institutional 
structures reinforcing the paradigm will capitalise on the retrospective approach of 
historical institutionalism by showing how actors gained distributional advantages from the 
UNFCCC’s design and layers of subsequent policy (Bennett and Elman 2006), and how these 
institutional structures shaped the goals and preferences of actors and their expectations of 
each other’s behaviour (Hall and Taylor 1996, Greener 2002). The aim of this chapter is to 
investigate the extent to which these advantages shaped North-South policy contestation 
and perpetuated donor control over finance flows, in the context of the inadequate levels of 
climate finance that has so far been the result of 25 years of policy. Accordingly, this chapter 
will first assess the Convention and its creation process to identify the extent to which a 
voluntary paradigm influenced actors’ perceptions and objectives, and the initial 
institutional design. Secondly, the chapter will focus on three sub-themes to examine how 
the voluntary paradigm became embedded in the UNFCCC’s institutional rule structures: 
calculation of climate finance needs, the basis and specificity of developed countries 
finance commitments, and institutional influence on whether those commitments are 
fulfilled. 
5.2 Roots of the voluntary paradigm in the Convention 
Gupta (2014, p. 54) argues that in the years leading up to the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development in 1992, when the UNFCCC was signed, a liability paradigm was initially 
prevalent in statements at various climate conferences, such as Noordwijk in 1989 and the 
Second World Climate Conference in 1990, which would have brought a legal basis for 
developed countries’ obligations to reduce emissions and compensate other countries for 
climate change harms. In addition, a duty to provide compensation for the alternative, more 
costly, development paths that developing countries would need to take as a result of climate 
change was recognised at various climate conferences such as The Hague in 1989 (Zaelke 
and Cameron 1990, p. 283). As negotiations leading to the UNCED (where the UNFCCC was 
created) began, developing countries stressed their need to develop and what they saw as the 
obligation of industrialised countries to provide financial resources since they held 
responsibility for causing the climate change problem (Bodansky 1993, p. 480). The G-77 
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used strong normative rhetoric, such as ‘”guilt,” “historical responsibility,” “compensation 
for past deeds” and the “right” of the poor to 0.7 percent of the GNP of the rich in the form 
of ODA’ to press for a moral, compensatory basis for the global response to climate change 
(Goldemberg 1994, p. 179). 
However, the reality of what this basis for North-South burden sharing would 
actually entail in financial terms was made clear when the UNCED Secretariat released an 
estimate that the “new and additional” resources required for fulfilling Agenda 21 (a broader 
environment and sustainable development agenda including climate change) would 
amount to US$125 billion per year. This frightened many of the developed countries 
participating in the UNCED negotiations and illuminated the inadequacy of the existing 
voluntary contributions to the GEF, which had been funded to the tune of only US$1 billion 
during its pilot phase (Goldemberg 1994, pp. 179–180). Even delegates of a typically more 
progressive country like Sweden acknowledged that the issue was difficult to tackle in an 
economic climate where developed countries felt funds were limited, and when the notion 
of incremental costs (and therefore the magnitude of potential funding needs) was ‘still not 
sufficiently explored’ (Kjellen 1994, pp. 164–165). 
As negotiations to create the UNFCCC continued, developed countries consistently 
described provision of finance as “assistance” (Dasgupta 1994, p. 135), and remained firm 
in undertaking commitments to provide finance to developing countries because of their 
greater capacity to pay, not because of their historical responsibility (Bodansky 1993, p. 480), 
thereby de-legitimising developing countries’ perspective. The US in particular had been 
determined to avoid any normative language referencing “guilt” or responsibility in the 
Convention text (Goldemberg 1994, p. 181). Although most developed countries, with the 
notable exception of the US, accepted the need to provide funding to developing countries 
(Dasgupta 1994, p. 135), developed countries generally remained strongly resistant to 
specific commitments on financial resources (Djoghlaf 1994, p. 107). The firm stance 
demonstrated by developed countries suggests the presence of a coalition of actors with 
aligned preferences seeking to influence institutional design. In this case, a leadership 
paradigm emerged within the negotiations over creating the Convention, casting developed 
countries as leaders rather than polluters, thereby obscuring their responsibility for causing 
harm and obligation to provide compensation and instead implying that developed 
countries would voluntarily reduce emissions, provide financial and technological support 
to countries affected by climate change, and allow space for developing countries to continue 
developing (Gupta 2014, p. 54). 
From a strategic perspective, a paradigm of leadership or, more specifically to 
climate finance, voluntarily assisting developing countries with excessive burdens, was more 
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acceptable for developed countries fearful of binding commitments to cover the vast 
potential costs involved in financing developing countries’ ongoing, and relatively 
uncertain, future needs for responding to climate change (Schipper 2006, p. 86). North (1990) 
argues that reducing the uncertainty involved in interaction between states, particularly 
where information is lacking, is a key function of institutions. Institutionalising a frame or 
paradigm where climate finance was built on a foundation of voluntarism or assistance, 
rather than as a moral or leadership obligation, would cap the financial uncertainty involved 
in co-ordinating global climate policy amongst developed and developing countries, 
although obviously to the advantage of developed countries by effectively giving them 
control over how much finance to provide. This control is the key result of the shift from a 
liability to a leadership paradigm and the resultant voluntary underpinning for how climate 
finance should be structured. Institutionalisation of the voluntary paradigm can be seen in 
the Convention text, so is vital to understanding how the UNFCCC institutional design set 
the stage for policy development.  
The final Convention text includes several provisions making reference to or briefly 
outlining the financial commitments that are expected from developed country Parties, and 
while voluntarism is not mentioned, the Convention includes no clauses that would take 
control away from donor countries. Article 4.3, on commitments for climate change action, 
includes an expectation that developed countries will provide financial resources needed to 
meet the “agreed full incremental costs” of developing countries (i.e. costs over and above 
business-as-usual spending). However, this is only in relation to carrying out specified 
climate change-related actions, including adaptation, education and awareness, quantifying 
emissions and the like, and notably does not cover mitigation actions. The terminology of 
“agreed full incremental costs”, which has subsequently become a standard part of UNFCCC 
climate finance policy, was a key compromise in the final stages of negotiation and ‘the 
enshrining of incremental costs in the Convention without any prior analysis, 
understanding, definition or clarity, was a means of maintaining ambiguity’ regarding what 
financial and other assistance UNFCCC policy could require developed countries to provide 
(Rahman and Roncerel 1994, p. 260).  
Article 4.3 goes on the state that ‘the implementation of these commitments shall 
take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds’. Consistent 
with the perspective demonstrated in negotiations leading up to the UNCED, developing 
countries perceived Article 4.3 as a commitment by developed countries to provide financial 
resources and a clear indication that progress towards achievement of the Convention’s 
objectives was dependent upon fulfilment of these commitments (Hyder 1994, p. 217). 
However, the text does not bind developed countries and provides little for developing 
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countries to lean on in holding developed countries to account or bringing about clear 
commitments in policy. It also implies that developing countries retain control over how 
they relate finance commitments to notions or calculations of “adequacy”, thereby implicitly 
reinforcing the voluntary paradigm and excluding principles of compensation. 
Article 4.8 instructs that developed country Parties should take into account the ‘the 
specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects 
of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures’ in 
implementation of the activities set out in Article 4, such as small island countries, fragile 
ecosystems and areas prone to natural disasters. This is expanded upon by 4.9, which 
specifies that ‘Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations’ of 
LDCs with regard to funding and technology transfer.1 Despite making direct reference to 
needs, Articles 4.8 and 4.9 again left the emphasis with developed countries to determine 
what finance they will provide. In terms of needs assessment procedure, Article 11.3(d) states 
that the financial mechanism shall include ‘determination in a predictable and identifiable 
manner of the amount of funding necessary and available for the implementation of this 
Convention and the conditions under which that amount shall be periodically reviewed.’ 
One again, though, no principles or process for determination of funding needs are 
specified, leaving this policy area on very vague foundations. 
Although the Convention includes several references to the needs and 
circumstances of developing countries and the provision of adequate and predictable 
funding, overall the Convention’s initial policies on North-South financial transfers reflect 
the approaches advocated by the US and other developed countries (Nitze 1994, p. 194). 
Areas that could have seen control moving from donor countries to the plural body of the 
UNFCCC, such as assessments of need or definitions of “adequacy”, were left vague; the 
Convention did not specify how financial commitments would be structured and connected 
developing countries’ needs, how needs would be defined or assessed, or appropriate 
timescales for fulfilment of finance commitments. Ambiguity may seem to be the opposite 
of reducing uncertainty, but the ambiguity left developed countries protected from the 
uncertainty of firm moral or legal responsibility for the spiralling costs that developing 
countries would incur in responding to climate change. While this did not necessarily 
 
1 As a result of these main clauses, as negotiations proceeded, climate finance has been dealt with 
under the financial mechanism discussions supplemented by discussions and policy regarding 
adverse effects of climate change and policy implementation, relating Article 4.8 and 4.9 and 
generally referred to as “adverse effects”. 
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cement a voluntary paradigm, the way it advantaged developed countries certainly created a 
foundation for a voluntary framing to become institutionalised. 
5.3 Voluntarism and assessment of funding needs 
The previous section identified the roots of a framing or policy paradigm of voluntary 
commitments in the Convention, after developed countries prevailed in policy negotiations. 
The advantages gained from this aspect of institutional design reflected North-South 
division and power inequality; exploring how the voluntary paradigm has been reinforced 
and sustained, and determining how it has contributed to subsequent policies within 
UNFCCC climate finance, is important for identifying how institutional influence 
reinforced or diminished this aspect of Northern advantage. The first key area of policy 
concerning levels of finance is the assessment of developing countries’ needs, in terms of 
how climate change will affect them and the support they will need to implement policies 
and activities in pursuit of the mitigation and adaptation objectives of the UNFCCC regime. 
This is a highly complex area (see 2.2.1 above) but one which is central to understanding how 
UNFCCC policy relates to the broader climate finance sector and which states or groups of 
states, if any, consider that UNFCCC policy and the climate finance it leads to are “fair” and 
“adequate”. 
While the Convention briefly indicated an expectation that developed countries 
ought to take into account developing countries’ needs, it gave no indication of how to 
conduct such assessments or how they would or should influence finance commitments 
made by developing countries. In addition, the Convention failed to define what “adequate” 
finance will entail, and therefore how “needs” should be defined or conceptualised within 
institutional processes, leaving considerable ambiguity around what the basis of financial 
needs assessment should be (Verheyen 2002, p. 132). This section will trace how ambiguity 
around finance needs assessment was initially addressed in the four years following the 
Convention’s signing, as COP negotiations began and institutional arrangements with the 
GEF were established. The ongoing influence of the voluntary paradigm will then be 
examined through subsequent negotiation rounds as developing countries sought to ensure 
their needs formed a prominent part of the UNFCCC climate finance system, while 
developed countries sought to minimise the extent to which UNFCCC policy would move 
away from a basis of donor willingness to take recipient needs into account when making 
finance commitments. 
5.3.1  Initial operationalisation of needs assessment 
At the first COP in 1995, decision 11/CP.1 paragraph 1(a)(vi) briefly describes a reciprocal 
relationship between developed country Parties and the operating entity of the financial 
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mechanism, whereby information flows to Parties ‘to assist them to take into full account 
the need for adequacy and predictability’ of finance, and requires the operating entity of the 
financial mechanism to use needs assessment procedures created by the COP under Article 
11.3(d) of the Convention. Needs assessment arrangements were mentioned the following 
year in the memorandum of understanding (MOU) that established the connection between 
the UNFCCC and the GEF (governed by the GEF Council), which was an important step in 
institutionalising the selection of the GEF as the first operating entity of the financial 
mechanism. The MOU was adopted in 1996, and includes a clause that ‘COP and the [GEF] 
Council shall jointly determine the aggregate GEF funding requirements for the purpose of 
the Convention. Procedures to facilitate such a joint determination will be developed by the 
COP and the Council and annexed to this Memorandum’ (decision 12/CP.2, Annex, 9). 
Werksman (1996, p. 59) describes North-South contestation over policy that could disrupt 
developed countries’ advantage gained from the role of the GEF, when he argued that if the 
negotiations on funding assessment 
shift the power to set the GEF's replenishment goals toward the COPs, where developing 
countries hold a numerical majority, demands might quickly outstrip donors' willingness to 
contribute. Should the discretion continue to rest with the donors, the amount of funds 
available through the GEF may continue to bear no relationship the Conventions' 
challenging objectives. 
These discussions represented a key opportunity to reduce the original ambiguity 
surrounding needs assessment processes created by the Convention, and for the UNFCCC 
to either reinforce power distribution and structures from the voluntary, donor-led 
development aid system or break away from these influences with new institutional rule 
structures. Not surprisingly, developed and developing countries disagreed over what should 
be included in the determination of funding requirements. The GEF Council, widely 
considered to be a donor-dominated body (see 2.3.7 above), approved a draft annex to the 
COP/GEF MOU on the topic, but the G77/China group of developing countries tabled its 
own draft annex with a different set of inputs to the assessment process, including 
specifying ownership or oversight of the needs assessment process by the COP rather than 
the GEF Council. Negotiations continued at SBI-4 in 1997 (before COP-3), where ‘Argentina, 
India, Iran and Kuwait supported the G-77/China proposal’, and the Philippines noted that 
‘the G-77/China proposal responds to the needs of developing countries’ and highlighted 
the desire for COP to retain control (ENB-39). Several developed countries sought to prevent 
further discussions beyond those at the GEF Council that had produced the draft annex 
(ENB-39, and written submissions from the US and EU in FCCC/SBI/1996/MISC.1), and also 
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challenged the way the G77/China proposal interpreted language from the Convention 
(ENB-39). 
The annex (FCCC/SBI/1996/14) eventually adopted as policy was ‘derived from the 
GEF-adopted annex’ (ENB-39) but it does note that ‘the COP will make an assessment of the 
amount of funds necessary to assist developing countries, in accordance with guidance 
provided by the COP, in fulfilling their commitments under the Convention over the next 
GEF replenishment period’, taking into account needs that developing countries articulate 
in their national communications to the UNFCCC. However, the first key indication that the 
opportunity to resolve the ambiguity of the Convention with clearer institutional rules was 
not taken is the lack of detail in the annex about how the COP will undertake funding 
calculations, and therefore it certainly ‘does not amount to a full financial needs assessment, 
in any sense of the term’ (Khan and Müller 2011, p. 14). Secondly, the MOU annex ties 
assessment of funding needs to GEF replenishment cycles, which are the periodic phases 
where the GEF Council and donor countries agree between themselves on how much will be 
contributed to the GEF over the subsequent years of the period. This tie was a clear 
reinforcement of donor control over UNFCCC policy by giving prominence to a GEF-
controlled process. 
The annex does indicate that the GEF ‘will take into account fully and 
comprehensively the COP’s assessment’ and report back on this after each replenishment 
cycle, and envisages that GEF reports in advance of a replenishment period will instigate a 
fresh review by the COP of necessary and available funding for climate change activities in 
accordance with Article 11.3(d) of the Convention. However, in practice, GEF assessments 
are submitted to potential donor countries to consider during negotiations over GEF 
replenishment, and it is the outcome of these negotiations that determines GEF funding for 
the subsequent cycle; as a result, ‘for many years, the decisions taken by the GEF on these 
issues have obviated the practical need for the COP to assess the level of funding in the 
manner anticipated in the Annex to the MOU’ (Yamin and Depledge 2004, p. 268). This 
shows that contributions to the GEF remained a voluntary process rather than a COP-
controlled process that might link funding requirements to independent or external needs 
assessments and issue mandatory targets for developed countries. Consequently, adding 
needs assessment to the links with an external institution (the GEF) is evidence of a 
mechanism of policy path reinforcement, making it harder to disrupt the positive feedbacks 
gained from these arrangements by making it more difficult to alter policy away from its 
incumbent design when the external institution has a stake or an official role in that policy 
(Pierson 1994). 
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5.3.2  Contestation of the needs assessment policy 
After completion of the COP/GEF MOU annex on determination of funding requirements, 
developing countries continued to push strongly for a COP-led process to determine 
funding requirements. For example, at SBI-7 in 1997 (before COP-3), Kuwait went as far as 
to suggest an amendment to the Convention which would call on Annex I Parties ‘to provide 
financial resources, including technology transfer, determined by the COP to meet the full 
incremental costs of developing countries' obligations’ (ENB-58). In an indication of 
developing country perceptions, ‘Saudi Arabia said the amendment is the only way to ensure 
necessary funds are forthcoming’ but, not surprisingly, it was rejected by several developed 
countries (ENB-58). At SBI-8 in 1998 (before COP-4), the G-77/China, ‘supported by Saudi 
Arabia, China, India, Venezuela and Ethiopia, called on the SBI to identify the needs of 
developing countries, requesting information from SBSTA and the IPCC’ and ‘proposed that 
the item be taken up at all future COPs’ (ENB-82). The UNFCCC Secretariat produced a 
document outlining needs assessment (FCCC/SBI/1998/CRP.1) which was followed by 
decision 5/CP.4, which built on Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the Convention by stipulating that 
further analysis should include identification of the ‘specific needs and concerns of 
developing country Parties’ arising from the adverse effects of climate change, and 
identification and consideration of actions ‘to meet these specific needs and concerns’. The 
contestation over whether the COP can or should conduct needs assessments indicates that 
there remained a coalition of developing countries actively seeking to change the 
institutional structure founded on the GEF and its replenishment cycles. 
COP-4 policies were reinforced in decision 12/CP.5 (paragraph 3) in 1999, which 
again specifies that the implementation process for Articles 4.8 and 4.9 will ‘identify what 
actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions relating to funding, 
insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of 
developing country Parties’. However, these successive COP decisions did little to alter the 
institutional structure giving control over needs assessment to the GEF, since there 
remained no reference to particular sources of information or operational guidelines for 
determining needs, nor a means to measure whether developed countries have delivered 
commensurate levels of finance. There also is evidence that developing countries’ 
expectations were affected by the voluntary paradigm by beginning to voice demands for 
finance in a way that recognised that there was no institutional mechanism for linking 
finance with needs and that, ultimately, developed countries were in control: ‘the G-
77/China, Nepal and others said developing countries are the most affected by climate 
change, and Annex I countries must implement their commitments relating to provision of 
financial resources’ (ENB-120).  
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5.3.3  Renewed drive to give COP stronger role in needs assessment 
The institutional structure that saw the COP essentially delegate needs assessments to the 
GEF as part of its replenishment negotiations remained stable for several years over three 
funding replenishment cycles. At COP-8 in 2002, however, funding requirements were given 
renewed attention in decision 5/CP.8 (paragraph 3), which requires the UNFCCC Secretariat, 
in consultation with the GEF Council, to prepare a report ‘on the determination of funding 
necessary and available for the implementation of the Convention’. That developing 
countries were able to secure this clause in UNFCCC policy shows developed countries’ 
control of needs assessment, and their subsequent financial obligations, via the GEF was 
still subject to contestation. Developed countries’ response demonstrates their 
determination to rally their coalition in support of existing policy to prevent institutional 
change and protect the advantageous policy path: 
Norway, supported by the US, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, Canada, Australia and the EU, 
and opposed by India, Malaysia, China, called for the deletion of text initiating a process to 
aggregate GEF funding requirements for the UNFCCC, as well as a request to the 
Secretariat to produce a paper for SBI-18 outlining procedures for joint determination of 
necessary and available funding for UNFCCC implementation. (ENB-205) 
A first report (FCCC/SBI/2004/6) was produced for SBI-20 in 2004 (before COP-10) 
and focuses mostly on the GEF’s replenishment process and funding activities, only 
mentioning “adequacy” once despite the purpose set out in decision 5/CP.8. However, the 
future steps section of the report does indicate that the SBI will carry out an ‘assessment of 
the amount of funds necessary to assist developing countries in implementing the 
Convention over the fourth replenishment period of the GEF’ (paragraph 28). Initiation of 
this second report and the data to be included was the subject of considerable debate at SBI-
20. ‘Argentina stressed the importance of accelerating the financial needs assessment under 
the UNFCCC prior to discussions on the next GEF replenishment’ (ENB-234), indicating 
intent to disrupt the existing institutional structure. In contrast, ‘Switzerland said the 
assessment could not be conducted in time for the negotiations on the next GEF 
replenishment’ (ENB-234), and Japan recalled ‘the distinct roles of the GEF and COP in 
jointly determining the amount of available funding’, warning against going beyond the 
remit of the COP/GEF MOU (ENB-242). These statements demonstrate developed countries 
reinforcing the existing structure and their influence through the GEF. 
SBI-20 did instruct the UNFCCC Secretariat and GEF Council to jointly produce a 
report ‘on the assessment of the funding necessary to assist developing countries in 
fulfilling their commitments under the Convention’ (FCCC/SBI/2004/10). This second report 
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(FCCC/SBI/2004/18) was presented to SBI-22 at COP-10 later in 2004, and summarises the 
financial needs identified by non-Annex I Parties in their national communications to the 
UNFCCC, resurrecting a COP-controlled mechanism of aggregating needs that originated 
in the COP/GEF MOU annex but was sidelined by the prominence of the GEF’s own 
assessments (see 5.3.1 above). The report considers that the US$2.7 billion of projects 
identified in non-Annex I Parties’ national communications ‘provides a good indication of 
the needs of Parties and as such represents the activities for potential funding by the GEF 
and bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels’ (paragraph 31), despite the fact that 
reporting investment needs is not the primary purpose of national communications. 
Obviously, the resulting figure is a stark contrast to the much larger funding estimates 
produced outside the UNFCCC (see 2.2.1 above), but is still higher than the US$0.93 billion 
allocated to climate change in the GEF’s second replenishment period and US$0.77-1.14 
estimates for the third replenishment period (GEF 2002). 
Discussions on funding assessment under decision 5/CP.8 continued at COP-10 in 
2004 with a clear North-South split over the existing institutional structure: the G-77/China 
said that, in accordance with the COP/GEF MOU, ‘the COP and GEF should jointly 
determine the necessary funding’, while ‘the US, Canada, EU and Japan supported 
maintaining the existing modalities for identifying funding’ (ENB-254). The resulting policy, 
decision 9/CP.10, acknowledged that the COP ‘did not make a formal assessment or 
communication of the amount of funds for the purpose of the joint determination that are 
necessary to assist developing countries as stated in’ the COP/GEF MOU annex. However, 
while decision 9/CP.10 goes on to state that the UNFCCC Secretariat’s funding assessment 
report should feed into the GEF’s fourth replenishment, it does not include institutional 
rules that will create a process to ensure this happens and only ‘urges’ the GEF council to 
‘ensure that adequate funding is available to enable developing countries to meet their 
commitments under the Convention’. As a result, this layer of policy again emphasised the 
prominence of the GEF, reinforcing existing institutional structures and developing 
countries’ advantage (Pierson 2004). Through the GEF, developed countries retained 
influence over funding needs assessment and setting funding requirements, instead of 
these processes moving more firmly under the authority of the COP, where developing 
countries have greater influence. 
This sequence of reports and policies demonstrates renewed attention to needs 
assessments several years after the MOU annex, which could be construed as developing 
countries building up a coalition to challenge the incumbent institutional structure and 
primacy of the GEF. As Hall (2016) suggests, the “network co-ordination effects” of linkage 
with the GEF have made it more difficult to overcome the policy path that left responsibility 
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for needs assessment and setting financial requirements with the GEF, since institutional 
change in this instance was not simply a matter of changing internal rules, but also altering 
the GEF’s replenishment process that had a remit broader than climate change and under 
the control of developed countries. A full, comprehensive assessment of funding needs was 
not carried out by the COP and the multitude of external assessments not acknowledged, so 
the GEF replenishment process remained the central means of securing financial 
commitments within the UNFCCC. Developed countries were evidently determined to 
preserve the role of the GEF and resist attempts to give the COP greater control over the 
needs assessment process, which might lead to a more structured mechanism for dictating 
what finance they must provide, thereby eroding the voluntary paradigm. 
5.3.4  Examining developed countries’ finance commitments at COP-15 
In 2007 the UNFCCC began leading up to a comprehensive climate change policy milestone 
to be agreed at COP-15 in 2009. Developing countries continued to draw attention to the 
challenge of adapting to and mitigating climate change, and the costs associated with 
responding to this challenge. The 2007 Bali Action Plan, which initiated negotiations 
leading to COP-15, mentioned ‘improved access to adequate, predictable and sustainable 
financial resources’ (decision 1/CP.13, 1(e)(i)), and adaptation policy that included ‘financial 
needs assessments’, ‘taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of developing 
countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially 
the least developed countries and small island developing States, and further taking into 
account the needs of countries in Africa’ (decision 1/CP.13, 1(c)(i)). However, this policy 
platform for the future Copenhagen talks once again reinforced the advantage that 
developed countries gained from weak UNFCCC policy on needs assessment by failing to 
articulate a concrete process to assess needs and link the results to financial targets for 
developed countries. 
As negotiations leading up to the Copenhagen COP began in 2007, the UNFCCC 
Executive Secretary introduced a report by the Secretariat, saying its main findings 
‘concerned financial and investment flows needed in 2030 to meet worldwide mitigation 
and adaptation requirements. For mitigation, he identified the need for an additional USD 
200-210 billion in 2030’ (ENB-336). This assessment of funding requirements was much 
more comprehensive in scope than previous reports based on Parties’ national 
communications, and it was part of a wave of second-generation studies that produced cost 
projections for global response to climate change (Narain et al. 2011). Some of these other 
studies also fed into the UNFCCC negotiation process; for example, at the same meeting in 
2007, consultants ‘estimated that a total of USD 50-170 billion of additional investment and 
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financial flows will be needed for adaptation in 2030’ and the World Bank ‘spoke of the large 
shortfall between current and needed financial flows’ (all ENB-336). 
This new wave of more detailed external climate change cost assessments was 
reflected in renewed attention within negotiations to needs assessment, adequacy and direct 
reference to external studies. As negotiations continued leading towards the Copenhagen 
COP-15, at AWG-LCA-3 in 2008 (before COP-14) ‘AOSIS proposed an adaptation 
framework, containing mechanisms to: ensure timely flows of new and additional resources 
to address immediate and long-term adaptation needs’ (ENB-382). At AWG-LCA-6, the 
African Group ‘emphasized [sic] the urgent need for action, and called for a comprehensive 
international programme on adaptation with scaled-up finance and a target of US$ 70 
billion per year by 2020’ (ENB-413). At AWG-LCA-7, ‘India noted that the new report by the 
World Bank on the Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change estimates that US$75-100 
billion per year is required for adaptation in developing countries. He stressed that this 
range “is probably an underestimate” but should be used as a starting point for discussions 
on the scale of resources needed’ (ENB-434).  
Despite the ongoing prominence of needs in developing countries’ rhetoric, there is 
evidence that their expectations had been shaped by the voluntary paradigm. For example, 
at AWG-LCA-5, the African Group ‘underscored the need for adaptation and massively 
scaled-up and predictable funding’ (ENB-398) but also ‘noted that the necessary scale of 
funding has never been dealt with before under a UN convention and wondered about 
institutional arrangements’ (ENB-400). This suggests that developing countries’ 
expectations had been shaped by past experience of institutional processes (Duit 2007) and 
they were aware of the institutional challenges they faced in securing finance commitments 
that would meet their needs. Developing countries also showed that they perceived finance 
flows as controlled by developed countries and expected to wait for voluntary offers of 
funding: at AWG-LCA-5, AOSIS ‘called for significant public funding and asked developed 
countries how much money they would be “putting on the table” in Copenhagen’ (ENB-399), 
and at AWG-LCA-6, AOSIS ‘urged a “firm commitment” from developed countries to bridge 
the gap between available and necessary financing’ (ENB-415). 
Developing countries were successful in securing quantified financial commitments 
at COP-15, for US$100bn annually by 2020 and US$30bn per year for 2010-2012. However, 
the process of building consensus around these commitments was characterised by 
developed countries volunteering particular sums of finance rather than being shaped by 
the COP and either internal or external assessments of developing countries’ needs. 
Increasing direct, independent offers of finance reinforced the voluntary paradigm in 
response to external studies becoming more numerous and detailed. For example, at AWG-
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LCA-7, ‘Japan highlighted his country’s intention to provide more financial and technical 
assistance than in the past, in accordance with the progress of international negotiations’ 
(ENB-432). While the numerical commitments were significant, they did not alter control 
over the delivery of funding since ‘there was little movement on substantive matters such as 
the amount of finance that would be available’ (ENB-439). At COP-15, ‘US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton announced that the US is prepared to work with other countries to mobilize 
US$100 billion a year by 2020’ and Japan announced they would raise climate aid to about 
US$15 billion by 2012 (ENB-458), as the most powerful developed countries cemented the 
final agreement by reinforcing that financial flows would still be subject to their willingness 
to contribute. 
5.3.5  Needs assessment in the Paris Agreement 
Developing countries primarily focused on the roadmap to achieving the US$100bn annual 
target after its adoption, but they continued to discuss the adequacy of the target and made 
reference to finance necessary to meet their needs and to maintain the agreed temperature 
target (ENB-464). Developed countries continued to announce voluntary funding, rather 
than acknowledging needs assessments or any particular burden-sharing framework that 
underpinned or justified these pledges (ENB-460 & 463), demonstrating their continued 
control over finance actually flowing into the UNFCCC system. Some developing countries 
sought explicitly to prevent the US$100bn figure becoming a de facto limit to pledged or 
expected climate finance, which demonstrates a degree of foresight and remains a key 
challenge for developing countries post-Paris, as they seek to maximise the potential for the 
entrenched voluntary regime to mobilise adequate resources and raise ambition over time. 
In terms of questioning the US$100bn target directly, at AWG-LCA-15 in 2012 
(before COP-18), Barbados ‘indicated that the US$100 billion per year of long-term finance 
would be “grossly inadequate” for assisting countries in adaptation’ (ENB-544). At ADP-2 
(before COP-19), the African Group ‘expressed concern over the lack of adequate mitigation 
finance’ (ENB-568). At ADP-2-5 (before COP-20), the African Group ‘called for a mid-term 
target of US$60-80 billion per year by 2016 and a pathway for moving to US$600 billion per 
year by 2030’, and AILAC identified ‘the need for a mid-term finance target of US$70 billion 
for 2016’ (ENB-598). Tellingly, the African Group said at COP-20 that ‘long-term climate 
finance should not be confined to US$100 billion annually’ (ENB-611), illustrating how this 
figure had become institutionalised without a direct link to evolving developing country 
needs. At ADP-2-10 (before COP-21), the G77/China ‘highlighted the need for: a floor of 
US$100 billion by 2020 with a clear burden-sharing formula; and recognition of the 
principles of the Convention’ (ENB-644).  
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Developing countries also continued to make reference to their needs. At COP-19 in 
2013, China, AOSIS and South Africa expressed disappointment with ‘the lack of ambition, 
proposing that the COP decision urge Annex I parties to increase their level of ambition in 
line with science and CBDR’ (ENB-589) and at ADP-2-5 (before COP-20), the African Group 
‘stressed the need for adaptation needs assessment and assessment of support, including 
clarifying the type and sources of support. Tuvalu suggested incorporating a review 
mechanism to assess if finance matches adaptation needs’ (ENB-598). At COP-20 in 2014, 
‘Egypt said climate finance should be related to the global temperature goal, and called for 
identification of needs, priorities and necessary enabling environments’ (ENB-616). At 
ADP-2-8 (before COP-21), ‘the African Group called for a clear link between a quantitative 
financial goal and temperature goal’ and ‘the G-77/China called for developed countries and 
Annex II parties to provide finance in line with developing country needs, with references 
to Convention Article 4 and CBDR’ (ENB-622). At ADP-2-9 (before COP-21), AOSIS ‘called 
for a goal for climate finance that will keep temperature increase below 1.5°C. Many 
developing countries called for adequate and predictable support’ (ENB-637). Developing 
countries had little to lean on within the institutional structure, though, so these references 
remained objections to the prevailing institutional prioritisation of developed countries’ 
willingness to contribute as the deciding factor in financing levels. 
In contrast, developed countries could negotiate from a position of retaining the 
existing lack of a clear needs assessment process: at COP-20 the US ‘suggested deleting 
reference to mobilization of climate finance “as a means to stay below the long-term 
temperature limit,” and, opposed by the African Group, to “adequate and predictable” 
funding for adaptation’, while ‘Australia and New Zealand did not support linkages between 
mitigation ambition, adaptation needs, the global temperature goal and finance’ (ENB-611). 
Provisions advocated by developing countries were whittled away during negotiations and 
the final Paris Agreement commits developed countries only to a ‘continuation of their 
existing obligations under the Convention’ (Article, 9, paragraph 1) (Obergassel et al. 2015, 
pp. 257–258), indicating a path of least resistance to reiterate the existing voluntary 
arrangements rather than alter the finance process to include needs assessment more 
robustly. Additional clauses state that ‘Parties recognize the importance of support for and 
international cooperation on adaptation efforts and the importance of taking into account 
the needs of developing country Parties’ (Article 7, paragraph 6), and that the global 
stocktake, where commitments are reviewed and expected to be enhanced, shall include 
reviewing ‘the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support provided for 
adaptation’ (Article 7, paragraph 14). However, once again there are no detailed institutional 
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rules to give developing countries greater influence over determining adequacy or linking 
needs to clear requirements for what developed countries must provide. 
Decision 1/CP.21 (adopting of the Paris Agreement) confirmed that ‘developed 
countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization goal’ (the US$100bn 
target) until 2025 and stipulating that by then the COP ‘shall set a new collective quantified 
goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities 
of developing countries’ (paragraph 53). The decision also ‘recognizes the importance of 
adequate and predictable financial resources’ (paragraph 54), but again does not give any 
procedural details. Prior to 2020, when the Agreement comes into force, the COP ‘resolves to 
enhance the provision of urgent and adequate finance’ and ‘strongly urges developed 
country Parties to scale up their level of financial support, with a concrete road map to 
achieve the goal of jointly providing USD 100 billion annually by 2020 for mitigation and 
adaptation while significantly increasing adaptation finance from current levels’ (paragraph 
114). This this relatively vague language where developed countries “intend” and are “urged” 
to act ultimately reiterated the US$100bn as a general target and reinforced the existing 
voluntary paradigm, giving little hope that funding will be increased in line with the needs 
of developing countries (Sharma 2017), particularly as adaptation costs continue to spiral 
and the significant gap widens between funding provision and needs (UNEP 2015).  
5.4 Clear, assessed and defined financial commitments 
Developing countries have faced an ongoing challenge within the policy process to convert 
expressions of support by developed countries for contributing climate finance to 
developing countries into firm commitments and quantified finance policy. This challenge 
embodies the embedded nature of the voluntary regime, with donor willingness 
underpinning UNFCCC climate finance policy rather than quantified needs assessments 
and legally binding or enforced commitments. The previous section showed that early 
climate finance policy was dominated by insubstantial needs assessment policy and reliance 
on the GEF and its replenishment process, and during this period developing countries 
combined their efforts on securing funding for adaptation with a push to move away from 
the GEF and introduce a system that would make funding mandatory rather than voluntary. 
While this push was unsuccessful, the next key drive for assessed funding came when the 
many rounds of negotiations leading up to COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 opened up a 
broad remit of policy making (first under the Convention Dialogue and then the AWG-LCA). 
In this negotiating space, developing countries consistently increased justice-based 
references to assessing developed countries’ contributions according to specific GDP 
percentages, building on the ability-to-pay principle, or burden sharing arrangements based 
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on the polluter pays principle and historical responsibility for emissions. This section will 
examine the impact of these increasing demands for assessed contributions and an 
institutional burden-sharing procedure, which challenged the voluntary paradigm by 
‘calling for a paradigm shift, in which financing for climate change is seen as reparation or 
compensation for loss and damage, based on historical responsibility and therefore 
obligatory, and not discretionary, in the same vein as ODA’ (ENB-439). 
5.4.1  Efforts to secure mandatory funding as part of the new Marrakesh 
funds 
Yamin and Depledge (2004, p. 279) argue that negotiations at COPs 5-7 (1999-2001) were 
influenced by developing countries’ initial years of experience of what could and could not 
be funded through the GEF, whose procedures, while influenced by COP decisions, were set 
by the donor-controlled GEF Council. This generated support for the creation of new funds 
at COP-7 that would give greater attention and priority to adaptation and broader 
development efforts, for which developing countries had long sought greater funding, as 
they continued attempts to subvert the intentions of the initial institutional design (Thelen 
1999). Proposals for new funds from the Umbrella Group and the EU formed the basis of 
discussions at COP-6, but developed countries showed little inclination to move beyond the 
centrality of the GEF and its replenishment process towards any kind of mandatory funding 
framework. The perspective of developing countries regarding both justice and the strength 
of the existing institutional structure was made clear by the response from the G77/China, 
which stressed that ‘“the ball is in the court of developed countries,” saying they have the 
economic resources and have caused the problem, and therefore it is their responsibility to 
resolve this’ (ENB-162). 
COP-6 ended without an overall agreement and was continued at a supplementary 
conference (COP-6.bis). Negotiations over the proposed funds included ‘whether 
contributions to funds should be voluntary or mandatory and who should contribute’ (ENB-
171) and demonstrated clear division between developed and developing countries: 
Most Annex I Parties, opposed by developing countries, supported voluntary rather than 
mandatory levels of contribution, and opposed any compliance consequences/penalties. One 
developed country added that levels of contributions should be set for countries collectively, 
not individually, and did not accept the formula for burden sharing, which calculates Annex 
I Parties’ financial contributions based on their share of carbon dioxide emissions in 1990. 
Annex I Parties also preferred building on existing institutions, with a focus on the GEF. 
(ENB-169) 
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Ultimately, ‘developing countries compromised by agreeing not to insist on mandatory 
funding’ (ENB-176), thereby withdrawing their bid to gather a coalition of sufficient strength 
to secure institutional change on this matter (Hall 2016). The text of decision 7/CP.7, which 
launches the LDC Fund and SCCF, does recognise the need for new and additional funding 
beyond that already given to the GEF, but specifies only that Annex I Parties ‘should provide 
funding for developing country Parties’ through the new funds as well as existing GEF and 
bilateral/multilateral channels (paragraph 1(c)). Annex II Parties ‘shall be invited to 
contribute’ to the SCCF (emphasis added).2 
The Adaptation Fund uses a novel levy on CDM projects as a source of funding, and 
decision 11/CP.7 states only that ‘Parties included in Annex I that intend to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol are invited to provide funding’ additional to the levy (paragraph 3, emphasis added). 
While the CDM levy is a non-discretionary source of funding, Khan and Roberts (2013, p. 
175) argue that the levy actually extracts money that technically belongs to the nations 
hosting the projects, which are mostly larger developing countries such as China, India and 
Brazil. These countries view the levy as a solidarity payment with LDCs and other developing 
countries, meaning the levy does not represent developed countries having agreed to a 
mechanism for mandatory funding contributions. As ENB-176 reported, ‘from a developing 
country perspective, the texts mirror the compromise’ that they made over the LDC Fund 
and SCCF, ‘under which they lost out on their previous insistence on mandatory funding 
levels or any setting of funding levels.’ As a result, although developing countries tried to 
generate sufficient momentum within negotiations to break out of the voluntary paradigm 
and secure mandatory funding streams, the Marrakesh funds added additional layers of 
policy to reinforce the prevalence of donor prerogative within the financial mechanism and 
strengthen the voluntary funding policy paradigm; ‘as one developing country delegate 
expressed it “they have shown us the blank checks [sic], now the question is will they actually 
enter any figures”’ (ENB-176).  
5.4.2  Attempts to reinforce justice-based finance before COP-15 
The early stages of negotiations leading up to COP-15 saw developing countries make 
renewed efforts to bring developed countries’ historical responsibility into the policy 
process. At the fourth Convention Dialogue in 2007 (before COP-13), AOSIS ‘proposed a new 
fund based on the “polluter pays principle” to link emissions to Annex I countries funding 
commitments’ (ENB-336), and at AWG-LCA-2 in 2008 (before COP-14), AOSIS said that the 
aim of their financing proposals was to ‘implement Convention articles including 4.3 and 
 
2 There is no equivalent clause concerning the LDC Fund in decision 7/CP.7. 
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4.4, in line with the polluter pays principle’ (ENB-337). At AWG-LCA-3, ‘Brazil noted that the 
“polluter pays” principle should be applied in conjunction with historical responsibility’ 
(ENB-382), at AWG-LCA-4/COP-14, ‘Bhutan said polluters should pay for adaptation 
financing’ (ENB-394) and at AWG-LCA-5, ‘Bolivia stressed that developed countries should 
pay their climatic debt’ (ENB-407). At AWG-LCA-7, ‘Uganda, for the LDCs, highlighted that 
developed countries’ responsibility under international law to redress damage caused by 
climate change formed the basis for public funding from those countries’ (ENB-432) and 
‘Venezuela said that developed countries were using “green excuses” to get out of their 
historical responsibilities’ (ENB-434). ‘India stressed that ODA financing is discretionary 
while climate change finance should be assessed based on clear acknowledgement of 
historical responsibility’ (ENB-438). 
Developing countries also built on ethical obligations by demanding that finance 
commitments should be specified as a defined proportion of GDP, representing overall 
ability to pay. At the fourth Convention Dialogue in 2007, Algeria ‘proposed a fund with 
contributions from developed countries of 0.1-0.5% of their GDP’ and ‘Egypt proposed that 
the Secretariat look into a mechanism for assessed contributions’ (both ENB-337). In a 2008 
submission to the AWG-LCA, China proposed that ‘developed countries shall annually 
provide financial support of no less than 0.5% of their total GDP to support actions by 
developing countries to address climate change in developing countries’ 
(FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1). At AWG-LCA-2, India suggested a new fund ‘capitalised by 
developed countries at a level of 0.3% to 1% of GDP’ and China reiterated their earlier 0.5% 
of GDP proposal (Khoor 2008, reproduced in Müller 2008a, pp.32–33). At AWG-LCA-3, 
Mexico introduced their proposal for a fund (later realised as the GCF) based on 
‘contributions from all parties based on greenhouse gas emissions, population and GDP’ 
(ENB-381). 
At AWG-LCA-5, ‘Brazil supported assessed contributions’ (ENB-399), while ‘the G-
77/China, supported by AOSIS and others, proposed assessed contributions’ and ‘the LDCs 
and others proposed using GDP and cumulative emissions to assess developed countries’ 
contributions’ (ENB-400), and ‘Mexico underscored using GDP, population and emissions 
as indicators to assess contributions, and reminded that financing for the UN is based on 
assessed contributions’ (ENB-403). At AWG-LCA-6, ‘Colombia preferred the 2% of GNP 
assessed contribution option’ (ENB-415), and at informal talks between AWG-LCA-6 and 7, 
‘South Africa stated that the African Group would not accept an agreement on finance 
without a financial commitment of one percent of global GDP’, China stressed that finance 
should ‘constitute at least 0.5-1% of developed countries’ GDP’ (ENB-424) and ‘Bangladesh 
called for sustained financial resources over and above 1.5% of developed country GDP’ 
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(ENB-427). At AWG-LCA-7, ‘Bangladesh, for LDCs ‘called for funding equal to 1.5% of 
developed countries' GDP’ (ENB-431). With this wide range of developing countries 
demonstrating such consistent demands for a change to the existing basis for climate 
finance, it is clear that a coalition of actors was seeking to alter institutional structures that 
gave control over finance flows to developed countries (Hall 2016). 
Over the rounds of negotiation leading up to COP-15, a few developed countries 
demonstrated some support for these demands and recognition of a moral basis to North-
South flows of climate finance. For example, at AWG-LCA-3, ‘Switzerland noted its 
submission on a funding scheme based on common but differentiated responsibilities, and 
the “polluter pays” principle’ (ENB-381). At AWG-LCA-4/COP-14, on the architecture to 
deliver finance, the Netherlands ‘said countries should pay according to capacity and 
contribution to global emissions’ (ENB-394) and Canada ‘stressed the principles of equity, 
common but differentiated responsibilities, precaution and “polluter pays”’ (ENB-399). At 
the informal meeting between AWG-LCA-6 and 7, ‘the EU acknowledged the need for 
assessed contributions’ (ENB-427). These hints of acknowledgment did not translate into 
alignment between Northern and Southern perspectives, though: ‘Japan, Australia and the 
US emphasized that assessed contributions as a key source of finance was not an area of 
convergence’ (ENB-427). As COP-15 approached, developing countries had made little 
progress in securing either a historical responsibility or percentage of GDP basis for climate 
finance, leading one developing country delegate to say in frustration, ‘we are not begging 
for aid, we are demanding fulfilment of a legal commitment’ (ENB-439). This illustrates the 
continuing legacy of the development assistance sector and influence of the voluntary 
paradigm that still contributed to North-South bargaining on the basis of donor-recipient 
identities and relationships 15 years after the UNFCCC commenced. 
At COP-15 in 2009, the EU proposed a US$100bn per year commitment, which may 
appear to be a significant concession by developed countries but, just as with developed 
countries’ response to calls for needs-based commitments discussed in the previous section, 
the US$100bn proposal was a reinforcement of the voluntary paradigm rather than 
acceptance of demands to introduce defined finance calculations based on GDP 
percentages or a specific ethical principle, since developed countries chose the figures and 
no governance arrangements for achieving the target were included (Bodansky 2010, p. 237). 
As a result of deep divisions and procedural mishandling, the final Copenhagen Accord was 
limited in scope compared to usual COP agreements but it did include pledges to mobilise 
US$100bn by 2020 and short-term financing of US$10bn a year between 2010 and 2012 (so-
called fast-start financing). However, ‘the basis for operationalizing the financing provisions 
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in the text is uncertain, which many have pointed out is very unfortunate and detrimental 
to those developing countries that really need it’ (ENB-459).  
Although developing countries ‘reiterated the flaws in the [proposal] document, 
including lack of effective commitments’ (ENB-459) and ‘the scale of contributions’ 
continued to cause disagreement (ENB-456), developed countries were able to lean on the 
voluntary paradigm to increase their negotiating weight by pressurising developing 
countries with overt threats to withhold funding (Carter et al. 2011, Vidal 2011). Here the 
institutional structure underpinning the voluntary paradigm gave developed countries a 
power advantage that enhanced their political ability to resist the coalition of developing 
countries that sought to introduce a system of assessed contributions. As a result, although 
the headline figures entailed a significantly greater commitment than had ever been offered 
through the GEF replenishment mechanism, without significant operational detail or 
framework, developed countries had retained their control over finance flows and avoided a 
system based on GDP percentages or another ethically-based assessment. 
5.4.3  Reactions to the US$100bn commitment in the Copenhagen Accord 
Although the headline figures agreed at Copenhagen were a notable outcome of climate 
finance policy making, the Copenhagen Accord was deemed by many to be a political failure. 
The subject of vigorous debate until the final moments of the COP and, with a small group 
of countries refusing to accept it, the Accord was only “noted” by the COP rather than 
adopted. As a result, COP-16 the following year in Cancún was an important opportunity to 
reinforce what had been agreed in Copenhagen and operationalise policies such as the 
US$100bn commitment. Despite momentum from Copenhagen, the negotiations leading to 
COP-16 suggest that developed countries’ pledges had successfully reinforced the existing 
paradigms and policy paths that underpinned the voluntary finance regime and donor 
control over amounts and delivery of finance. Developing countries continued their vocal 
challenge of these structures, particularly in terms of assessed levels of contribution, but 
policy output from COP-16 offered little in response to what developing countries had long 
argued for. 
Developing countries continued to call for contributions related to GDP percentages, 
most notably at AWG-LCA-10: ‘Timor-Leste suggested that this should be in the form of a 
percentage of developed countries’ Gross Domestic Product’ (ENB-463), ‘Nicaragua called 
for commitment of 6% of developed countries’ GDP’, the African Group said scaled up 
funding should amount ‘to 1.5% of their GDP’, ‘Bolivia stressed that developed country 
commitments based on their GDP offer the necessary predictability of funding’, the LDCs 
‘stated that funding should…comprise 1.5% of GDP from developed countries’, COMIFAC 
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stated that funding should amount ‘to 1.5% of their GDP’, the G-77/China ‘proposed 
assessed contributions starting at 1.5 % of developed countries’ Gross National Income as 
the primary basis of funding’, and ‘China called for assessed contributions by developed 
countries, expressed as a percentage of annual GDP’ (all ENB-464). These demands illustrate 
that the challenge to the voluntary paradigm continued from a strong coalition covering 
almost the full spectrum of developing country negotiating blocs, but developed countries 
remained unwilling to entertain the prospect of assessed contributions: at AWG-LCA-12, ‘on 
the scale of long-term financing, many parties highlighted the need for new, additional, 
adequate and predictable finance, as well as assessed contributions derived mainly from 
public sources. Other parties cautioned against proposing “simplistic percentage figures”’ 
(ENB-484). 
Despite the headline figures agreed at COP-15, at AWG-LCA-10, AOSIS ‘complained 
that ‘six months after COP 15, financing for adaptation is yet to materialize’ (ENB-462), and 
there were complaints that ‘parties had not really moved on from their “entrenched pre-
Copenhagen positions.” The assessment of a veteran developed country finance expert was 
that parties were “pretending as though the US$100 billion pledged in Copenhagen never 
happened”’ (ENB-464). This North-South division continued through negotiations leading 
up to COP-16, where ‘developing countries supported the option that developed countries 
should commit 1.5% of their GDP to support developing countries, rather than text referring 
to a US$100 billion commitment annually by 2020’ (ENB-495), evidence of a final push to 
directly challenge institutionalisation of the US$100bn target and its reinforcement of the 
voluntary paradigm and developed countries’ advantage. Following the established pattern, 
‘many developed countries expressed reservations on text indicating that the main or major 
source of funding will be assessed or indicative contributions from Annex II parties to the 
Convention’ (ENB-495), confirming developed countries’ resistance to the challenge. Policy 
agreed in Cancún retained reference to mobilising the goal of US$100bn annually, adding 
an important policy layer strengthening this target, and included no assessed contributions 
or burden sharing framework, nor a compliance mechanism to ensure fulfilment of pledges 
would be forthcoming. 
5.4.4  The impact of the US$100bn target on the Paris Agreement 
Having overcome the challenge to institutional structures at Copenhagen and Cancún, the 
Paris Agreement in 2015 was the next significant milestone in UNFCCC negotiations and 
policy output. The US$100bn annual climate finance target has been controversial within 
and beyond the climate governance regime since its introduction at the Copenhagen COP 
(Sharma 2017), but evidence suggests that the level of US$100bn was becoming a clear policy 
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path and potentially established as part of the institutional structure at the heart of finance 
negotiations, leading developing countries to reduce their calls for contributions related to 
GDP or the “polluter pays” principle. Instead, without a framework to determine how much 
each country should contribute to ensure the US$100bn target is reached, and a notable 
absence of planning or commitments for the 2012-2020 period, developing countries 
pushed for a clear roadmap towards the US$100bn target in the negotiation rounds leading 
up to the Paris COP in 2015. 
For example, at AWG-LCA-14 (before COP-17), the ambiguity of finance provisions 
in the Copenhagen Accord led developing countries to raise ‘questions about the possibility 
of a “financing gap,” expressing fears that the Green Climate Fund will just be an “empty 
shell”’ (ENB-521). At COP-17, ‘Nicaragua said there was no concrete roadmap for mobilizing 
[sic] the US$100 billon pledged by 2020’ (ENB-528) and China said the negotiating text 
‘should specify how the developed countries’ commitment to mobilize US$100 billion 
included in the Cancun Agreements will be achieved’ (ENB-534). In the first ADP 
negotiations in 2012 (which superseded the AWG-LCA leading up to Paris), ‘Brazil said the 
uncertainty related to the 2012-2020 financing gap must be overcome’ and China ‘proposed 
including in the workplan a specific process or mechanism for scaling-up intensified 
support to developing countries’ (ENB-554). At COP-19, various developing countries, 
including the African Group, India, Mali, China, the LMDCs, the Philippines and Venezuela, 
‘called for a pathway for the delivery of the US$100 billion target’ (ENB-591), at ADP-2-5 ‘the 
Philippines, with India, called for clarity of support to build trust among parties’ (ENB-595). 
At COP-20, ‘China said it was “imperative” to define in Lima a roadmap to mobilize US$100 
billion per year by 2020’ and Grenada called for ‘milestones to reach the US$100 billion goal’ 
(both ENB-616). At COP-21, the BASIC group stressed that developed countries must ‘define 
a clear roadmap to achieving the US$100 billion goal’ in the pre-2020 period (ENB-654), ‘the 
Philippines called for ensuring pre- and post-2020 adaptation finance through quantitative 
goals’ (ENB-661), and ‘one developing country party requested “a concrete roadmap” be 
inserted for achieving the US$100 billion goal’ (ENB-663). 
Consistent with their previous behaviour, developed countries, particularly the US, 
were resistant to greater clarity on exactly what finance they would provide and a roadmap 
to the US$100bn target, as they sought to preserve the institutional structure that gave them 
control over delivery. At the final session of the AWG-LCA in 2013 (before COP-19), ‘on 
continuity of climate financing during the period 2013-2020, some developing countries 
asked for elaboration of reassurances by developed countries. The US distinguished between 
providing reassurance about continuity of finance after 2012 and having a numerical target, 
noting that his country was scaling-up financing’ (ENB-554). At COP-19, some developed 
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countries ‘rejected quantified pathways’ (ENB-587). At ADP-2-6 (before COP-20) ‘China, 
Iran, the LDCs and Ecuador called for quantitative commitments’ on finance (ENB-602), but 
‘Norway and New Zealand opposed legally-binding numerical financial commitments’ 
(ENB-601) and ‘Switzerland, Canada, the US and Australia opposed a short-term 
quantitative goal in the post-2020 period’ (ENB-602). At COP-20, ‘Norway, the EU and Japan 
opposed an ex ante process to commit to quantified support’, ‘with the EU signaling [sic] 
this as “a red line”’ (ENB-611). Also at COP-20, ‘Japan, with Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada, opposed including specific quantitative financial commitments’ (ENB-617) and the 
Umbrella Group, the EU, and Switzerland ‘rejected “unacceptable bifurcated proposals [by 
the G77] for quantified commitments for public finance”’ (Dimitrov 2016, p. 5). 
As with previous periods of negotiation, developed countries also emphasised the 
finance that they had delivered, thereby portraying the “success” of the voluntary system. At 
COP-18 in 2012, the Umbrella Group ‘emphasized that the fast-start finance commitment 
has been collectively surpassed’ (ENB-558). At COP-19, some developed countries 
emphasised ‘work undertaken towards achieving the 2020 goal’ (ENB-587) and ‘when ‘China 
emphasized the importance of agreeing on a roadmap for achieving the US$100 billion 
target’, ‘the EU drew attention to fast-start finance efforts’ (ENB-591). At COP-20, when the 
G77/China called for clarity on financial contributions, the US and the EU ‘highlighted the 
GCF’s initial capitalization of US$9.7 billion prior to Lima’ (ENB-612). Some developed 
countries did seem to acknowledge the need to increase levels of finance, such as at COP-18 
when the EIG ‘highlighted several achievements on finance, noting that further work is 
required, including scaling up finance to agreed levels by 2020’ (ENB-557) and the EU said 
it ‘will continue to provide support after 2012 and will work to scale up finance towards 2020’ 
(ENB-558), but this did not lead to acceptance of a quantified roadmap. 
Assurances and pledges of particular sums of finance were consistent with the 
existing institutional structures that gave developed countries control over how and when 
they would provide finance; the GCF was still dependent on donor willingness to contribute 
(de Sépibus 2015, p. 311). As a result, despite the US$100bn target, statements of support did 
little to reassure developing countries or alter their expectations of what developed countries 
would do or agree to. For example, Colombia said that US statements about scaling-up ‘did 
not provide adequate reassurance that the US$100 billion target would be met’ (ENB-554), 
and ENB-594 reports that at COP-19 in Warsaw, 
‘financial issues proved thorny, ultimately tied to diminishing trust among parties in the 
climate process. Pledges made in Warsaw, including US$40 million by the Republic of Korea 
to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and US$72.5 million by seven European governments to 
the Adaptation Fund, were insufficient to build confidence among developing countries that 
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the 2009 promise of US$100 billion per year by 2020 would be realized… With the GCF in 
large part still an “empty shell,” many developing countries worried that pledges would not 
materialize into actual deposits to realize the 2020 goal… In Warsaw, with the 
operationalization of the GCF, several developed countries expressed willingness to pledge, 
yet the pledges did not necessarily raise developing countries’ confidence that the funds will 
actually materialize. 
At COP-21, in a repeat of events at COP-15, the voluntary paradigm contributed to 
developed countries’ political power when ‘several Northern countries opposed making 
financial commitments, and even suggested reversing previous pledges of climate finance’ 
as they sought to secure developing countries’ agreement (Dimitrov 2016, p. 4). The Paris 
Agreement is weak on finance and ‘does not include a collective, quantified goal for 
adaptation finance, as had been demanded by developing countries’ (Obergassel et al. 2015, 
p. 254). The Agreement does state that ‘continuous and enhanced international support 
shall be provided to developing country Parties’ (Article 7, paragraph 13) but, ‘as many 
lamented, the US$100 billion finance mobilization goal, set to be reached by developed 
countries in 2020, is “essentially extended in the decision through 2025”’ (ENB-663), again 
showing the strength of developed countries’ control over delivery of finance. As well as this 
extension, decision 1/CP.21 on implementation of the Paris Agreement stipulates that by 
2025 the COP ‘shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per 
year’ (paragraph 53) and paragraph 114 ‘strongly urges developed country Parties to scale up 
their level of financial support, with a concrete road map to achieve the goal of jointly 
providing USD 100 billion annually by 2020’. However, once again the Agreement does not 
include any mechanism for ensuring individual developed countries set out how and when 
their finance commitments will be delivered. 
5.5 Compliance and measurable, reportable and verifiable 
 finance 
As well as calling for assessed and needs-based contributions, developing countries have 
argued consistently that developed countries should fulfil the obligations they have made in 
the Convention and subsequent policy. For example, at COP-6 in 2000, ‘the Sudan noted 
reluctance by developed country Parties to implement their commitments in relation to the 
provision of finance’ (ENB-160), at COP-8 in 2002 ‘the G-77/China expressed 
disappointment at the low level of financial resources provided by Annex I Parties, stressing 
that action so far has been symbolic’ (ENB-202), at COP-9 ‘Micronesia called on developed 
countries to meet their UNFCCC commitments relating to financing adaptation projects in 
SIDS’ (ENB-229), and at COP-10 Qatar said the finance needs of developing countries 
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‘should be met through full implementation of commitments by Annex I Parties’ (ENB-258). 
These demands reflect the way in which institutional design and the established voluntary 
paradigm had allowed developed countries to control the finance that they pledged and the 
speed at which they delivered the money, with the donor-controlled GEF replenishment 
process a key part of this before other UNFCCC funds were created. Experience of this 
finance system led developing countries (and other observers) to expect that developed 
countries would not provide the levels of finance they had committed to or would not provide 
it within the pledged timescale (Bulkeley and Newell 2015, p. 49, Flannery 2015, p. 86). 
In response to their distrust of developed countries, developing countries called for 
institutional mechanisms to increase transparency and make sure that commitments were 
being fulfilled, in particular rules to ensure commitments are “monitorable, reportable and 
verifiable” (MRV). This section will examine how these calls originated in relation to the 
established voluntary basis for climate finance and how policy development concerning 
compliance and MRV reinforced or disrupted the established institutional structure giving 
donor countries control over finance flows. There was little in the policy output during this 
period that referred to any kind of mechanism to review finance delivery in relation to 
commitments or oblige compliance. As a result, the analysis in this section commences in 
the context of the broad negotiating track leading to the milestone COP-15 in Copenhagen 
in 2009, which led to the defined US$100bn headline finance commitments that first gave a 
focal point to transparency and compliance. The section continues by analysing the 
subsequent emergence of the bottom-up governance regime prior to COP-21 in Paris, when 
developed countries sought to broaden the number of countries expected to provide climate 
finance while continuing to resist compliance measures. 
5.5.1  Efforts to strengthen finance commitments prior to COP-15 
The expansive remit of the AWG-LCA negotiations that led to the Copenhagen Accord and 
Cancún Agreements, and the high expectations of a comprehensive agreement at COP-15 
in Copenhagen in 2009, meant that policy paths were potentially more vulnerable than in 
previous rounds of negotiation, presenting developing countries with an opportunity to re-
shape the institutional structures that underpinned the voluntary, donor-led UNFCCC 
finance regime. In the negotiations leading to COP-15, developing countries targeted 
prominently the fulfilment of developed countries’ obligations through measuring, 
reporting and verifying financial flows. The first stage of this came when the Bali Action 
Plan of 2007 introduced the phrase ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’ for the first time, 
after considerable debate about whether it should apply to the finance, technology transfer 
and capacity building provided by developed countries in addition to developing countries’ 
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mitigation acts (Khan and Müller 2011, p. 18). That developing countries were willing to agree 
to MRV of their mitigation in return for the same transparency of developed countries’ 
support provision illustrates how important the ability to ensure fulfilment of developed 
countries’ commitments was (Müller 2008b). 
Negotiations on forming the agreement intended for COP-15 began at AWG-LCA-1 
in 2008, where ‘China said developed countries must fulfill [sic] their legal obligations under 
the Convention to provide funding to developing countries’ (ENB-361), and another 
‘developing country delegate said in frustration, “we are not begging for aid, we are 
demanding fulfillment [sic] of a legal commitment”’ (ENB-369). At AWG-LCA-2, ‘the G-
77/China said funding should come from implementation of Annex I countries’ 
commitments’ (ENB-370) and at AWG-LCA-6 in 2009 (before COP-15), ‘Venezuela called for 
a special emphasis on obligations that have not been honored [sic], including those related 
to adaptation, finance and technology transfer’ (ENB-413), and Indonesia ‘reminded Annex 
I parties of their commitment under the Convention to meet the full- and full incremental-
costs of developing countries’ (ENB-415). At AWG-LCA-7, ‘the G-77/China stressed that the 
discussion should focus on how to enhance the Convention’s implementation through 
meeting developed countries’ commitments to provide new and additional financial 
resources to enable mitigation and adaptation actions’ (ENB-432), and also said that 
‘developed countries were denying their historical responsibility and their corresponding 
commitment to provide financial resources’ (ENB-437). 
At AWG-LCA-4/COP-14, South Africa said MRV must be applied to ‘implementation 
of financing…commitments by developed countries’ (ENB-391). At AWG-LCA-5, ‘India, with 
Saudi Arabia, cautioned against revising the principles of the Convention’ and called for 
‘the fulfilment of commitments related to finance’ (ENB-398). At informal talks between 
AWG-LCA-6 and 7, ‘the G-77/China and other developing countries emphasized the 
importance of MRV to successful mobilization of financial resources’ (ENB-424) and with 
Egypt, Argentina, Sri Lanka and the African Group, Venezuela ‘said funding should…be 
subject to MRV’ (ENB-415). Calls for MRV naturally led to calls for institutional rules that 
could ensure developed countries complied with their commitments, which can be 
interpreted as institutional rules that would give the COP, and thereby developing countries, 
greater influence over finance flows. For example, at AWG-LCA-5 ‘Tanzania called for 
compliance mechanisms for finance’ (ENB-399), and at AWG-LCA-7 the G-77/China, 
supported by the LDCs and the African Group, ‘supported a compliance mechanism to 
ensure fulfilment of developed countries’ funding commitments’ (ENB-431). The G-
77/China, ‘with Bangladesh, highlighted the need for a compliance mechanism for 
monitoring how developed countries implement their financial commitments’ and the LDCs 
  Page 118 of 265   
‘proposed a two-stage compliance regime, a “naming and shaming” mechanism listing 
defaulters as an initial step and then the imposition of penalties as a further step’ (ENB-
436). 
Developing countries also stressed that voluntary funding was not providing 
sufficient resources, such as at AWG-LCA-5 when ‘Indonesia highlighted insufficiency of 
voluntary funding’ (ENB-405) and AWG-LCA-6 when Mexico ‘registered doubt on whether 
voluntary agreements would work’ (ENB-416). As a means to overcome this insufficiency of 
funding, developing countries also called for legally-binding commitments; for example, 
Panama, with Bangladesh, Cambodia and others at AWG-LCA-6 ‘said that the provision of 
financial support by Annex I parties should be legally binding’ (ENB-414), and at AWG-
LCA-7, AOSIS ‘said that commitments on finance should be legally binding’ (ENB-429). In 
terms of institutional structures, this lack of trust reflects the way that the voluntary 
paradigm has shaped Parties’ expectations of each other; developed countries expect that 
they can control the rate at which they contribute finance, and developing countries expect 
that developed countries will capitalise consistently on the advantages they gain from 
established institutional rule structures by controlling how and when they “meet” their 
commitments.  
The Copenhagen Accord does state that delivery of ‘financing by developed 
countries will be measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any 
further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will ensure that accounting 
of such targets and finance is rigorous, robust and transparent’ (paragraph 4). While no 
framework was included to establish how this MRV would be carried out, the Cancún 
Agreements the following year added policy detail to the Copenhagen Accord by deciding, 
‘building on existing reporting and review guidelines, processes and experiences, to enhance 
reporting in the national communications of developed countries on the provision of 
financial support to developing country Parties’ (decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 40). This 
included ‘development of common reporting formats and methodology for finance, in order 
to ensure that information provided is complete, comparable, transparent and accurate’ 
(paragraph 41) and a work programme to develop relevant guidelines (paragraph 46). While 
these initial policies showed some promise of greater climate finance transparency within 
the UNFCCC (Gupta and van Asselt 2019, p. 24), the Cancún Agreements made no reference 
to penalties or compliance, which reflects the power imbalance inherent in the institutional 
arrangements and shows that this new layer of policy did not significantly alter the voluntary 
paradigm and donor countries’ control over finance flows. 
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5.5.2  Seeking fulfilment of the US$100 billion commitment 
After the US$100bn target had become established, developing countries’ continued to show 
their well-established expectations within the institutional structure that developed 
countries will not fulfil the voluntary pledges they make. This was encapsulated by India 
noting at COP-18 in 2012 ‘that the record of Annex I countries leaves “no reason for 
optimism” on their willingness to voluntarily scale up contributions to the Adaptation Fund’ 
(ENB-559). Similarly, at ADP-2 (before COP-19), ‘the Philippines called for urgent 
implementation of developed country parties’ obligations under the Convention; lamenting 
the lack of common understanding on finance twenty years after the Convention was 
negotiated’, and China ‘underscored the need for clarity on how much financial support 
developed countries will be providing to developing countries’ (both ENB-568), again 
illustrating how developing countries understood developed countries to be in control 
finance flows. Developing countries showed clear frustration with the restrictions of the 
voluntary paradigm, such as at COP-19: ‘developing countries stressed their expectations for 
tangible deliverables. A developed country suggested no big, new finance commitments 
would be forthcoming, calling Warsaw an “implementation COP,” prompting a developing 
country party to ask what there would be to implement, “empty funds?”’ (ENB-586). 
Frustrations with the voluntary system bred distrust between the North and the South within 
negotiations: also at COP-19, ‘developing countries complained of “broken promises” and 
made desperate calls for implementing agreed commitments on finance, while mutual 
accusations of backtracking were thrown around’ (ENB-594). 
In the context of these frustrations and North-South distrust, developing countries 
continued their demands for MRV and transparency of finance, connected to their calls for 
a concrete roadmap for delivering finance examined in the previous section. For example, 
at the informal AWG-LCA session in 2012 before COP-18, ‘developing countries expressed 
concern over the mid-term financing gap, and noted the need to consider MRV of financial 
support and enhancing transparency of its provision’, and ‘China, Brazil and South Africa 
stressed that further work is needed on the issue of MRV of support to developing countries’ 
(both ENB-550). In the first ADP negotiations in 2012 (which superseded the AWG-LCA 
leading up to COP-21), the Philippines emphasised the need to ‘enhance tracking of climate 
finance performance, including through a transparent mechanism for publication of 
information’ (ENB-554). Developing countries were disappointed with interim policy, such 
as at COP-18: ‘for many, this falls considerably short of the MRV of financial support’ they 
had expected when MRV was introduced in the 2007 Bali Action Plan (ENB-567). At ADP-2 
in 2013 (before COP-19), ‘the Republic of Korea emphasized the importance of MRV of 
climate finance. He identified the GCF as the key mechanism for ensuring transparency of 
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financial support and enhancing trust between developed and developing countries’ (ENB-
568), again indicating the ongoing distrust under the voluntary paradigm.  
At ADP-2-4 (before COP-19), ‘China emphasized transparency should ensure 
implementation of the Convention, stressing the required leadership of developed 
countries’ (ENB-595), which illustrates again how developing countries were still making 
these requests for MRV and transparency within the structure of the voluntary paradigm and 
expectations that developed countries will voluntarily “lead” rather than be subject to 
defined rules. At COP-19 in 2013, numerous developing countries, including the African 
Group, India, Mali, China, the LMDCs, the Philippines and Venezuela, called for MRV of 
support (ENB-591) and ‘the G-77/China and the African Group called for work on the MRV 
of support’ to be undertaken by the Standing Committee on Finance, a body set up under 
the UNFCCC (ENB-586). This latter call was reflected in decision 7/CP.13, which ‘invites the 
Standing Committee on Finance to consider ways to increase its work on the measurement, 
reporting and verification of support’ (paragraph 9). Despite such policies, at a UNFCCC 
workshop on reporting of financial information in 2015 ‘participants observed 
discrepancies and a lack of transparency in reporting on climate finance’ (ENB-634), 
indicating ongoing problems with existing MRV systems. Developing countries continued 
to push for institutional change as the Paris Agreement took shape: at ADP-2-8 in 2015, the 
LMDCs ‘called for a finance registry and for reporting on finance using a common format’ 
and ‘China proposed that information on MOI by developed countries be verified through a 
technical review process, followed by a multilateral assessment process and conclusions with 
compliance consequences’ (ENB-622), and at ADP-2-10 in 2015, India stressed inclusion of 
‘MRV of support in the agreement’ (ENB-641). 
Developed countries began to indicate support for more rigorous MRV, which may 
at first appear to be an acceptance of developing country demands, but must be viewed in 
the context of developed countries wanting to move away from simplistic North-South 
differentiation and expand the donor base within UNFCCC climate finance, particularly in 
terms of large developing countries (Dimitrov 2016, p. 5). With this objective, developed 
countries had a new self-interested motivation to enhance MRV because new rules would 
increasingly apply to developing countries too (Gupta and van Asselt 2019, p. 26), just as 
finance burdens would be shared more broadly. Developed countries’ intentions were 
demonstrated at ADP-2-8 in 2015: ‘the EU proposed that all parties individually and 
collectively mobilize climate finance with developed country leadership. Japan opposed 
limiting the requirement to provide finance to Annex II parties. Australia suggested 
replacing reference to countries in annexes with language on “all parties in a position to do 
so” (ENB-622). 
  Page 121 of 265   
The negotiating text developed at ADP-2-8 reflected this emerging push by 
developed countries to open up finance: ‘a range of views exist on differentiation, from 
quantitative commitments for Annex II Parties to financial contributions from all “parties 
in a position to do so”’ (ENB-626). At ADP-2-10 in 2015 ‘several developed countries 
underlined the need for more countries to mobilize finance’ (ENB-641) and ‘Japan said MRV 
of support should be in the agreement’ (ENB-642), and at ADP-2-11, ‘the Umbrella Group 
supported a unified and robust transparency system, covering both action and support 
applicable to all parties’ (ENB-647). While developed countries gave ‘reassurances with 
regard to the fulfillment [sic] of existing commitments and continued leadership of 
developed countries’, ‘some parties expressed strong reservations, calling for consistency 
with existing provisions and principles of the Convention’ (ENB-659), demonstrating how 
policy negotiations remained within the voluntary paradigm and coalitions continued to 
disagree over particular interpretations of original institutional rules (Mahoney and Thelen 
2009). 
While no new financial commitments were made in the Paris Agreement by 
developed countries, decision 1/CP.21 stipulates the setting of a new finance goal in 2025, 
but some countries interpreted this ‘as including an expectation that some developing 
countries should participate in the mobilization’ (ENB-663). In terms of transparency, in 
Article 9 of the Agreement developed countries are instructed to report ‘projected levels of 
public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties’ in their biennial 
communications, but only when this information is “available” (paragraph 5). Article 13 
stipulates that ‘developed country Parties shall, and other Parties that provide support 
should, provide information on financial…support provided to developing country Parties’ 
(paragraph 9), and states that the COP will ‘adopt common modalities, procedures and 
guidelines, as appropriate, for the transparency of action and support’ (paragraph 13). 
Paragraph 115 of Decision 1/CP.21 on adoption of the Paris Agreement states that COP-22 
will assess progress implementing decision 1/CP.19 paragraphs 3 and 4 from 2013, which 
included resolving to “accelerate” the provision of financial support and “urging” developed 
country Parties to increase financial support to developing countries. 
The reporting and stocktake provisions in the Agreement introduce a degree of 
transparency that is intended to encourage holding developed countries to account, and 
which the US and EU agreed would serve the same purpose as legally binding provisions 
(Bodansky 2016), and increases the focus on finance and other forms of support (Gupta and 
van Asselt 2019, p. 25). This may appear as a success for developing countries’ push for 
transparency and MRV but this new layer of policy must be considered in the context of 
developed countries’ push to open up the donor base so there is reduced North-South 
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differentiation in finance flows, and alter the institutional structure so the expectation of 
actors within the policy process becomes that developing countries will increasingly become 
finance donors (Okereke and Coventry 2016). Revealing that developed countries were 
ultimately unwilling to give up control over finance flows and could still rely on the 
advantageous position underpinned by the voluntary paradigm, the only compliance 
provision in the Agreement consists of a ‘committee that shall be expert-based and 
facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and 
non-punitive’ (Article 15, paragraph 2), meaning that sanctions or other punitive measures 
that would allow the COP to exert control are not available.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Originating in the political process that created the Convention, and rooted in broader 
histories and power distributions associated with North-South development assistance, a 
voluntary paradigm has become an influential feature of the institutional structure shaping 
the UNFCCC climate finance policy process. Initially a manifestation of political 
compromise, the rule ambiguities surrounding how developing countries’ needs should be 
determined and how finance requirements for developed countries should be calculated, 
including links between the two, meant an institutional structure that favoured developed 
countries emerged from the creation of the UNFCCC. Developed countries were able to exert 
greater influence over subsequent finance policy because the lack of clarity on policy areas 
key to determining quantities of climate finance reinforced developed countries’ 
expectations that they should be in control of this process, rather than be subject to policies 
such as a percentage of GDP or a needs assessment process. Institutional links with the GEF 
cemented these advantages by bringing the GEF’s replenishment process into the 
institutional structure of UNFCCC finance requirements process. These initial institutional 
rules institutionalised the voluntary paradigm and this chapter has demonstrated how its 
influence can be identified throughout the subsequent years of policy making. 
Developing countries fought hard to bring in some kind of more systematic 
determination of what climate finance should be provided, initially arguing for a robust 
needs assessment process with greater oversight by the COP, with little success. Attempts to 
secure funding mechanisms dedicated to developing countries’ needs, particularly for 
adaptation, only resulted in the creation of new funds when developing countries withdrew 
attempts to secure mandatory funding, once again reinforcing developed countries’ 
willingness to provide finance as the dominant structure underpinning policy making. The 
more expansive policy process leading up to COP-15 in Copenhagen provided an 
opportunity for developing countries’ demands for defined finance targets and normative 
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claims, such as for assessed contributions, to gain prominence in negotiations. The results 
of this process, particularly the US$100bn a year by 2020 target, appear to represent success 
for developing countries in overcoming institutional structures in place since the 
Convention, but the policy replicated key ambiguities from the Convention and was the 
product of developed countries’ willingness rather than any kind of needs-based calculation 
or assessment based on normative principles. Furthermore, the voluntary paradigm added 
weight to developed countries’ political threats to withhold funding at crucial moments of 
negotiation. With the US$100bn target fitting into the existing paradigm of climate finance 
dependent on developed countries’ willingness to contribute, developing countries could 
only seek a roadmap to indicate how and when the pledges would be fulfilled and more 
robust MRV of finance flows. The rhetoric of many developed countries emphasised 
portions of finance they had voluntarily provided, implying the success of UNFCCC policy 
while simultaneously reinforcing their position as controllers of climate finance amounts 
and provision. 
The voluntary paradigm had been reinforced in several instances of policy making 
by the time negotiations began leading towards creation of a renewed climate governance 
regime at COP-21 in Paris. Developing countries sought to highlight the inadequacy of the 
US$100bn target and voice their frustration with fulfilment of the commitment being 
dictated by developed countries’ willingness. However, with an institutional structure of such 
strength, developed countries were again able to reinforce their advantage by resisting new 
needs-based targets or a defined roadmap to delivering their pledged levels of finance, 
ensuring the Paris Agreement did little to alter the existing policy path based on the 
voluntary paradigm. Evidence shows that developing countries’ trust in delivery of finance 
had been eroded consistently, indicating the extent of their power deficit within the policy 
process and the constraints of the institutional structure on their ability to bring about 
compliance by developed countries, let alone levels of finance that will meet their needs. 
While some progress towards developing countries’ calls for transparency and MRV was 
made in Paris, this coincided with moves by developed countries to increase expectations 
that developing countries will be voluntary donors of climate finance, thereby further 
cementing the voluntary nature of developed countries’ own contributions. Overall, the 
institutionalisation of the voluntary paradigm and the history of its influence on Parties’ 
expectations shows how the institutional structure, rooted in the original institutional 
design, conferred lasting advantages to developed countries and suggests the voluntary 
paradigm will remain at the core of how the UNFCCC’s institutional structure shapes and 
constrains the policy process in perpetuity. 
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6. Additionality and sources of climate 
finance 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Climate finance, in particular for adaptation, is seen by most developing countries as a cost 
imposed on them by the actions of developed countries, and therefore as a debt to be repaid 
rather than as a matter of donations or assistance (Müller 2008a). Based on this perspective, 
developing countries fear that existing flows of development aid will be diverted to meet 
climate change commitments, that developed countries will claim undue credit for private 
climate investment flows, and will shift the burden of meeting their obligation to provide 
climate finance too heavily onto private sources of finance. Despite these concerns, ‘due to 
lack of political agreement, there remains neither a universally agreed definition of climate 
finance or its constituent objectives…nor consensus on how parties should interpret and 
apply agreed parameters’ (Pickering, Skovgaard, et al. 2015, p. 151). Compounding this 
disagreement, strategic ambiguity in policy wording allows donor countries flexibility to 
choose sources that maximise private finance and minimise the pressure that climate 
finance places on their national budgets (Hall 2017). This ambiguity is significant since 
additionality and sources are highly technical policy areas that rely on clarity of both rules 
and any normative basis to influence the behaviour of actors when making and 
implementing policy, with significant implications for the levels and forms of climate 
finance that developed countries provide, and thus the achievement of both material 
interests and just outcomes. 
Additionality, or ensuring finance flows are additional to other planned or potential 
funding, that will take place anyway, in particular official development assistance (ODA), is 
a longstanding concern throughout the broader climate finance system and within UNFCCC 
policy (Pickering et al. 2017). Most contributor countries claim that the climate finance they 
provide is “new and additional” but this is not actually apparent (Brown et al. 2011); the lack 
of definition has hampered consistent reporting to the UNFCCC on climate finance flows 
(Buchner, Brown, et al. 2011), with developed countries using many and varied definitions of 
additionality, or no definition at all (FCCC/SBI/2011/INF.1/Add.2). Without clear guidelines 
or accountability, and with evidence that ODA is increasingly taking the form of climate 
finance (Halimanjaya 2015), the general expectation of additionality remains unfulfilled 
and the subject of ongoing North-South or donor-recipient contestation. 
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Public finance and the goodwill of developed countries is increasingly seen as 
inadequate to meet developed countries’ commitments (Bowen et al. 2017). The Convention 
allows for a variety of sources of climate finance and all key UNFCCC policy milestones 
maintain this flexibility, which ‘certainly accounts for the budgetary constraints of many 
developed countries’, particularly in light of the recent financial crisis (Knoke and Duwe 
2012, p. 16). In terms of political realities, it appears inescapable that private as well as public 
sources will be required for climate finance, but developing countries remain 
understandably suspicious that developed countries will use the flexibility permitted by 
UNFCCC policy to assign as much of the responsibility for providing finance to the private 
sector as possible (Stewart et al. 2009). This highlights the normative clash underpinning 
North-South disagreement over climate finance, with developed countries seeking to 
downplay the restitutive basis for climate finance and its implications for public finance, 
while developing countries repeatedly highlight this basis in their negotiating rhetoric (e.g. 
Moore 2012).  
This chapter will first examine how the Convention’s rules concerning additionality 
and sources of finance were created, identifying key ambiguities in policy in order to 
investigate how they related to particular normative perspectives and how they reflected or 
generated power advantages for particular actors or coalitions. Gupta (1997, p. 141) reports 
that after the Convention was finalised, ‘gradually, the equity principle expressed in the 
ability to pay, the proportionality principle, the compensation principle and the 
additionality principle have got somewhat fudged together in a euphemistic “special 
responsibility” approach that is based on capabilities’. In this context of an increasingly 
opaque normative dimension to the policy process and ongoing political contestation over 
additionality and sources, this chapter will, secondly, scrutinise these two policy areas, in 
both cases examining how the Convention’s outcome affected the way Parties subsequently 
approached policy development that could retain or clarify normative ambiguities, and the 
success of efforts by developed and developing countries to achieve their objectives. 
6.2 Normative ambiguities in the Convention 
As political attention turned to a global governance response to climate change, 
compensation or aid was included as a key element of an umbrella framework proposed by 
legal experts in 1989 (Gupta 2014, p. 44). This framing echoes developing countries’ 
understanding of climate change as an economic and development issue, as they focused 
on their ongoing need to develop and the responsibility of developed nations to take the 
lead and provide funding that would sustain development paths in the face of the impacts 
of climate change and burden of necessary response measures (Bodansky 1993). Increasing 
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engagement of developing countries in the negotiation process shifted climate change from 
an environmental issue, as originally framed by the North, to one that also included poverty 
and development. 
Although developing countries were not united in their expectations, their 
involvement at the Noordwijk international climate change conference in 1989 led to its 
declaration recognising North-South issues, such as the external debt problem, Northern 
responsibility and the need for financial and technical assistance for the South (Bodansky 
1993, p. 467). These moves to include developing country perspectives and priorities as 
climate change negotiations gathered pace reflected a broader trend in the late 1980s for 
North-South issues to come to the centre of multilateral negotiations, as in the case, for 
example, of the Montreal Protocol, where developing countries demanded financial and 
technical resources as the price of obtaining their participation (Bodansky 1993). The UN 
General Assembly, subject to less domination by developed countries than most other 
international governance organisations, produced Resolution 44/228 that started the 
process leading up to the UNCED, where the Convention was agreed. The resolution linked 
the environment to development and indicated that the UNCED should ‘include ways and 
means of providing new and additional financial resources’ for environmentally sound 
development projects in developing countries and ‘consider ways of effectively monitoring 
the provision of such new and additional financial resources’ (UN 1989, para. 15(j)). 
As the G77 sought to increase their participation and ensure the initial multilateral 
response to climate change would reflect their priorities, developed countries pushed back 
with resistance from countries such as the US and UK to any extension of development as a 
result of connecting climate change with poverty and development (Hirst 2014). While 
developing countries felt that the UN resolution adequately reflected the responsibility of 
developed countries to provide financial resources, ‘the sense of a global moral obligation 
to address global environmental issues was at a low ebb during 1992 in the United States as 
well as elsewhere in the North’ (Rahman and Roncerel 1994, p. 262), and it rapidly became 
evident that developed countries ‘no longer felt bound by [the UN resolution’s] language or 
intent’ (Hyder 1994, p. 206). Developed countries were unwilling to accept a clear definition 
of or requirements for new and additional resources, citing the restrictive forces of domestic 
voters and treasuries, and even went as far as accusing developing countries of using the 
environment as a “club” with which to beat additional resources from Northern economies 
strapped by recession (Hyder 1994). Developed countries balked at the UNCED Secretariat’s 
estimate that new and additional resources for climate finance should amount to US$125bn 
per year (Goldemberg 1994, p. 179) and took the view that ‘in practical terms the issue is 
difficult to tackle in an economic climate where there are few new funds available’, 
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remaining strongly resistant to requests for financial resources and discussions over 
additionality, as well as to the prospect of financial transfers on preferential and 
concessional terms (Djoghlaf 1994, Kjellen 1994, pp. 164–165). 
Developing countries, meanwhile, felt that developed countries had used Resolution 
44/228 to draw them into a negotiating process in which developed countries assumed they 
could use their economic might to ensure that their preferences for institutional design won 
out over the core interests of developing countries (Hyder 1994). Seeking to ensure that 
funding additional to ODA and rooted in historical responsibility and moral obligation 
would form a central pillar of the climate regime, developing countries were unified on the 
need for adequate, new and additional resources; India sought a pre-negotiation 
commitment on “new and additional funding” but dropped this after US resistance 
(Bodansky 1993, p. 484). However, 43 developing countries later joined together to propose 
that developed countries should ‘provide on a grant basis new, adequate and additional 
financial resources to meet the full incremental costs of developing country Parties’ 
(Dasgupta 1994, pp. 138–139). Developing countries continued to ramp up their rhetoric as 
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) meetings progressed towards the 
UNCED, with repeated use of arguments about “guilt”, “historical responsibility”, 
“compensation for past deeds” and the “right” of poor countries to 0.7% of the GDP of 
wealthy countries as development aid (Goldemberg 1994, p. 179).  
Development and environmental funding were interconnected throughout the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) negotiations that led to UNCED, as early 
focus on securing new and additional resources on top of the UN’s 0.7% of GDP target for 
ODA was mixed with discussions on increasing GEF contributions and including an 
environmental element in World Bank funding (Knecht and Cicin-Sain 1993). Developed 
countries responded to moves to link climate change with poverty and development by 
firmly placing climate finance within the existing ODA regime, avoiding links between 
financial commitments and responsibility for causing climate change, and resisting clear 
commitments to increase net financial flows as implied by the term “new and additional” 
(Dasgupta 1994). This is consistent with US insistence that its agreement to create a new 
fund to distribute finance under the Montreal Protocol did not represent a precedent for 
climate change, which had much more significant funding implications (Collins 1991). The 
negotiations remained centred on the North giving additional funds to the South, rather 
than a broader view taking into account other problems like poverty and conflict and 
engaging with wider economic systems that perpetuate global inequalities that underpin the 
need for sustainable development (Davidson 1992). 
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The final Convention text does state that developed country Parties ‘shall provide 
new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing 
country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1 (Article 4.3, 
emphasis added). However, this commitment is only for developing countries’ reporting 
obligations, rather than their needs more broadly, and clauses covering resources for broader 
adaptation and mitigation activities do not stipulate new and additional resources. Yamin 
and Depledge (2004, p. 276) report that in the case of adaptation funding, the lack of 
reference to new and additional resources came about because during negotiations, donor 
states expected that adaptation needs would be met outside of the GEF based on an 
assumption that such resources would be new and additional. With such assumptions 
playing into the hands of developed countries by maintaining ambiguity, developing 
countries largely failed to ensure their additionality concerns were reflected in the 
UNFCCC’s initial institutional rules. 
In terms of sources, little is specified in the Convention, but Article 7.2(h) states that 
the COP shall ‘seek to mobilize financial resources in accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 
3, 4 and 5, and Article 11’, wording which would become significant in subsequent finance 
policy. Article 11.5 makes clear that ‘developed country Parties may also provide and 
developing country Parties avail themselves of, financial resources related to the 
implementation of the Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral 
channels’, thereby offering no clarity on how UNFCCC finance relates to the sources and 
channels of the broader landscape of development funding. The openness and lack of 
specificity evident in these various Convention clauses contributed to locking in the power 
dynamics and North-South relations evident in prior negotiations; the ambiguity left the 
UNFCCC without institutional rules that provided a clear interpretation or 
operationalisation of the justice principles that were core to developing countries’ 
perspective and priorities, while developed countries sought to achieve advantageous 
institutional design by securing policy that ensured their ongoing control over whether and 
how climate finance was sourced, counted and delivered. 
6.3 Climate finance additionality and definitions in the UNFCCC 
With the Convention institutionalising the “new and additional” principle, an expectation 
had been created that additionality would be a consideration shaping how UNFCCC climate 
finance policy developed. However, the brevity of the principle offered very little in terms of 
specificity around what exactly should count as climate finance, and how calculations 
should be undertaken so that additionality would be ensured by developed countries 
consistently in individual countries’ contributions over time and with equivalent procedures 
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used by different countries. Discussions on additionality began immediately in the initial 
rounds of negotiation, such as prior to COP-2, when ‘Bangladesh said that the GEF 
definition of “incremental costs” should include “new and additional funding”’ (ENB-23) 
and at COP-2, when the G77/China proposed that to facilitate COP oversight, the GEF should 
‘indicate the rationale by which the amount described as “new and additional” is regarded 
as such, vis-à-vis other sources of official development assistance’ (ENB-39). Despite 
continued prominence in climate finance negotiations since this early point, additionality 
remains an unresolved issue within the UNFCCC finance system today (Schalatek 2018). 
This has prevented a sense of justice from emerging within climate finance, as developing 
countries suspect the re-labelling of development assistance and view climate finance as 
lacking the element of compensation they see as necessary for justice (Stadelmann et al. 
2010). However, existing literature has not shown how resistance on the part of developing 
countries to agreeing a baseline for additionality within the UNFCCC is related to the initial 
design of the Convention and its influence on power distribution and expectations. 
Accordingly, this section will examine how the policy process progressed from the 
ambiguous starting point in the Convention, looking in particular at how negotiations and 
outcomes at certain points of policy formulation where additionality expectations and rules 
could have been made clearer or more detailed have been influenced by the way initial rules 
were created in the Convention and the subsequent development of policy layers. 
6.3.1  Additionality in the Clean Development Mechanism 
The CDM was created in the Kyoto Protocol, agreed at COP-3 in 1997. The CDM works with 
credits, known as “certified emissions reductions”, which are generated by the creation of 
emissions reduction projects in developing countries and can be sold to developed countries 
for offsetting their emissions reductions obligations. Development of the CDM’s operating 
procedures presented an opportunity for coalitions of Northern and Southern states to push 
for rules that would reflect their priorities as providers and recipients of finance, and the 
manner in which additionality was addressed directly illustrates its significance as a matter 
of justice and a threat to developed countries’ influence in negotiations. Developing 
countries wanted to ensure that the finance they would deliver would meet their 
expectations of additionality, which Côte D'Ivoire stated clearly at COP-4: ‘the CDM should 
not be a substitute for official development assistance or support from the GEF’ (ENB-96). 
At SBI-10 in 2000 (before COP-6) and again at COP-6, the G77/China said that funding for 
CDM projects should be additional to GEF, ODA and other developed country financial 
commitments (ENB-107 & 118). At SBI-12 (before COP-6), Colombia said the CDM should 
‘ensure sufficient additionality’ (ENB-133). Subsequently at COP-6, discussion group chairs 
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‘noted some support on the use of ODA financing in the CDM if this is additional to current 
ODA levels’, although ‘Saudi Arabia called for clarity on what is meant by financing that is 
“additional” to “current” ODA’ (ENB-161). 
ENB-98 documents a workshop in 1999 before COP-5, which focused on Kyoto 
Protocol mechanisms. Input from external consultants included reviewing the ability of 
development financing options ‘to meet the requirement for financial and environmental 
additionality’. Input also included an explanation that ‘the COP must agree on a level of 
ODA from which the financial flows related to climate are additional’ and encouragement 
that ‘existing ODA must not be reduced’. Another consultant encouraged giving finance 
recipients authority over mixing ODA and climate finance for CDM projects: ‘public 
authorities in the recipient countries must approve the use of ODA but are often reluctant 
to do so due to lack of additionality of funds’. This external input was backed up by national 
statements, with China stating ‘that funding for CDM projects shall be additional to ODA, 
GEF and other financial commitments of the developed country Parties under the FCCC’, 
and India stressing that ‘CDM funding must be additional to ODA and the FCCC 
commitments’. 
Despite this input and developing countries’ calls for additionality, negotiations at 
this stage of the UNFCCC’s evolution remained open, with the lack of a clear definition of 
additionality contributing to discussions that had no clear trajectory and no unified position 
among developed countries. At COP-6, the EU acknowledged that ‘CDM funding should not 
compete with’ GEF and ODA funding, but Japan said that ‘there were no provisions requiring 
financial additionality and none that preclude the use of ODA as a source of funding’ (ENB-
118). At SBI-13 (before COP-6) ‘Japan said any requirements on financial additionality 
should not result in diversion of ODA’ (ENB-148), but at COP-6, ‘Japan, opposed by China 
and Indonesia, supported using ODA funding for the CDM’ (ENB-160).  
Policy setting out CDM guidelines was agreed at COP-7 in 2001. Decision 17/CP.7 
includes a statement in the introduction ‘emphasizing that public funding for clean 
development mechanism projects from Parties in Annex I is not to result in the diversion of 
official development assistance and is to be separate from and not counted towards the 
financial obligations of Parties included in Annex I’. Paragraph 2(f) requires that CDM 
project design documents should ‘provide an affirmation’ that these restrictions have been 
met. These operational principles were echoed in 2004 in decision 22/CP.10, which states 
that ‘each Party included in Annex II shall provide information on the implementation of 
Article 11 of the Kyoto Protocol [(finance provisions)], in particular information on what new 
and additional financial resources have been provided’ and ‘in what way these resources are 
new and additional’ (Annex, §II, J). These initial institutional rules operationalising the CDM 
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reinforced general principles of additionality of finance in both the Convention and Kyoto 
Protocol, and appear to state clearly what is required of developed countries’ finance 
contributions through the mechanism. However, the rules actually reinforce earlier 
ambiguity, since they do not include a definition of what “new and additional” should entail 
or any information on baselines, either for ODA or other climate finance flows, making an 
objective calculation of additionality impossible and leaving developed countries explicitly 
with control over how they determine and report on notions of additionality within their 
financial contributions. 
6.3.2  Pursuing new rules on additionality as part of SCCF 
operationalisation 
Development of operational guidance for the Special Climate Change Fund, created in at 
COP-7 in 2001 alongside the LDC Fund and Adaptation Fund, presented a space for 
discussion on additionality and the potential for more detailed rules. Initially, decision 
7/CP.7, which launched the SCCF, ‘established that there is a need for funding, including 
funding that is new and additional to contributions which are allocated to the climate 
change focal area of the Global Environment Facility and to multilateral and bilateral 
funding’. This is clearly in line with the precedent set by the Convention and bolstered by 
the CDM for only making reference to additionality, rather than institutionalising a clear 
definition or creating procedures to control finance flows. The funds created at COP-7 were 
accompanied by a statement of financial support from the EU and five other developed 
countries, which pledged US$410 million per year by 2005 (FCCC/CP/2001/MISC.4, p7):  
Funding to be counted can include: contributions to GEF climate change related activities; 
bilateral and multilateral funding additional to current levels; funding for the special 
climate change funds, the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund and the LDC fund; and funding 
deriving from the share of proceeds of the clean development mechanism following entry 
into force of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The statement shows that, without institutional guidelines, developed countries would 
include virtually all flows of finance when calculating their contributions, making it almost 
impossible to enforce any consistent and meaningful measure of which flows are additional 
to others or to prevent double counting, and thus to actually ensure the spirit of “new and 
additional” is implemented in a manner that ensures a reasonable standard of additionality. 
The introduction to decision 7/CP.8 in 2002 initiated development of SCCF 
guidance, but it only recalled the previous decision and did not add detail on implementing 
the general expectation of “new and additional” funding, reinforcing this phrase, and its 
inherent ambiguity, as part of the institutional structure of the UNFCCC. A more concerted 
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effort to gather a coalition behind more detailed institutional rules on additionality is 
evident at COP-9, where the G77/China emphasised that a draft decision on SCCF guidance 
‘lacked reference to the additionality of the funds’ (ENB-225) and noted that ‘the SCCF 
should be financed from new and additional funds’ (ENB-226). The group continued to press 
this point when, following a revised draft, they ‘addressed concerns that the text, inter alia, 
had not incorporated elements regarding the predictability, and new and additional nature 
of the funding’ (ENB-227). Developed countries pushed back against the concerns raised by 
the G77/China; first, ‘while noting minor concerns over the draft decision, the EU, Canada 
and Norway said the draft decision provides a good basis for negotiations’ (ENB-225), and 
then, ‘noting that the text was a good basis for negotiations, the EU and Canada said several 
elements had not been included in the revised text’ (ENB-227). The final decision 5/CP.9 
contains no reference to the additionality of SCCF funds, meaning developed countries 
prevailed and the opportunity to alter the existing policy path was not taken, preserving 
developed countries’ control over additionality definitions and calculations. 
6.3.3  Additionality within the broad remit of Copenhagen negotiations 
A broad negotiating landscape leading up to COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 made the drive 
to ensure additionality increasingly complex, since almost all aspects of climate finance 
were open for policy discussion in the AWG-LCA process and the weakness of prior policy 
concerning additionality gave very little beyond the “new and additional” sentiment in the 
Convention to build from. Developed countries sought to retain the advantages obtained 
from the Convention’s freedom for donor countries to define the relationship between 
climate finance and ODA. Key financial commitments were made at COP-15 in 
Copenhagen, and more firmly established at Cancún the following year, bringing the focus 
for climate finance policy within the UNFCCC onto how these headline commitments 
should be implemented. Initial policies at Copenhagen and Cancún were strongly 
influenced by developed countries’ reinforcement of existing path dependent policies, 
maintaining institutional structures that were relatively stable and remained rooted in the 
Convention. These structures built on the early years of policy outlined above and were 
firmly established as UNFCCC negotiations led towards COP-15 and 16, constraining the 
eventual outcome and, in tandem with developed countries’ continued drive to maintain the 
voluntary paradigm underpinning the control of finance levels (see Chapter 5), ensuring that 
developed countries retained the freedom over additionality that had begun in the 
Convention. 
Developing countries continued to call for clarity on additionality: at AWG-LCA-2 
(before COP-14), ‘China indicated that financial support flows should be separate and 
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distinct’ from ODA (ENB-358) and at AWG-LCA-3 (before COP-14), the G-77/China 
‘proposed a financial mechanism based on the principles, inter alia, of: direct access to 
funding, new and additional resources, and predictability’ (ENB-381). At AWG-LCA-5, 
‘South Africa emphasized that climate change financing should not be merely a reshaping 
of ODA’ (ENB-399) and at AWG-LCA-6, Sierra Leone, for LDCs, highlighted the need ‘for a 
“massive scale” of financing outside ODA’ (ENB-315). At the intercessional meeting between 
AWG-LCA-6 & 7, South Africa and Bangladesh ‘emphasized new additional and predictable 
funding, beyond current ODA levels’ (ENB-406), and at AWG-LCA-7 (before COP-15), the G-
77/China, supported by the LDCs and the African Group, said funding should be ‘additional 
to ODA’ (ENB-431). 
The dynamics between developed and developing countries over use of ODA, and 
the enduring institutional legacy of the development assistance system and North-South 
relationships, are evident in ENB-438, which records AWG-LCA-7 (before COP-15): 
On the provision and generation of financial resources, Antigua and Barbuda, for AOSIS, 
expressed concern that many of the proposals appeared to be donor/recipient 
arrangements. With the Philippines, for the G-77/China, she said that the disbursement of 
funds should be science-based and should not be counted towards ODA. The G-77/China 
expressed concern that ODA would be diverted to climate change-related activities at the 
expense of other development activities… Highlighting the need to significantly scale up 
financial resources, Japan cautioned against excluding ODA. Canada described the term 
“ODA” as a technical accounting concept. He called for careful consideration of 
“donor/recipient dynamics” and proposed the use of the terms “provider/user.” 
Note that Canada’s statement implies that ODA is a “technical accounting concept” and 
therefore not a significant issue, but this is precisely the concern for many developing 
countries; without a common standard for conducting this accounting, and thus holding 
developed countries’ calculations to account for the additionality, or otherwise, of their 
climate finance contributions, ODA and additionality remain procedural areas in which 
developed countries can obscure the under-delivery of climate finance. The Canadian and 
Japanese statements show that developed countries sought to oppose directly the imposition 
of additionality rules on their finance contributions. 
There was limited progress resolving these divisions at COP-15 in Copenhagen. The 
negotiation text included bracketed reference to the main source of funding being ‘new and 
additional provided by developed countries listed in Annex II over and above financing 
provided through institutions outside the framework of the financial mechanism of the 
Convention’ (ENB-447), but these were cut to only cursory reference to the now-standard 
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“new and additional” resources in the brief final text of the Copenhagen Accord, along with 
assurance that the ‘collective commitment by developed countries is to provide new and 
additional resources’ (decision 2/CP.15, paragraph 8). After the Copenhagen pledges of 
US$100bn per year by 2020 and US$30bn “fast-start finance” between 2010 and 2012 were 
in place, discussions moved to implementation policy. At AWG-LCA-10 (before COP-16), the 
African Group ‘highlighted the need to assess, inter alia, whether support by Annex II parties 
is delivered in a simplified manner, with direct access, and whether it is new and additional 
grant-based assistance from public resources’ (ENB-467). At COP-16, ‘on fast-start finance, 
developing countries said text should provide more details on transparency, including 
whether the funding is genuinely new and additional’ (ENB-495). 
The discussions on transparency at AWG-LCA-10 also prompted countries to raise 
the issue of how to define climate finance. China ‘identified the need for guidelines for the 
provision of new and additional finance. India emphasized the need for a set of common 
guidelines on what constitutes climate change financing and verification of support by a 
third party’ (ENB-466) and Brazil ‘called for guidelines on defining new and additional 
financing’ (ENB-467). This meeting is one of the relatively few occasions that direct 
discussion on defining climate finance is recorded, despite how relevant the question is to 
UNFCCC policy and how frequently it is mentioned in academic research on additionality. 
More commonly, statements from developing countries suggest that the language of the 
Convention was shaping developing country negotiating positions and constraining their 
expectations, further strengthening the limits of UNFCCC policy. For example, at AWG-
LCA-12 (before COP-16), Cuba ‘said the reference to “mobilization of long-term finance” is 
an “empty concept” and said it should reiterate the language in the BAP [Bali Action Plan] 
on provision of new, additional and predictable financial resources’ (ENB-482). However, 
without the definition of climate finance and any kind of baseline or ODA guidelines, 
repeated reinforcement of the “new and additional” expectation has had limited effect on 
practical functioning of the climate finance system. 
Rather than referring to the priorities of developing countries and any ethical basis 
for particular transparency and additionality rules, the more neutral and technical 
perspective pushed by developed countries is in evidence when the Cancún Agreements 
(decision 1/CP.16) state that ‘mobilization and provision of scaled-up, new, additional, 
adequate and predictable financial resources is necessary to address the adaptation and 
mitigation needs of developing countries’ (paragraph 1(d)). This concluded a phase of 
negotiations in which there were some instances where coalitions of developing countries 
made a concentrated push for clarity on additionality rules or a definition of climate finance 
that can better allow developing countries to hold developed countries to account for the 
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“new and additional” nature of their contributions. Overall, however, additionality was lost 
within the multitude of issues and policy areas open to negotiation leading up to the 
Copenhagen Accord and its operationalisation. No progress can be identified in policy 
terms, with the same “new and additional” phrase repeatedly reinforced as the limit of 
UNFCCC rules on the subject. This left the North-South power balance initiated with the 
Convention intact, with developed countries able to advocate maintaining the existing policy 
path and thus retaining the advantage they gained from the ambiguity surrounding 
additionality under the broader voluntary paradigm, while developing countries were unable 
to build a coalition of sufficient strength or gain legitimacy for their ideas and secure 
institutional change. 
6.3.4  Continuing efforts to secure a UNFCCC definition of climate finance 
Developed countries claimed that the US$30bn fast-start finance committed at Copenhagen 
had been fully delivered (e.g. ENB-558), but with evidence that little of it was additional to 
ODA (Fallasch and De Marez 2010, Fransen et al. 2012, Kharas 2015), developing countries 
had practical experience of developed countries sidestepping the now long-established new 
and additional principle. Developing countries such as the Solomon Islands declared this 
was ‘damaging the fragile confidence that we have’ in the prospect of developed countries 
fulfilling their commitments, and by extension continued to erode trust within the UNFCCC 
(Li 2011). Although this principle had been repeated in multiple COP decisions by this point, 
there remained no agreed definition of climate finance or baselines that are essential for 
ensuring that what happened with fast-start finance would not happen to climate finance 
over the longer term. COP-15 and 16 had reinforced institutional structures that prevented 
the UNFCCC taking control of calculating flows of climate finance and oversight of 
additionality, so developing countries faced an uphill struggle to ensure their needs were 
reflected in the comprehensive climate agreement planned for COP-21 in Paris in 2015.  
Calls for clarity on what constitutes climate finance, and criteria for new and 
additional finance in particular, increased markedly from COP-17 onwards, in response to 
contestation over the additionality of fast-start finance and the more distinct need and 
opportunity to hold developed countries to account about exactly what finance flows should 
be considered relevant to fulfil the longer-term US$100bn commitment. In COP-17 
discussions about fast-start finance, one developing country ‘said that new and additional 
criteria for finance had not been clarified’ (ENB-532), and then at COP-18, the Philippines 
‘observed that there is no common understanding of what constitutes climate change 
financing’, and ‘Kenya and Uganda called for a clear definition of climate finance. 
Bangladesh highlighted the absence of differentiation between climate finance and official 
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development assistance’ (ENB-560). Also at COP-18, ‘Papua New Guinea called for clarifying 
what constitutes climate finance, expressing concern that significant amounts are 
channeled [sic] to the private sector or fall under official development assistance’ (ENB-585). 
At ADP 2 (before COP-19), the Philippines gave a clear illustration of developing countries’ 
desire to hold developed countries to account for their responsibilities when they ‘called for 
urgent implementation of developed country parties’ obligations under the Convention; 
lamenting the lack of common understanding on finance twenty years after the Convention 
was negotiated’ (ENB-568). 
At COP-19 in 2013, after three intercessional meetings on long term finance, 
‘acknowledging progress made, many representatives stressed that further work is required 
on: climate finance definitions’ (ENB-583) and ‘Egypt stressed the need to define 
predictability and additionality of climate finance’ (ENB-592). Decision 3/CP.19 on long 
term finance requests the Standing Committee on Finance (an internal UNFCCC advisory 
body), ‘in the context of the preparation of its biennial assessment and overview of climate 
finance flows, to consider ongoing technical work on operational definitions of climate 
finance, including private finance mobilized by public interventions’ (paragraph 11). This 
decision constitutes, at least on paper, a direct challenge to the path dependent policies that 
had left control of designating funds as climate finance in the hands of donor countries for 
20 years. With development of the intended nationally determined contributions (INDC) 
system in the lead-up to COP-21 and reinforcement of the voluntary paradigm in a 
comprehensive new stage of the climate regime (see 2.3.3 above), the Paris Agreement was 
likely to be the last significant window in the policy process to alter well-established 
institutional structures that left the UNFCCC without a detailed definition of climate 
finance and thus without an institutional mechanism to exert control over designating 
funds as climate finance and keeping track of flows. Parties were invited at COP-19 to 
provide details of the emissions reduction, adaptation and support efforts they were willing 
to contribute to the combined international climate change response, in the form of 
voluntary INDCs. Although there are no recorded direct references to definitions in the 
context of INDCs, there was an important lack of standardisation within the INDC system, 
including with finance (Höhne et al. 2017), and no reference to the “technical work” being 
undertaken by the Standing Committee on Finance. 
Evidence from the negotiations suggests a wide range of developing countries sought 
to gather a strong coalition of actors to overcome the established institutional structure 
concerning additionality. At ADP 2-4 in 2014 (before COP-20), ‘Grenada urged agreement 
on the definition of climate finance, pointing to the categorization of ODA and 
humanitarian assistance as climate flows’ and ‘the LDCs and the Philippines called for a 
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definition of climate finance’ (ENB-595). At ADP 2-5, ‘CARICOM, Bangladesh and Guyana 
called for developing a common definition of climate finance’, and AILAC said an 
internationally agreed methodology for tracking financial flows should include ‘a common 
definition of climate finance to avoid double counting’ (ENB-598). At ADP 2-6, ‘Chile and 
CARICOM called for a definition of climate finance’ (ENB-602). At COP-20, ‘AOSIS and 
AILAC called for a clear definition of climate finance, with AILAC stressing this will help 
avoid double counting’ (ENB-613), and CARICOM ‘stressed the needs to clearly define 
climate finance as funds aimed entirely at addressing climate change and as being new and 
additional to official development assistance’ (ENB-616). However, despite these numerous 
appeals for a climate finance definition, the working draft of an agreement that formed the 
Lima Call for Climate Action (decision 1/CP.20) contained numerous finance provisions that 
made reference to new and additional funds and transparency, but did not include mention 
of defining climate finance or additionality, indicating that a coalition of sufficient strength 
was not obtained and institutional structures in this area held firm. 
At ADP 2-11 in 2015 (before COP-21), the Arab Group ‘requested a placeholder for 
the definition of “climate finance”’ in the definitions section of the final agreement (ENB-
649), but at COP-21 itself, ‘new textual proposals, emphasizing [sic] climate finance as 
specifically defined in the new agreement’ was one of various issues that ‘prompted many 
parties to express concerns about little progress’ (ENB-656). The final Paris Agreement 
makes no reference to a definition of climate finance or a process to agree one, only 
requesting that modalities, procedures and guidelines should take into account ‘the need to 
ensure that double counting is avoided’ (Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 92(f)). As such, it 
appears that the existing institutional structures held and, in the context of the NDC 
system3, Parties remain responsible for how they determine the additionality of their own 
contributions and whether they uphold the general expectations of policy to provide new 
and additional finance. The only additional relevant policy was decision 9/CP.21 on 
methodologies for reporting financial information by Annex I Parties, in which the COP 
‘recognizes the need to enhance common understanding on key terminology for reporting 
financial information under the Convention to facilitate transparency and comparability of 
information and data’ (paragraph 1). These provisions cannot be considered a significant 
advance beyond previous policies, especially since there was no reference to the work 
supposedly initiated by decision 3/CP.19 two years previously. 
 
3 The “I” for “intended” was dropped after the Paris Agreement was adopted at COP-21. 
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6.3.5  Negotiations around additionality calculations prior to COP-21 
With the headline finance pledges agreed in Copenhagen reaffirmed in Cancún, developing 
countries used the language of transparency in their continued efforts to strengthen the 
institutional structure related to additionality. There has been an ongoing lack of 
transparency across the broader climate finance system, leading to consistent double 
counting (Pereira et al. 2013), so calls for transparency relate to holding developed countries 
to account for the climate finance pledges they have made and developing countries’ 
concern with ensuring additionality, and are associated with clear accounting rules and 
procedures standardised across all contributor countries (Weikmans and Roberts 2019). 
Transparency is inherently connected with developing countries’ calls for clarity on 
definitions of climate finance and “new and additional”, and formed part of their broader 
efforts to secure robust MRV of developing countries’ support. 
At COP-17 discussions on fast-start finance in 2011, ‘one developing country called 
for reporting with total transparency’ but ‘some developed countries said that it was 
“discouraging” to receive so little credit for efforts towards fast-start finance and called for 
a paragraph on enhancing transparency to be deleted’ (ENB-532). Nicaragua criticised ‘the 
transparency of fast start finance’ and ‘Egypt noted the need for clarity on the predictability, 
sustainability, additionality and transparency of support’ (ENB-534). There is evidence of a 
response to these concerns in policy at COP-17, with decision 2/CP.17 requiring that the 
financial information in developed countries’ biennial reports to the UNFCCC should 
include ‘an indication of what new and additional financial resources they have provided 
pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Convention’ and ‘Parties shall clarify how they have 
determined that such resources are new and additional’ (paragraph 18(f)). However, since 
each Party must only ‘report in a rigorous, robust and transparent manner the underlying 
assumptions and methodologies used to produce information on finance’ (paragraph 15), 
rather than use common accounting procedures that could assuage developing country 
concerns, the policy actually reinforces the established institutional structure of donor 
country control over accounting and designating resources as new and additional. 
Developing countries continued to press for transparency. At COP-18, the LDCs 
‘stressed transparency and additionality of financial resources’ (ENB-558) and ADP 2-2 
(before COP-19), ‘to bridge the trust gap and address the challenge of the insufficient 
provision of means of implementation [(finance, technology transfer and capacity building)], 
the Republic of Korea proposed developing MRV for finance with clear definitions, baselines 
and scope’ (ENB-575). At COP-19, the G-77/China ‘called for identification of specific 
amounts, timelines and sources of finance to strengthen the current reporting system’ (ENB-
587), the African Group stressed the need for improved transparency in finance 
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commitments, and Saint Lucia called for a ‘standardized format for reporting by developed 
countries’ (both ENB-588). 
In advance of COP-20 in 2014, numerous developing countries and blocs argued for 
transparency and common accounting rules with reference to additionality. At ADP 2-4, 
‘Brazil said NDCs must provide in a clear, transparent and verifiable manner their 
intentions regarding provision of finance, including…demonstrating additionality to official 
development assistance’, South Africa ‘called for improving the ex post system of MRV to 
eliminate double counting’, and ‘Ecuador recalled their submission on transparency of 
climate finance, stressing only funds that are entirely aimed at addressing climate change 
should be counted towards obligations on climate finance’ (all ENB-595). At ADP 2-5, 
‘Algeria, with other developing countries, called for clear accounting rules in the 2015 
agreement’, ‘China expressed concern over lack of methodology for reporting on support’, 
‘AILAC supported an internationally agreed methodology for tracking financial flows’, ‘Iran 
said developed countries should provide ex ante information on MOI in a common 
template’, ‘the Philippines said MRV of support should include enhanced reporting 
procedures for Annex II parties based on comparability of efforts’, and ‘Brazil emphasized 
preventing double-counting’ (all ENB-598). 
There were further references to transparency, additionality and avoiding double 
counting at COP-20, where the Business and Industry NGOs constituency (BINGOs) stressed 
‘the importance of establishing credible and transparent MRV and avoiding double 
counting’ (ENB-611) and AOSIS ‘emphasized the need for common reporting formats’ 
(ENB-616). The extent and range of developing countries’ coalition building in 2014 
demonstrates the strength of the Southern push against Northern control of additionality 
and accounting, and thereby against path dependent institutional structures that had 
contributed to developed countries preventing stronger UNFCCC rules in this area for such 
a long period. Reflecting this push, the draft negotiating output from COP-20 included 
numerous references to transparency of support and a requirement that developed country 
Parties mobilise finance that ‘is quantifiable, comparable and transparent’ (decision 
1/CP.20, paragraph 35.2(t)). The draft for Section J, on transparency of action and support, 
included options for a common transparency framework in order to facilitate comparison 
and accountability, and an option for the COP to elaborate rules for transparency and 
accounting that will cover whether funds are new and additional (paragraph 69, option 1(i) 
and option 3(j)). As the Paris conference approached, the Indian government (Dasgupta and 
Government of India 2015) and civil society organisations (Adaptation Watch 2015) issued 
a direct, public challenge to developed countries’ estimates of how much finance they were 
delivering and how much was new and additional, demonstrating the low levels of trust 
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developing countries had in the UNFCCC system to ensure finance commitments were kept 
and the expectation of additionality was met. 
Despite these challenges within and outside the negotiation process, and the 
potential shown in the draft sections prepared at COP-20, the Paris Agreement itself is very 
limited in references to additionality and transparency of accounting. Decision 1/CP.21, 
which covers implementation of the Agreement, includes in paragraph 92(f) a request that 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, created to develop modalities, 
procedures and guidelines for implementing the Agreement takes into account ‘the need to 
ensure that double counting is avoided’ in finance accounting. In the Paris Agreement itself, 
Article 9 includes a stipulation that ‘developed country Parties shall provide transparent and 
consistent information on support for developing country Parties’ (paragraph 9), but aside 
from a reference in the same article that ‘mobilization of climate finance should represent 
a progression beyond previous efforts’ (paragraph 3), there is no reference to additionality 
or ODA. Article 13 initiates a transparency framework for support, with the aim ‘to provide 
clarity on support provided and received by relevant individual Parties’ (paragraph 6), but 
again there is no reference to additionality. Thus, the potential evident in the Lima draft text 
was lost in Paris, and the new NDC regime was initiated without even the standard wording 
of “new and additional” to shape the actions of Parties contributing climate finance, 
reinforcing the institutional structure that gave contributor countries control over 
determining and accounting for additionality. 
6.4 Sources of UNFCCC climate finance 
Debate over the sources of climate finance has evolved considerably over the course of 
UNFCCC negotiations. The differences between how developed and developing countries 
perceived climate finance were left unresolved by vague wording in the Convention, which 
permitted all sources of climate finance without offering any clarity on how policy should 
be structured or how future decisions on available sources should be made. In a similar 
manner to additionality, a normative frame was avoided, so as the extent of necessary 
climate finance became clearer over time and private and other “innovative” sources became 
more prominent across the broader landscape of climate finance as well as within the 
UNFCCC, institutional rules from which to build policy were ambiguous and the 
expectations of different actors were not aligned. It is within this ambiguous institutional 
space that developed and developing countries sought to ensure their perspective and 
preferences on finance sources, whether based on justice or economic practicalities, would 
be translated into more detailed institutional rules and policy that would underpin finance 
commitments and new funding institutions. This section will examine how actor interaction 
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and policy making progressed from this ambiguous beginning, addressing the distinct 
North-South split evident in negotiations on finance sources and the challenge for 
coalitions of developing countries to form a bargaining position consistent both between 
countries and over time; finance sources has been the area where developing countries have 
been least unified in their objectives as harsh political realities, underpinned by donor 
control over climate finance and the broader development/ODA sector, have exposed the 
huge gulf between available public funding and the need for climate finance. 
6.4.1  Initial navigation of rule ambiguity 
From early in the UNFCCC negotiation process, developed countries pushed to reinforce 
the control they gained from the Convention over how finance was sourced. Initially this 
encompassed a range of sources, rather than the focus on private finance and investment 
that would develop in later years. For example, at INC-11 in 1995 (before COP-1), France 
‘noted that in addition to the GEF, other traditional sources of funding are important, 
including multilateral banks, financial assistance, private sector and national resources’ 
(ENB-3). At COP-3 in 1997 the US ‘pointed to the need for finding innovative sources of 
financing involving the private sector’ (ENB-70), and at SBI-10 in 1999 (before COP-5), ‘the 
EU and US supported Switzerland’s written proposal that all bilateral and multilateral 
contributions, not just GEF efforts, be taken into consideration’ in the review of GEF 
activities (ENB-100). At COP-6, ‘Japan said the widest possible range of resources should be 
mobilized, including ODA’, and China, Norway and Canada held consultations ‘on the 
possible role of multilateral funding institutions’ in the Clean Development Mechanism 
(ENB-161), and ‘Finland said the GEF is not the only funding channel, and stressed the 
availability of bilateral and private sector funds’ (ENB-160). 
Little pushback or contrary perspectives from developing countries are documented 
in the ENB record at these early stages, and policy began to build up largely consistent with 
the Convention’s openness to multiple private, bilateral and multilateral sources. The Kyoto 
Protocol built directly on Convention provisions by stating that the Meeting of the Parties 
(the equivalent of COP) will ‘seek to mobilize additional financial resources’ (Article 13). 
Decision 11/CP.4 the following year noted that ‘Annex II Parties are providing bilateral 
contributions’ in addition to GEF funding (paragraph 11) and 10/CP.5 decided that financial 
and technical support for capacity building ‘should be provided through the financial 
mechanism and through bilateral and multilateral agencies, as appropriate’ (paragraph 1(a)). 
These policies were confirmed at COP-7, where the LDC Fund and SCCF were created; 
decision 7/CP.7 decides that new and additional funding should be provided through 
increased GEF replenishment, the SCCF, LDC Fund and bilateral and multilateral channels 
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(paragraph 1(c)), and decision 5/CP.7 details which adverse effects activities should be 
funded by the GEF, SCCF, Adaptation Fund and other bilateral and multilateral sources 
(paragraphs 7-8). 
Building on the institutional precedent for “mobilising” climate finance, donor 
countries began to advocate a “catalyst” role for public funding that flowed through the 
UNFCCC system (Mace 2005, p. 237), which initiated a lasting drive to institutionalise public 
finance as a means to “leverage” greater sums from private sources, thereby diminishing the 
connection between historical responsibility and public finance and the characterisation of 
climate finance as compensation in line with developed countries’ positions when 
negotiating the Convention. For example, at SBI-18 in 2003 (before COP-9), ‘the EU stressed 
that the SCCF should have a catalytic function’ (ENB-215) and at COP-9, ‘the EU said the 
SCCF should be a catalyst for leveraging additional resources from bilateral and multilateral 
sources’ (ENB-223). The introduction to decision 1/CP.12 recognised the need for the GEF 
to ‘continue its efforts to mobilize additional resources to support the implementation of 
eligible project activities’ and reiterated that the SCCF should be a ‘catalyst to leverage 
additional resources from bilateral and other multilateral sources’, adding to the 
institutional rule structure in line with developed countries’ interests and their 
interpretation of the Convention. 
6.4.2  Developed countries strengthen institutional structures as 
developing countries demonstrate increasingly conflicted priorities 
Developing countries faced a growing challenge as they gained more operational experience 
of the climate finance regime and a greater range of sources became available for investing 
in climate change actions. The latter developments were acknowledged explicitly in 
UNFCCC policy when the introduction to decision 9/CP.10 noted that ‘in recent years there 
has been an increase in the number of funding sources available for activities relating to 
climate change’. With funding levels remaining inadequate to meet their needs, developing 
countries were caught between promoting new and “innovative”, usually private sources that 
could generate higher levels of climate finance, and maintaining their long-held 
prioritisation of public finance that aligns with principles of North-South restitution and 
compensation for climate harms. For example, in discussions on technology transfer at 
SBSTA-20 in 2004 (before COP-10), Thailand, supported by the G-77/China, and opposed by 
the US, EU, Canada, Switzerland and Japan, encouraged a planned workshop on innovative 
financing ‘to generate concrete proposals on funding mechanisms under UNFCCC Article 
4.5 (technology transfer)’ (ENB-236). Perhaps counterintuitive in terms of the perspectives of 
developing and developed countries on the subject, the enthusiasm of developing countries 
here illustrates the complex negotiating position they occupied. 
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In contrast, developed countries had a clear interest in maintaining the structure 
that did not prioritise public over private sources, originally institutionalised in the 
Convention, and they sought to frame this openness to multiple sources as advantageous to 
the UNFCCC climate finance system as a whole. For example, at COP-12 in 2006, ‘the EU 
and Australia highlighted the value of looking at all sources of funding for the Convention’s 
implementation’ (ENB-315), and decision 2/CP.12 on the financial mechanism requested 
the GEF to report to COP-13 on ‘efforts to engage the private sector in providing resources 
to address climate change’ (paragraph 3(d)). Other policy further reinforced established, 
structural expectations that UNFCCC funds would not be limited to public funding, such as 
the initial modalities for the Adaptation Fund, which included the ‘ability to receive 
contributions from other sources of funding’ (decision 5/CMP.2, paragraph 2(e)). Wary of 
seeing developed countries push their obligations onto the private sector, but at the same 
time keen to encourage any new sources and channels of finance, developing countries were 
unable to coalesce around a negotiation position that could directly challenge the path 
dependent policy structures already in place. Instead, developing countries demonstrated a 
variety of perspectives on the emerging landscape of public, private and “innovative” 
funding sources. 
6.4.2.1  Developed countries’ clear priority to increase private finance 
Developed countries consistently highlighted the role that private finance can play in filling 
the gap between public finance and the sums actually required. Their statements presented 
it as fact that private sources have much greater potential for climate finance, and there was 
a notable absence of any reference to the idea that climate finance is a moral obligation as 
yet unfulfilled. Instead, developed countries used language that implied a combined effort 
to achieve a goal, with public and private sources simply part of a spectrum of options, rather 
than a politically- and ethically-loaded policy question with the significant repercussions 
that developing countries have repeatedly sought to highlight. Efforts to cast the question of 
sources in a technical, ethically-neutral light can be seen throughout the AWG-LCA process 
that led to COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009. For example, at the first Convention Dialogue 
meeting in 2006 (before COP-12), ‘the European Community stressed the role of the private 
sector, noting that the total value of the global carbon market in 2005 was many times greater 
than government funding for’ the GEF (ENB-297). At COP-13, the US suggested that ‘the 
private sector would provide the bulk of immediate investments’ for implementing the 
Convention (ENB-345), and at AWG-LCA-1 (before COP-14), ‘the US indicated that the 
private sector would generate the majority of financing’ (ENB-361). At AWG-LCA-2 (before 
COP-14), the US said ‘public support for research and development and national enabling 
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environments would promote private sector investment’ (ENB-368) and ‘the private sector 
should become the main source of funding’, while ‘the EU underlined the role of the carbon 
market, innovative financing and leveraging private investments’ (ENB-370). 
At COP-14 in 2008, ‘the US, Norway and Canada highlighted the importance of the 
private sector’ (ENB-390). At the intercessional meeting between AWG-LCA-6 and 7 (before 
COP-15), the US ‘stressed the role of private sources in generating the scale of financing 
needed’ (ENB-424). At AWG-LCA-10 (before COP-16), ‘Canada supported the establishment 
of new market mechanisms’ and suggested that ‘carbon markets contribute to low-cost 
mitigation and mobilization of private finance’, while ‘the EU and US highlighted the role 
of market mechanisms in mobilizing the US$100 billion of annual funding agreed in 
Copenhagen’ (ENB-467). The UNFCCC itself contributed to this increase in neutral 
language, with the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change 
Finance concluding at COP-16 that ‘it will be challenging but possible to mobilize US$100 
billion annually for climate action in developing countries by 2020 and that a combination 
of different sources will be necessary’ (ENB-488). In the face of developing countries 
‘demanding fulfilment [sic] of a legal commitment” (ENB-439) to provide finance, 
reinforcing the Convention’s neutrality in terms of public and private sources meant 
developed countries could shift the emphasis of climate finance negotiations away from 
their obligations and onto how best to attract greater levels of private finance, presenting 
this as the only way to meet developing countries’ needs. 
6.4.2.2  Developing countries’ changing and varied perspectives 
Developing countries’ challenge to balance the need to encourage any possible new sources 
of funding with their desire to ensure that developed countries carry a fair share of the 
burden emerged as increasingly significant within policy negotiations in the lead-up to 
COP-15. Some countries, particularly larger developing countries, promoted innovative 
sources, and many echoed developed countries’ statements on the practical reality of 
requiring private finance. For example, at the first “Convention Dialogue” meeting (before 
COP-12), the Philippines ‘highlighted the need for innovative ways of financing’ and ‘urged 
innovative mechanisms for financing adaptation’ (ENB-297), and at COP-12, South Africa 
‘stressed the need for innovative financing mechanisms to support climate action’ (ENB-
317). At AWG-LCA-1, (before COP-14), the G-77/China and others called for ‘developing a 
mechanism to mobilize resources’, ‘China stressed innovative funding mechanisms’ for 
technology transfer (ENB-361), and ‘Mexico noted the need to consider innovative means of 
financing’ (ENB-367). At COP-14, ‘Brazil said new options are needed to provide the vast 
resources required (ENB-390) and ‘Bangladesh underlined the need to involve and 
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incentivize the private sector’ (ENB-391). At AWG-LCA-6 (before COP-15), ‘Turkey identified 
the need to mobilize the private sector in addition to public funding’ and Tuvalu ‘stressed 
the need for a variety of sources and for innovative funding, such as levies on international 
transport and a share of proceeds on market mechanisms that may be developed under the 
AWG-LCA’ (ENB-415), reflecting broader conversations about possible ways to generate the 
required levels of climate finance. At AWG-LCA-10 (before COP-16), ‘Guyana explained that 
from a “pragmatic and realistic standpoint” market sources are needed to complement 
public funding’ (ENB-467). 
On other occasions, developing countries pushed back against the rise of private and 
innovative sources: at the fourth Convention Dialogue (before COP-13), ‘discussions on 
investment invited familiar developing country concerns about the risks of relying too 
heavily on flows of private investment’ (ENB-336). At AWG-LCA-2 (before COP-14), the G-
77/China said ‘funding should come from implementation of Annex I countries’ 
commitments’ and ‘India, the African Group, China and AOSIS stated that the private sector 
can play only a limited role’ (ENB-370). At the intercessional meeting between AWG-LCA-6 
& 7 (before COP-15), ‘China said that the increasing emphasis on the private sector as a 
source of finance would lead to unpredictable funding, stressing that finance should be 
provided by the public sector’ (ENB-424), and Venezuela, with Egypt, Argentina, Sri Lanka 
and the African Group, ‘said funding should come from public sources’ (ENB-425). Concerns 
were also raised about developing countries, particularly LDCs, being able to access private 
finance, such as at AWG-LCA-6, when ‘Tanzania highlighted that LDCs are not able to solicit 
funding from the private sector’ and ‘the Gambia described failed attempts to involve the 
private sector in her country’ (ENB-415). In addition, developing countries highlighted 
adaptation, which often lacks the features necessary to attract profit-motivated private 
investment. For example, at AWG-LCA-6, the African Group ‘said public financing is 
essential for adaptation technologies, which often do not attract private sector investment’ 
(ENB-416).  
Ultimately, developing countries’ expectations and priorities were changing. There 
was increasing acceptance that public and private finance were both required, mixed with 
ongoing concern that developed countries should not use private sources to undermine their 
commitments or obscure their failure to deliver public finance. At AWG-LCA-6 (before COP-
15) ‘many developing countries also stressed the need for public financing, saying that the 
private sector and carbon markets should play a complementary role’ (ENB-415), and ‘while 
identifying the need to engage the private sector, the G-77/China emphasized that this 
cannot substitute the implementation of developed countries’ commitments under the 
Convention. He also urged ensuring that the public sector is the primary source of funding’ 
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(ENB-416) and Colombia ‘expressed concern that parties’ commitments would be 
transferred to the private sector’ (ENB-415). Overall, the debate was summarised in this 
extract recording discussions at the intercessional meeting between AWG-LCA-6 & 7: 
‘debate centered [sic] on whether funds should be derived from strictly public sources or a 
mix of both public and private sources. Developing countries generally preferred that the 
primary sources of funds be public, with no conditionalities. Developed countries highlighted 
the role of private sources, preferring a mix of the two. Switzerland said that there was 
convergence on public and private sources but not on their respective roles… Barbados 
pointed to divergence on the extent to which public and private sources will play in the 
generation of funds’. (ENB-427) 
This disagreement continued at AWG-LCA-7 (before COP-15), where in the closing plenary, 
the Vice-Chair ‘highlighted a common understanding that public and private sources of 
funding are needed but noted that no common view prevailed on the main source’ (ENB-
439). 
COP-15 at Copenhagen ended in widely-publicised disappointment, with little to 
show for the prior years of heightened negotiation rounds, but the Copenhagen Accord did 
include key headline targets for provision of climate finance (examined in more detail in 
Chapter 5). However, the commitment was to ‘mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a 
year by 2020’, which ‘will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral 
and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance’ and can include ‘investments 
through international institutions’ (decision 2/CP.15, paragraph 8). Accompanied by an 
explicit reference to previous policy, the Cancún Agreements the following year (decision 
1/CP.16) state that ‘funds provided to developing country Parties may come from a wide 
variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative 
sources’ (paragraph 99). Despite a wide range of suggestions and perspectives in evidence 
between and amongst developed and developing countries, policy outcomes remained 
highly constrained within the existing path allowing flexibility of sources and channels, and 
lack of moral basis or reference to compensation. While the headline targets are a key 
milestone in UNFCCC climate finance and have formed the foundation of subsequent 
policy architecture, the failure to address the concerns of developing countries regarding 
prioritising public finance and transferring responsibility onto the private sector, indicates 
that the associated layers of policy were a product of and reinforced the institutional 
structures that have shaped expectations about the kind of policy framework that the 
UNFCCC can produce. 
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6.4.3  Ongoing battle to secure institutional change without limiting 
finance 
The previous section showed that developing countries faced a complex challenge to 
encourage the scaling up of climate finance, while simultaneously recognising the necessity 
of private and innovative sources, and seeking to ensure that developed countries fulfil the 
obligations to provide finance that are established as a principle in the UNFCCC and 
championed by developing countries and NGOs alike as an ethical responsibility in light of 
the harms of climate change. With the Convention clearly permitting any and all sources of 
funding to be part of fulfilling developed countries’ commitments within the UNFCCC 
system, developing countries have repeatedly highlighted the role of public finance but have 
had little success overcoming the policy path initiated by the Convention’s original 
openness. These concerns were combined with the ambiguity of the Copenhagen finance 
commitments, which gave little detail on how the commitments would be fulfilled and left a 
gap in policy between fast-start finance and the longer term US$100bn commitment 
(covered in more detail in Chapter 5); for example, at COP-17, Nicaragua criticised ‘the 
transparency of fast start finance and the absence of identified funding sources’ for 
financing the GCF (ENB-634). 
6.4.3.1  Developing countries constrained by conflicting priorities 
Developing countries continued to highlight developed countries’ responsibilities and 
articulate concerns that these would be shifted onto the private sector. For example, at COP-
17 in 2011, ‘Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia warned against overreliance on the private sector’ 
for GCF funding (ENB-529), and at the AWG-LCA intercessional meeting before COP-18, 
Algeria, for the G-77/China, highlighted ‘public long-term finance’, and ‘many developing 
countries stressed that the role of the private sector in financing REDD+ cannot replace 
Annex I parties’ financing obligations, nor public funding’ (ENB-549). At COP-19, ‘Ecuador 
highlighted the need to ensure finance from parties, not only the private sector’ (ENB-592) 
and at ADP 2-5 (before COP-20), ‘Venezuela stressed that developed countries’ responsibility 
cannot be transferred to the private sector’ (ENB-598). At COP-20, the African Group ‘said 
that commitments should not shift responsibility from developed to developing countries, 
nor encourage private over public support’ (ENB-613) and ‘Brazil noted that including 
private sector involvement in the new agreement does not ensure climate finance’ (ENB-
617). In addition, some developing countries called for clarity on which sources developed 
countries proposed to use to fulfil their finance commitments: at COP-20, ‘Ethiopia called 
for clear communication by developed countries on the amount and sources of their finance 
commitments’ (ENB-616). Sometimes these concerns led to calls for clarity on provision of 
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public finance, such as at ADP 2-8 (before COP-21), when ‘China urged a clear road map 
with targets for public funding from developed countries and progressively scaled up 
finance’ (ENB-622). 
Just as in previous rounds of negotiation, many developing countries also continued 
to express consistently their preference for prioritising public finance. At COP-17, ‘Malawi 
underlined the role of public finance’ (ENB-534), at AWG-LCA-15 (before COP-18), AOSIS 
‘emphasized that small island developing States (SIDS) have high adaptation needs for 
which private sources of financing are not generally available’ (ENB-538). At COP-19, ‘many 
developing countries called for…public finance to be the main source of climate finance’ 
(ENB-587), and at ADP 2-6 (before COP-20), ‘the LMDCs said public finance should be the 
major source of climate finance’ (ENB-601) and ‘Algeria, China, Iran and India stressed 
public sources of finance, with China, Iran, Ecuador, Palau and Tanzania saying that private 
sector finance should be complementary’ (ENB-602). At COP-20, Egypt and Paraguay 
emphasised that ‘finance should come mainly from public sources’ (ENB-611), at ADP 2-9 
(before COP-21), ‘India and Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Group, stressed public sources as the 
main source’ (ENB-637), and at ADP 2-10 (before COP-21), ‘AILAC underlined public funds 
as the primary source, supplemented with private and alternative sources’ (ENB-641). These 
calls were complemented by a letter sent in advance of COP-20 by 118 NGO groups from 37 
countries, which urged UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to ‘ensure that private finance 
is not counted as international climate finance’ (Friends of the Earth 2014). 
At the same time as warning about shifting responsibilities and highlighting a 
preference for public finance, a wide range of developing countries and blocs continued to 
refer to the need for multiple finance sources. At AWG-LCA-15 (before COP-18), Guyana, 
‘with many others’, ‘underscored that a variety of sources will be required to achieve the 
necessary scale of financing’ (ENB-541) and at the intercessional meeting between ADP 1 
and COP-20, the African Group ‘said any future legal outcome should be a further 
articulation of commitments reflected in the Convention, such as…acceptance of all sources 
of finance’ (ENB-550), showing a key developing country bloc reinforcing the Convention’s 
openness. At ADP 2-2 (before COP-19), regarding REDD+ financing, Ghana stressed the 
need ‘for the GCF to catalyze [sic] finance from public and private sources’ and Guyana 
stressed that ‘payments need to come from a variety of sources’ (ENB-576), and then at COP-
19 the African Group called for ‘Annex I countries to leverage private-sector support’ (ENB-
588). Demonstrating the necessity that some developing countries saw in openness to all 
sources for maximising levels of climate finance, at COP-20, the African Group ‘called for 
discussing a strategic approach to finance, including addressing sources, predictability, 
adequacy and stability, and ways to deliver the necessary scale of finance needed to stay 
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below 2°C’ (ENB-611). Also at COP-20, ‘India called for greater creativity from developed 
countries to mobilize innovative sources of finance, such as pension funds’ (ENB-616). At 
ADP 2-8 (before COP-21), the LDCs called for ‘new sources of finance’ (ENB-622), at ADP 2-
9, ‘Mexico identified need for all sources’ (ENB-637), and at COP-21, the King of Cambodia 
called for ‘stimulating private investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency’ (ENB-
653). 
It is clear that developing countries remained caught in a difficult position, as they 
had been throughout previous rounds of negotiations. Another NGO letter, this time from 
112 groups to OECD finance ministers in 2015, stated that ‘private investment in climate-
friendly activities is vital and efforts to increase the transparency of these financial flows are 
welcome. However, private finance should not be substituted for public funding or counted 
towards the $100 billion’ (Orenstein 2015). Trying to navigate the evolving landscape of 
climate finance with multiple sources and channels, while holding developed countries to 
account for their ethical obligation to provide funding, developing countries were 
constrained by the entrenched institutional rule structure that underpinned openness to all 
sources of finance throughout policy. A clear definition of climate finance based on ethical 
principles, backed up with standardised accounting procedures, could have given 
developing countries confidence that the UNFCCC system would hold developed countries 
to account, and provided a foundation from which to encourage private and innovative 
sources with less concern that responsibility would be shifted onto them and away from 
public finance. Instead, developing countries’ expectations within the UNFCCC have been 
shaped by the institutional structure so firmly reinforced by successive layers of policy, and 
developed countries’ failure to provide adequate climate finance and live up to their pledges. 
This left no solid footing for developing countries to pursue their twin aims within this 
policy area of stimulating as much finance as possible and ensuring developed countries 
meet their responsibilities. 
6.4.3.2 Developed countries act strategically to build new institutional rules 
While developing countries have demonstrated a lack of unified negotiating strategy and 
common position on finance sources, as private finance became increasingly significant, 
developed countries demonstrated a more coherent effort to introduce various new 
institutional rules or norms that would add detail to the prior institutional openness put in 
place by the Convention. Their emphasis on highlighting the practical necessity of private 
finance and seeking to limit public finance to LDCs and unprofitable climate change 
adaptation, and framing public finance as leverage to facilitate greater sums of private 
finance, are all consistent with developed countries’ drive to maintain control over how 
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much finance they contribute and on what timelines. The institutional structures that had 
built up over the preceding two decades gave developed countries a strong position from 
which to reinforce their advantage. 
There is plentiful evidence of developed countries calling explicitly for private or 
multiple sources of finance. For example, at the informal ADP meeting (the negotiating track 
for COP-21) before COP-18 in 2012, the EU supported holding a high-level forum to work 
on issues such as private-sector financing after ‘underscoring that parties are not likely to 
step up existing targets and pledges this year’ (ENB-550), thereby reinforcing donor control. 
Then at COP-18, ‘the EU observed that it was important to recognize that no single source 
can address the aims of climate finance’ (ENB-560). In both instances, developed countries 
used language of a more technical nature to distance themselves from normative debates 
about obligations and the range of appropriate sources used to mobilise finance that might 
erode their control. At COP-19, ‘Canada said public finance alone will not suffice to address 
the needs of the poorest’ and ‘Japan and the US underscored the need to incentivize both 
public and private investment’ (ENB-587). ‘Numerous developed countries, including 
Canada, the EU, Japan, Norway and New Zealand, highlighted mobilizing private finance’ 
and New Zealand even went as far as to suggest a UNFCCC mechanism for ‘ensuring that 
public finance does not “crowd out” private sector engagement’ (ENB-592). At COP-20, 
‘Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the US suggested highlighting a variety of sources’ (ENB-
611), ‘Japan said parties who provide and receive support should work together to mobilize 
private finance’ (ENB-612), and ‘Australia called for recognizing support to developing 
countries from various sources’ (ENB-614). At ADP 2-8 (before COP-21), ‘the EU highlighted 
progress made, including on finance, indicating that the US$100 billion mobilization 
includes multiple sources’ (ENB-625), and at ADP 2-10 (before COP-21), ‘several developed 
countries underlined the need for more countries to mobilize finance and for mobilizing 
finance from all sources’ (ENB-641). 
Developed countries also pushed for the use of public finance to leverage private 
finance, again highlighting a more technical focus on increasing overall levels of finance, 
downplaying issues of justice in how much finance should be provided by developed 
countries in response to the ethical obligations that developing countries highlight. At COP-
19, for example, ‘Todd Stern, US Special Envoy for Climate Change, highlighted 
collaboration among donor countries to strengthen public finance as a means to leverage 
private investment’. He was supported by the World Bank, an organisation that has 
concerned developing countries for decades, which ‘underscored its progress in tracking 
climate finance’ in the context of ‘the importance of understanding how public finance is 
leveraging private finance’ (ENB-592). At ADP 2-4 (before COP-20), Australia highlighted 
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the importance of ‘leveraging private finance’ (ENB-595). At ADP 2-6 (before COP-20), ‘the 
US stressed the need to: use public finance to mobilize private investment’ (ENB-602) and 
at COP-20, ‘Luxembourg emphasized that public finance at the national and local levels has 
a vital role to play in mobilizing private investment’ (ENB-616). 
Developed countries also continued to build a coalition of support for 
institutionalising a distinction between the uses of private and public climate finance, 
building on the Convention’s lack of specificity. A division between public finance for 
adaptation and LDCs, and private finance for all other purposes and developing countries, 
would be likely to limit developed countries’ obligations, and tied into the broader trend of 
seeking to break down the distinction between developed and developing countries in policy 
areas including mitigation as well as finance (Okereke and Coventry 2016). At COP-19, the 
US identified ‘public finance as key for the LDCs, and highlighting the role of private finance 
in middle- and high-income economies’ (ENB-587) and ‘Norway underlined the need for 
public finance for adaptation’ (ENB-587), while at ADP 2-6 (before COP-20), ‘Australia 
emphasized using public finance to support those unable to attract private finance’ (ENB-
602). This distinction puts public finance in a more technical light, implying it is necessary 
to bolster or top-up beyond the limitations of profit-driven financing, and down-playing the 
justice roots of public finance that developing countries have been so concerned to 
recognise. Although references in the ENB record are relatively few, the distinction entered 
policy in decision 3/CP.19 on long-term climate finance, which ‘calls on developed country 
Parties to channel a substantial share of public climate funds to adaptation activities’ 
(paragraph 8), and was reinforced with identical phrasing in decisions 5/CP.20 and 5/CP.21, 
both also addressing long-term climate finance. In addition, Article 9 of the Paris Agreement 
includes a clause stating that ‘The provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to 
achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation…considering the need for public and 
grant-based resources for adaptation’ (paragraph 4). 
In addition to the references in policy to the different roles of public and private 
finance, openness to a variety of sources continued to prevail within policy. Decisions 
2/CP.17, 1/CP.18, 4/CP.18 and 3/CP.19 all reiterate existing policy regarding a variety of 
public, private and innovative sources being acceptable routes to fulfilling the US$100bn 
annual commitment from Copenhagen and Cancún. Furthermore, decisions concerning 
funding for the GCF, which was being operationalised after COP-16, also adopted and 
reinforced the same openness to multiples sources; decisions 6/CP.18, 4/CP.19, 7/CP.20, 
7/CP.21 all invited resources from public, private and alternative sources, in addition to 
developed countries themselves, as part of this operationalisation process, placing the GCF 
firmly into the existing structures that ensured little institutional distinction between 
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different sources. With developing countries presenting various different positions on 
finance sources, it is perhaps not surprising that the various angles pursued by developed 
countries are the ones represented in the final layers of policy output, reinforcing the 
institutional structure that contributed to developed countries’ control over the sources of 
climate finance. 
The draft agreement contained in the Lima Call for Climate Action in 2014 (decision 
1/CP.20) and its progression to the Paris Agreement are particularly revealing of the 
coalitions of actors seeking to create institutional rules. The draft paragraph 53 on sources 
of finance included two options, the first of which required ‘primarily public sources, with 
supplementary funding to be drawn from private / alternative sources’, ‘stressing that public 
sources are the main source of finance’ and adding that ‘developed country Parties shall 
incentivize the private sector to provide funding’. The second option accepted ‘a wide variety 
of sources, including public, private and alternative sources, recognizing the need for a 
diversity of sources and instruments’, as well as ‘different types of financing for different 
activities and public sources for specific areas, given the limited potential for private 
investment, in particular in the most vulnerable countries and LDCs’. These two options 
clearly show the different positions taken by developing and developed countries, 
respectively. In the final Paris Agreement agreed the following year, the clarity of either draft 
option is lost and instead paragraph 54 of the implementing decision 1/CP.21 simply 
encourages support from ‘public and private, bilateral and multilateral sources, such as the 
Green Climate Fund, and alternative sources in accordance with relevant decisions by the 
Conference of the Parties’. Whilst clearly losing the emphasis on public sources, the final 
text suggests that ultimately in Paris coalitions of both developed and developing countries 
were constrained by the existing institutional rules and that it was simply too great a stretch 
from the status quo for either proposal to survive intact through the broader negotiation 
process. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Additionality and sources of finance are two of the most prominent manifestations in the 
policy process of developing countries’ normative or justice-based perspectives on the need 
for climate finance and how it should be provided. Both themes concern ensuring that 
climate finance provided by developed countries will actually represent fulfilment of moral 
obligations to provide compensation for climate harms, on one hand by ensuring the 
finance is not taken from other, existing flows of North-South development assistance, and 
on the other hand by ensuring that developed countries themselves provide the finance 
rather than claiming recognition for finance provided by private investors. Additionality in 
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particular was a concern already present in the broader development assistance system, 
where the complexity of finance flows and institutions makes accurate tracking of finance 
and avoiding double counting difficult. With climate finance, these problems were 
exacerbated by the challenge of drawing distinct lines between responses to climate change 
and development projects in areas such as infrastructure and agriculture. This challenge 
highlights the importance of a clear definition of climate finance, on which to base 
institutional rules facilitating accurate separation of climate finance from ODA and 
acceptable ratios of public and private finance. 
Despite existing knowledge of these accounting and definition issues, and 
developing countries’ strong push to ensure that additionality would be built into the 
UNFCCC, the Convention placed climate finance firmly within the norms and standards of 
the broader ODA system, bringing no definition of climate finance, no baseline or 
framework for accounting, and no restriction on the sources for obtaining climate finance. 
Vague references to “new and additional” were insufficient to institutionalise explicit 
expectations about how climate finance in the UNFCCC regime would function. As a result, 
the initial institutional design left developed countries, as climate finance donors, with the 
implicit control over additionality and sources and gave developing countries no real footing 
within the institutional structure to introduce stronger rules or clearer principles to 
underpin developed countries’ actions. Early layers of policy largely reinforced the 
framework for the finance system set out in the Convention, with developed countries 
exploiting the openness of the institutional rules to include as many finance flows as 
possible when calculating “fulfilment” of their pledges and successfully shaping policy 
reinforcing the Convention’s acceptance of multiple sources. The “mobilisation” term 
introduced in the Convention was increasingly used as a catch-all for funding, which 
obscured the normative obligation for providing climate finance that has been central to 
developing countries’ perspective.  
Developing countries became increasingly trapped in a complex negotiating puzzle 
where they wanted to maximise climate finance by encouraging private and innovative 
sources, but at the same time wanted to ensure that developed countries meet their 
obligations for providing compensation for climate harms, or at the very least fulfilled the 
commitments they made within policy. With Southern positions mixed, developed countries 
were able to capitalise on the openness to multiple sources that was by now firmly 
established as an institutional structure, pushing climate finance further towards a 
technical question and away from one of justice as they focused on what sources and 
instruments will be “necessary” to mobilise finance, and shifting expectations so public 
finance is linked only to situations or countries where private finance is less available. 
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Developing countries argued continuously for new and additional finance 
throughout all rounds of negotiation, but were unable to overcome the strength of 
institutional structures that left donor countries with control over accounting and 
definitions. Building on these enduring advantages gained from the institutional design 
and subsequent layers of policy, developed countries capitalised on the emergence of the 
voluntary NDC system to secure a finance regime in the Paris Agreement that left out the 
previously standard “new and additional” phrase, let alone introduced any definition of 
climate finance or standardised accounting procedures, which will likely lead to further 
disagreement as Parties negotiate the modalities for climate finance (Sharma 2017). Both 
additionality and finance sources policy demonstrate highly consistent output from the 
UNFCCC, and show how the institutional structures initiated in the Convention have 
contributed to a lack of legitimacy associated with normative input to the policy process and 
given developed countries a strong basis from which to control how they sourced and 
calculated climate finance. Despite consistent attempts to gather coalitions of sufficient 
strength to overcome these structures, developing countries never succeeded in adding 
clarity of expectations in terms of either the spirit or letter of institutional rules governing 
additionality or sources, and as a result these institutional structures can be said to have 
strongly favoured the interests and priorities of developed countries and constrained policy 
making accordingly. 
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7. Foundation and development of the 
financial mechanism 
 
7.1 Introduction 
With finance such a central component of the international response to climate change, the 
governance of the funds and organisations used to facilitate and oversee transfer of climate 
finance are key functions of the UNFCCC. These arrangements are known as the financial 
mechanism, and its design and evolution has been central to how climate finance policy has 
been developed and implemented. While components of the financial mechanism such as 
the GEF and GCF have been mentioned in the previous two analysis chapters, this chapter 
is, firstly, concerned with how the financial mechanism was initiated and selection of the 
GEF, an external organisation, as the initial operating entity. The origins of the GEF and its 
involvement in the financial mechanism set the stage for ongoing North-South controversy, 
which has continued through the life of the UNFCCC with developing countries calling 
consistently for direct access to funding, greater influence over the funds’ operations and 
better oversight by the COP (Huq 2011). This chapter will seek to establish the role of 
institutional influence and potential path dependence in the longevity and prominence of 
the GEF within the financial mechanism, prompting analysis of how the institutional 
connection was initiated in the Convention and reinforced in subsequent layers of policy. 
A central part of this historical analysis is investigating the impact that policy 
sustaining the UNFCCC-GEF connection has had on subsequent governance relationships 
between the UNFCCC COP and the other organisations and funds that have been created as 
the financial mechanism developed. Scholars have argued that the operational procedures 
of the SCCF and LDC Fund, under GEF management, have been dominated by influences 
beyond developing countries and their priorities (Mace 2005). In contrast, the Adaptation 
Fund, operationalised slightly later, had a noticeably different governance structure and has 
been praised as a model for UNFCCC funds (Horstmann and Abeysinghe 2011, p. 416). 
These outcomes prompt examination of institutional influence and whether 
operationalisation of the Adaptation Fund can shed light on the existence and strength of 
path dependence influencing fund creation, the appearance of a critical juncture or other 
mechanisms of institutional change, and the ability of coalitions of actors to overcome 
institutional constraints in particular circumstances. Latterly, the GCF was created to 
become the most significant entity in the financial mechanism, and it featured a governance 
structure similar to the Adaptation Fund. However, scholars have documented North-South 
  Page 158 of 265   
struggles in the GCF’s operationalisation process (Bracking 2015, Vanderheiden 2015). 
Accordingly, this chapter will examine the how the Adaptation Fund’s design affected 
subsequent strategies by coalitions of actors and how the GCF’s creation was influenced by 
both the earlier legacy of the GEF and later introduction of the Adaptation Fund. 
7.2 The Convention and initial selection of the GEF 
The GEF was created in 1989 by developed countries, following a suggestion by the Prime 
Minister of France at a meeting of the World Bank and IMF to create a voluntary fund 
dedicated to the environment. From the beginning a decidedly donor-led project, developed 
countries were supportive of the fund’s creation in advance of the 1992 Rio Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in order to pre-empt other funding proposals that 
may emerge (Boisson de Chazournes 2005, p. 193). The prospect of deciding on institutional 
arrangements for finance as part of the three conventions to be agreed at the UN Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 led developed countries, developing 
countries and the GEF itself to position themselves in advance of the Rio conference. In early 
climate change conferences such as Noordwijk in 1989, developed countries showed early 
momentum towards using an existing financial institution for climate finance, a position 
that developed countries would maintain but which would become increasingly at odds with 
the perspectives of the South (Bodansky 1993, p. 468).  
Many developed countries were unwilling to entrust their financial contributions to 
a new and unknown “green fund” that would potentially be under greater control by 
developing countries (Bodansky 1993, p. 538). Although the GEF was still in a pilot phase, 
developed countries chose to stand firmly behind it as the entity that should be designated 
as operator of the financial mechanism and sought to reinforce the “reality” of its broader 
international role and the importance of ensuring its success (Rahman and Roncerel 1994, 
p. 260). There is evidence that the US government’s internal plan was for the GEF to be 
selected as the sole channel for funds under the UNFCCC and that while its governance 
should be made more representative, control over funding decisions should remain with the 
World Bank (Goldemberg 1994, p. 181). 
In contrast, developing countries called repeatedly for creation of a new and 
independent “green fund” that would include separate funds for each of the UNCED 
conventions and avoid the inequities and donor-dominated governance associated with the 
World Bank and other Bretton Woods organisations, while ensuring oversight from and 
accountability to the COP (Hyder 1994, Sjöberg 1999). Throughout the negotiations leading 
to UNCED, Southern governments sought consistently to prevent identification of a specific 
institution, with NGOs expressing their belief that the North would ‘use the GEF as a new 
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strategic device to shift responsibility for past and present damage to the climate system 
onto the Southern countries’ (Rahman and Roncerel 1994, p. 260). The GEF appeared to 
many in the South as a tactic to prevent the creation of a new “green fund” and broader 
democratisation of the global economy and international financial institutions; responding 
to the prospect of GEF selection, developing countries argued for far-reaching changes that 
would make it more like the “green fund” that they championed simultaneously (Sjöberg 
1999). 
The World Bank and GEF, meanwhile, both had a change of leadership in 1991, 
which led to realisation within the institution’s leadership that its longevity required 
connections with the UNCED process and, in turn, sensitivity to the need for changes in its 
operations in order to facilitate these connections. The GEF positioned itself to be ready and 
able to become the preferred mechanism for the UNCED connections, with the 
administration making clear its openness to reforms and extending its mandate to cover 
desertification, in an effort to respond to developing country demands (Sjöberg 1999). Donor 
countries agreed to greater transparency and more equitable representation in order to 
ensure the GEF would be in a favourable position in advance of the UNCED conference 
(Jordan 1995), but, crucially, ‘the fact that the GEF was to be based on voluntary contributions 
and was being established at that time without any legal link or obligation to the Convention, 
gave donor countries the upper hand in the final decision’ (Gomez-Echeverri and Müller 
2009, p. 2). 
Within the negotiating process, donor countries refused to accept a new 
arrangement specific to the UNFCCC and recipient countries refused to accept the GEF as 
a permanent solution, continuing to advocate a “green fund” even though it was clear that 
this had no viability (Dowdeswell and Kinley 1994, Sjöberg 1999). The issue was only solved 
in the final round of negotiations before the UNCED, with disagreement resolved by using 
the word “interim” to sidestep developing countries’ concerns about the involvement of the 
World Bank and GEF (Gupta 2014, p. 60). The associated compromise entailed the COP 
controlling policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria for funding, while the GEF 
would have more transparent governance and equitable representation with regular 
reporting to the COP (Dasgupta 1994). The strength of US emphasis on the GEF was so strong 
that this interim designation was one of the reasons behind an initial refusal by the US to 
sign the Convention (Brown Weiss 1992, p. 817). The final agreement of developing countries 
was also induced by the World Bank’s idea to add additional “Earth increment” funding on 
top of its next replenishment process, accompanied by positive statements from developed 
countries about willingness to increase their contributions (ENB vol. 2, nos. 5 & 9). This 
package convinced developing countries that “new and additional” funds would be 
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forthcoming, but ultimately these elements were a vague part of the UNCED deal (Sjöberg 
1999, p. 23) and subject to considerable subsequent influence within the UNFCCC policy 
process. 
In the final Convention text, Article 11.1 states that the financial mechanism ‘shall 
function under the guidance of and be accountable to the Conference of the Parties, which 
shall decide on its policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to this 
Convention. Its operation shall be entrusted to one or more existing international entities.’ 
The direct reference to use of an existing entity ‘set an important precedent in entrusting 
the fundamental responsibility to an institution somewhat separate to the Convention’ and 
outside the UN (Dowdeswell and Kinley 1994, p. 124), potentially indicating the origin of a 
path dependence. However, Article 11 provided no clarity on how the relationship between 
the COP and the GEF would be structured and how COP modalities and procedures would 
ensure that funded projects conform with COP guidance (Bodansky 1993). This immediately 
opened up an important space within the policy process for ongoing North-South debates 
over oversight of the GEF and its operations; Bodansky (1993, p. 541) also notes that the US 
successfully opposed a proposal by AOSIS to include an explicit reference to funding 
adaptation costs in Article 11. This was in line with donor country preferences (and GEF 
policy) that the GEF should concentrate on funding projects with global benefits, i.e. 
mitigation, rather than the local or national benefits that principally result from adaptation 
projects, and is significant as the origin of a North-South struggle within the UNFCCC for 
adequate attention to adaptation funding that contributed to the later creation of the 
Marrakesh funds and the GCF. 
Article 21.3 of the Convention designates the GEF as the interim operating entity of 
the financial mechanism and includes a direction that the GEF ‘should be appropriately 
restructured and its membership made universal to enable it to fulfil the requirements of 
Article 11’. While this latter clause can be seen as a response to G77 pressure (Hyder 1994, 
p. 216), the Convention offers no clarity or direction on what the reforms will entail or what 
must be achieved to constitute “appropriate” reform. The Agenda 21 document, a non-
binding framework for sustainable development also agreed at the UNCED, provides some 
additional detail but this is limited to ensuring predictable, new and additional resources 
and broadening the scope of the GEF, rather than specific measures or requirements 
(UNCED 1992). Once again, this ambiguity in the Convention played a role in securing 
agreement at UNCED but left the final institutional design unclear and did not provide a 
robust means to ensure the COP could actually ensure the GEF would be reformed to any 
significant extent or in line with developing country priorities. Overall, the Convention 
facilitated the inclusion of the GEF in the financial mechanism, a key priority for developed 
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countries, and important policy features concerning the linkage between the GEF and the 
UNFCCC, the manner of COP oversight and the practical details of GEF operations were left 
open to the influence of further North-South negotiation in the policy process. 
7.3 Establishing the institutional relationship between the COP 
 and the GEF 
After the UNCED was concluded, the arrangements to operationalise the financial 
mechanism and the institutional linkages between the COP and GEF had to be agreed 
(Jordan 1994a). A central part of this process was the reform of the GEF specified in the 
Convention, which should ‘guarantee implementation of the obligations contracted by the 
industrialised nations’ and was seen as vital to realising the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility underpinning the Convention (Djoghlaf 1994, p. 109). The need 
for these reforms immediately exposed the challenges of connecting the GEF to the 
UNFCCC; while it was ‘crucial that the GEF restructure itself to meet the political 
requirements of the Convention’ and there was a need to ensure ‘the expected 
replenishment of the GEF takes the Convention fully into account’ (Dowdeswell and Kinley 
1994, p. 125), there was no clear mechanism to bring the authority of the COP to bear on the 
external entity. 
Building on the changes to the GEF already agreed in preparation for the UNCED, 
the reform process presented an opportunity for the North to demonstrate a willingness to 
engage with global problems in a more equitable manner than it had done previously (Jordan 
1995). There had been criticism from numerous directions about the performance of the GEF 
and that it was linked too closely to the World Bank and inheriting many of the Bank’s 
administrative and bureaucratic failings (e.g. The Economist 1993; MacIlwain 1993). These 
criticisms had led to calls for greater independence both externally and as an outcome of 
internal reviews (The Economist 1993b, Fairman 1994), but significant reforms of this nature 
were hampered by the paradoxical nature of the GEF-World Bank relationship; securing 
World Bank backing for projects was important for retaining the vital support of donors, yet 
this simultaneously reduced the credibility of the GEF in the eyes of recipient countries and 
NGOs and fostered North-South distrust (Jordan 1995, p. 307). 
However, the same North-South issues present in the UNCED were carried over into 
the GEF reform process, with the North retaining its focus on efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of funding and projects and the South highlighting participation and 
governance changes to build legitimacy (Sjöberg 1999, p. 23). Developed countries originally 
favoured a “one-dollar-one-vote” arrangement along the lines of Bretton Woods financial 
institutions (in which donors dominate) for the GEF Council, while developing countries 
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sought a “one-country-one-vote” system more like the UN General Assembly (MacIlwain 
1993, p. 199). These positions evolved as developed countries proposed various options for 
the Council’s representation and voting, while the G77 ‘insisted on holding a majority within 
the Council that better reflected its constituency of over 130 countries and on the right to 
elect its own Chair’ (ENB vol. 5, no. 13). The final structure featured 16 seats for recipient 
countries and 16 seats for donor countries and “economies in transition”, but with a 
“double-weighted majority” constituting both 60% of Council members and donors 
representing 60% of contributions required to pass motions (Van Praag 1994, p. 1274).  
The reforms gave developing countries an effective veto over Council decisions, but 
in practice the Council makes decisions by consensus on the recommendation of the Chair, 
so this veto power goes unused (Young and Boehmer-Christiansen 1997, p. 196, Müller 2007, 
p. 5); the balance of power in the Council remains in favour of developed countries, who 
‘underline their demands for influence with policy recommendations linked to the 
replenishment procedure’ (Streck 2001, p. 84). The GEF’s CEO is also Chair of the Council, a 
significant victory for developed countries during the restructuring (Horta et al. 2002). Some 
have argued that the restructuring process made the GEF more independent from the World 
Bank (Streck 2001, p. 80) and the fee for membership was removed in December 1992, 
leading to a rise in developing country members (Jordan 1994b, p. 19). Despite this, concerns 
remained over ongoing influence of the World Bank, as well as the participation of recipient 
stakeholders in policy decisions, defining the “incremental costs” and “global benefits” 
underpinning the GEF’s remit, the discretion held by the CEO for operating the GEF in 
relationship with the Convention’s COP, and the complexity of the GEF project approval 
cycle (Jordan 1994b, 1994a, Young and Boehmer-Christiansen 1997, Streck 2001). 
Developed and developing countries exhibited very different perspectives on the 
attempts at GEF reform once the UNFCCC meetings began in 1995. For example, ‘the EU, 
the US, Australia, Canada, Japan and Poland supported designating the GEF as the 
permanent entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism’ (ENB-2), and the 
Netherlands and Norway said that ‘the restructured GEF is now in conformity with the 
conditions in Article 21.3 and should permanently operate the financial mechanism’ (ENB-
3). In contrast, ‘the G-77, Peru, China and Benin commented that progress had been made 
during the GEF restructuring, but the GEF needs further modification in its representation’ 
(ENB-2) and ‘the Philippines and Peru did not believe that the GEF has been adequately 
restructured, especially with regard to universality of participation’ (ENB-3). Developed 
countries including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands and the US exerted 
pressure for the GEF to be confirmed as the permanent operating entity of the financial 
mechanism without delay at INC-11 (before COP-1) and COP-1 (ENB-3 & 4), a strategy that 
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would minimise the discussion and reinforce the institutional design that developed 
countries had secured with the selection of the GEF in the Convention. Developing countries 
pushed back, though, with Mauritius reiterating that ‘restructuring was a precondition for 
the GEF to be the interim, not the permanent, operating agency’ (ENB-3). At COP-1, the 
interim arrangements with the GEF were re-confirmed, with reference to the “restructured” 
GEF (decision 9/CP.1) but little in the way of detail about what changes or improvements 
were considered necessary by the COP and thus little to alter the advantage developed 
countries gained from connection between the UNFCCC and an external institution they 
designed. 
Developing countries also sought to highlight the need to ensure effective UNFCCC 
oversight of the GEF; for example, at INC-11 (before COP-1), ‘Uganda and Malaysia felt that 
the relationship between the GEF Council and the COP requires further work and evaluation’ 
(ENB-3), and at COP-2, Ghana ‘noted that the GEF’s actions depend on decisions of the COP 
and not the reverse’ (ENB-38). At COP-1, initial arrangements for oversight of the financial 
mechanism by the COP were articulated in policy, focusing on the COP providing guidance 
to the operating entity, with an expectation that the operating entity’s governing body ‘shall 
accordingly ensure conformity of entity's work with COP guidance’ (FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, 
section III, paragraph 2), along with an obligation for the governing body to report back to 
the COP on conformity of its operations with this guidance (paragraph 3). This set the 
pattern for the relationship of the COP with the GEF over subsequent years and rounds of 
policy, with expectations of COP oversight but little detail on institutional mechanisms or 
procedures to ensure the COP could enforce its decisions and intentions on the GEF and its 
governing Council. 
The initial governance structure for the financial mechanism was formalised in a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the COP and the GEF Council, agreed at 
COP-2 in 1996, which established the operational basis for the institutional relationship. 
Clause 2 states that ‘COP will, pursuant to Article 11.1, decide on policies, programme 
priorities and eligibility criteria related to the Convention for the financial mechanism 
which shall function under the guidance of and be accountable to the COP’, re-using 
language taken from Article 11.1 of the Convention. The MOU further stipulates that the 
COP will provide guidance to the GEF Council after each session (clause 3), and ‘the Council 
will ensure the effective operation of the GEF as a source of funding activities for the 
purposes of the Convention in conformity with the guidance of the COP’ (clause 4). There 
are further clauses specifying the duty of the COP to monitor the performance of the GEF 
and conduct regular reviews, and requiring regular reporting to the COP from the GEF 
Council on its operations and performance to facilitate this monitoring. These initial 
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policies seemed to reflect developing countries’ desire to see strong COP oversight of the 
GEF, but actually reinforced the policy path started at COP-1 and its associated advantages 
for developed countries, by doing little to imbue the COP with strength to control the GEF 
since they did not set out in detail how the COP will assess GEF compliance with its guidance 
and sanction the GEF if its performance or compliance is deemed inadequate. 
7.4 Confirmation of the GEF as operating entity of the financial 
 mechanism 
While the MOU between the GEF and COP was agreed at COP-2, final confirmation of the 
GEF as permanent operating entity of the financial mechanism was only agreed at COP-4. 
The SBI was tasked with reviewing the GEF, but at COP-3, ‘Australia, the US, Canada, Japan 
and the UK noted the success of the GEF’, and the UK stated that it was ‘committed to the 
GEF, prepared to make substantial contributions and called on other donors to do likewise’ 
(both ENB-48). In the context of selecting a permanent financial mechanism, developed 
countries backing the GEF in this manner suggests that they were tying future contributions 
to agreement by recipient countries that the GEF should permanently operate the financial 
mechanism. This implied threat reflects a strategy to exert power in the broader context of 
the voluntary paradigm examined in Chapter 5, in order to reinforce the policy path that 
kept the GEF at the centre of the financial mechanism. Developed countries continued to 
seek conclusion of the reform process: at COP-3, ‘the US said GEF had made an effort to 
meet the needs of FCCC Parties and expressed disappointment at the fact that the review of 
the financial mechanism had not concluded’ (ENB-70), and at COP-4, ‘several developed 
country Parties suggested that GEF should operate as the Convention's financial entity, 
although improvements are needed’ (ENB-90). 
In contrast to developed countries’ approval of the GEF, developing countries voiced 
complaints about its performance and their interaction with the organisation and its 
implementing agencies. At COP-2 in 1996, ‘Tunisia reported delays in GEF funding 
approval’ (ENB-38), at SBI-5 (before COP-3), ‘Burkina Faso and Algeria stressed that 
procedures to deal with the GEF can be very cumbersome’ (ENB-40), and at COP-3, ‘the 
Philippines mentioned experiencing problems with implementing agencies and said that 
they should be more aware of decisions taken by the GEF Council’ (ENB-70). At SBI-8 (before 
COP-4), the G77/China, with Egypt, called for ‘attention to adaptation measures’ and China 
called for ‘a more streamlined project approval process’ and ‘transparency in incremental 
cost calculations’ (ENB-80). Developing countries faced an uphill struggle to have these 
concerns recognised and acted upon, since the GEF already existed and its governance was 
dominated by donor countries; within the COP developing countries argued that they were 
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‘not getting the necessary cooperation on improvement and functioning of the operating 
entity on an interim basis’ (ENB-86), and without this co-operation their ability to influence 
the governance of the GEF was limited. 
At COP-4 in 1998, ‘several developing country Parties suggested a political 
reorientation of the GEF to meet their needs’ (ENB-90). Developing countries’ focus on their 
experience and needs reflects their overall priorities for climate finance policy more 
generally (see Chapter 5), and is evidence that developing countries were already pushing 
against the policy path initiated by the prior selection of the GEF. Some developing countries 
even went as far as advocating alternatives to the GEF; for example, at COP-4, ‘recognizing 
that the lack of multilateral financing constitutes a major obstacle to implementing the 
Convention and noting the slow and complex process to access GEF funds, Djibouti 
supported the establishment of an independent financial mechanism to finance the CDM 
for poor countries’ (ENB-96). These attempts to gather a coalition of actors of sufficient 
political strength within the policy process to reshape the UNFCCC’s policies and 
institutions illustrates the key underlying debate: should the governance and design of the 
financial mechanism be geared around donor requirement or recipients’ needs? This North-
South dynamic is captured in an exchange at COP-4, when the US tabled a draft decision 
on improving the GEF and resolving its status, and the G-77/China responded by saying that 
‘this proposal did not adequately meet the needs of developing country Parties’ (ENB-92). 
Despite the criticism and concerns voiced by developing countries, the GEF was 
confirmed as the permanent operating entity of the financial mechanism at COP-4, with 
decision 3/CP.4 stating that the COP ‘decides that the restructured Global Environment 
Facility shall be an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism’. 
Progression of the negotiations shows that the interim selection of the GEF, development of 
institutional links with the UNFCCC, and the GEF’s subsequent confirmation derailed the 
attempt by developing countries to base the financial mechanism on an entirely new 
funding body. This component of the UNFCCC’s initial institutional design does appear to 
have created a policy path putting the GEF, with its donor-dominated governance and 
operations, at the heart of the UNFCCC financial mechanism. Developed countries were 
able to negotiate from a position of preserving the prominence of the GEF and the 
advantages they gained from greater influence over its governance, while developing 
countries had to seek institutional change and were consequently hindered within 
negotiations. After confirmation of the GEF as a permanent operating entity of the financial 
mechanism, developing countries remained vocal in their criticism of the GEF but reduced 
calls to replace it and instead increased their push to reshape the financial mechanism to 
meet their needs more effectively. 
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7.5 Creation of new funds after the GEF is selected 
Confirming the GEF as the permanent operating entity of the financial mechanism 
preserved the advantages that developed countries experienced from their greater control 
over the organisation’s governance and agenda, and ensured that the UNFCCC financial 
mechanism reflected the broader development funding system, with its established North-
South or donor-recipient power dynamics (Ervine 2007). With developing countries having 
been unable to gather a coalition of sufficient strength to alter this path, attitudes to the 
financial mechanism remained characterised by a North-South or donor-recipient split, 
reflecting the broader landscape of and attitudes to development funding. Although the GEF 
was now permanent operating entity of the financial mechanism, developing countries 
exhibited several viewpoints in their criticism of the GEF. It could be construed that 
developing countries were seeking once again to gather a coalition of sufficient strength to 
overturn the established policy path, but the wide range of complaints also suggests a lack 
of co-ordination that could limit the strength of a coalition of actors and the legitimacy of 
their claims in the face of established institutional configurations and rules (Vatn 2015). 
7.5.1  Emerging themes of Southern criticism of the GEF 
The first perspective pursued by developing countries was ongoing criticism borne of their 
interaction with the GEF and its implementing agencies. At SBI-10 in 1999 (before COP-5), 
the G77/China ‘said the GEF did not provide adequate funding’ (ENB-101) and Barbados 
‘pointed to difficulties in obtaining financial assistance’ from the GEF (ENB-105). At COP-
5, ‘concern over perceived shortcomings of the GEF in delivering on its role as an operating 
entity of the FCCC’s financial mechanism’ was prevalent, and ‘a number of participants 
criticized the rigid eligibility criteria by which the GEF interprets and weights proposals 
submitted by countries as unrealistic, and said these criteria can delay the process of 
implementing national actions’ (ENB-116). At SBI-13 (before COP-6), Kenya commented ‘on 
the difficulties in dealing with the [GEF’s] implementing agencies’ (ENB-148). 
The second element was a drive to expand the remit of the financial mechanism, 
both in terms of the scope of activities funded, particularly adaptation, and the number or 
type of funds, which stemmed from discussions over the adverse effects of climate change 
and led developing countries to push for more funding for adaptation and needs 
assessments. At SBI-13 (before COP-6), ‘the G-77/China highlighted that the text should 
reflect the importance of creating a fund to support’ developing countries compiling 
information on their adverse effects actions and vulnerabilities (ENB-144). At COP-6, 
Nigeria ‘urged provision of funding through a mechanism other than the GEF’ (ENB-153) 
and adverse effects discussions centred ‘on the proposed adaptation fund and the fund 
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supporting specific concerns of LDCs’ (ENB-156), with Climate Network Africa emphasising 
‘the importance of a concrete adaptation fund’ (ENB-159), and Guatemala supporting ‘the 
prompt establishment of an adaptation fund’ (ENB-161). In contrast, developed countries 
sought to reinforce the role of the GEF: ‘Japan, supported by the US, recalled that the GEF 
was the vehicle for this funding’ and ‘the EU cautioned against creating a separate disaster 
fund for climate-related events’ (ENB-144). At COP-6, the ‘G-77/China, Africa Group and 
Samoa, opposed by US, Canada, Japan, Australia, urged the establishment of an adaptation 
fund based on a levy applied to all three’ flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol (ENB-
160). 
The third element was the drive to improve developing countries’ access to climate 
finance within the UNFCCC. Many developing countries have complained about the 
difficulties involved in gaining access to funding from the GEF (Huq 2002, p. 245), with the 
issue first appearing explicitly in the ENB record with a reference by Djibouti at COP-4 in 
1998 (ENB-96). Access was a particularly important issue for LDCs; for example, at COP-6, 
‘Vanuatu advocated for a fund for LDCs that do not have ready access to GEF funds’ (ENB-
160). The subject was first reflected in policy at COP-7, where decision 6/CP.7 invites the GEF 
to continue efforts to minimise the time between project approval and dispersal of funds by 
its implementing agencies, ‘urge its implementing/executing agencies to be more responsive 
to requests for GEF assistance from developing country Parties’ and ‘give consideration to 
measures to increase opportunities available to developing country Parties for accessing 
GEF funds for climate change activities’ (paragraph 2). Gaining traction over subsequent 
COPs, access became a key feature in the operationalisation of the Adaptation Fund. 
These three themes sit alongside the ongoing drive by developing countries to ensure 
effective oversight of the GEF by the COP, and the COP’s functional authority over the GEF 
that would reassure developing countries that they had an institutional means to influence 
the financial mechanism. For example, at COP-5 in 1999, while some felt that problems with 
the GEF ‘arise from inadequate guidance given to the GEF by the COP, others attributed 
them to difficulties in co-ordinating the interests and mandates of two intergovernmental 
bodies’ (ENB-116). At COP-6, the GEF’s performance in serving the COP also provoked 
criticism. The G-77/China suggested that the GEF had exceeded its mandate as its new 
Capacity Development Initiative had not sought guidance from the COP and was yet another 
solution “imposed” on developing countries’ (ENB-151). While the GEF confirmed on more 
than one occasion (e.g. ENB-148, 159, 163 & 185) that it would implement and follow 
guidance it receives from the COP, it was not simply a case of the GEF disobeying or failing 
to integrate COP guidance. For example, at SBI-13, ‘on questions about whether the GEF 
might reconsider its current focus on mitigation’, the GEF Chair ‘noted the limited guidance 
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provided by the COP on adaptation activities’ (ENB-148). Even with more effective 
governance and authority, guidance to the GEF would still be subject to the rigours of the 
UNFCCC policy process. 
7.5.2  Creation of the Special Climate Change Fund, LDC Fund and 
Adaptation Fund 
Developed countries’ responses to criticism of the GEF and the ability of the COP to oversee 
it were concentrated on improvement of the GEF, evidence of their continuing attempts to 
reinforce the advantageous policy path initiated in the Convention. For example, at COP-6, 
Denmark ‘called on the GEF to be more responsive to LDCs’ needs’ and, ‘noting the need to 
reform the GEF, Canada called for the creation of a “window” within the GEF to deal with 
special climate change issues such as adaptation.’ In addition, ‘the UK recognized the value 
of an Adaptation Fund’ but also ‘expressed a preference for an improved and enhanced GEF 
with a 50% increase in contributions’ (all ENB-160), again tying the prospect of increased 
funding to an ongoing focus on the GEF rather than a new fund more directly under the 
authority of the COP. A funding proposal from the EU focused ‘on the need to improve and 
increase funding for the GEF, especially taking into consideration the needs of least 
developed countries (LDCs), and suggests an “adaptation fund plus” within the existing GEF 
structure’ (ENB-162). Annex I Parties ‘preferred building on existing institutions, with a 
focus on the GEF. These delegates stressed that any new institutions must add value and not 
duplicate the GEF’s work or mandate’ (ENB-169). 
Many of these statements suggest that an increase in adaptation funding had, in 
principle, been accepted by many developed countries. Rather than a specific success for 
developing countries achieving institutional change, this is likely to stem from two factors. 
Firstly, the GEF had been restricted, according to donor preferences for “global benefits”, to 
a focus on mitigation (Rübbelke 2011, p. 1473). Secondly, adaptation was gaining more 
significant attention, both in terms of scientific and economic research, and input to the 
policy process from Parties, NGOs and others (Schipper 2006). The increasing prominence 
of adaption in the UNFCCC was reflected by introduction of the National Adaptation Plans 
of Action (NAPA) process and Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and 
adaptation, both in 2001 (Persson 2011, pp. 5–6). With momentum building towards 
understanding the need for adaptation within broader climate change efforts but the GEF 
constrained in its ability to fund this area, new funds were a more viable option than 
previous donor focus on the GEF might suggest. 
Proposals for new funds gained traction at COP-6 at The Hague, which ended 
without agreement overall. However, the draft carryover text included reference to agreement 
on creating ‘a new fund under the GEF’ for adaptation and ‘a new window under the GEF’ 
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for activities including capacity building and technology transfer (decision 1/CP.6, Annex, 
Box A). Momentum continued to grow at a second meeting held to continue COP-6 the 
following year (COP-6.bis), where there was general support for the two proposed funds 
(ENB-171), but the role of the GEF and differentiation between its remit and that of the new 
funds remained open to further debate (ENB-171 & 174). Relatively little is present in the 
ENB record concerning the involvement of the GEF in operating the SCCF and LDC Fund, 
but Boyd and Schipper (2002, p. 188) report that at COP-7, developed countries argued for 
the LDC Fund to be under GEF control, while developing countries preferred that it should 
be managed by the UNEP. Similarly, developing countries didn’t want the GEF to operate 
the SCCF as a result of their many longstanding complaints about its performance and 
governance (Dessai 2003, p. 297). Mace (2005, p. 232) notes that ‘the creation of the SCCF 
and the LDC Fund responded to developing countries’ mounting frustration with the GEF, 
which included the difficulty of accessing GEF funding, the GEF’s slow disbursement 
process and the problematic concept of incremental costs in the context of adaptation’. 
Eventually, negotiations at COP-7 resulted in three new funds: the SCCF, LDC Fund 
and Adaptation Fund. With their focus on activities beyond the GEF, particularly adaptation, 
and supporting ‘a work programme for the least developed countries’ (decision 7/CP.7), the 
funds may appear to constitute a success for developing countries’ efforts to extend the remit 
of the financial mechanism to cover more of the areas of greatest priority to them. However, 
developing countries’ concerns regarding the role of the GEF were not reflected in the policy 
that created the funds, and instead similar language to previous COP decisions was used; 
decision 7/CP.7 stated that both the SCCF (clause 3) and LDC Fund (clause 6) ‘shall be 
operated by an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism, under the 
guidance of the Conference of the Parties,’ with an almost identical clause in decision 
10/CP.7 for the Adaptation Fund. Although this provides a relatively clear implication of 
COP authority, the phrasing once again leaves the operation of the funds in the hands of 
the GEF Council and subject to the existing mechanisms for COP oversight of the GEF. In 
light of the earlier controversy regarding selection of the GEF, and developing countries’ 
consistent frustrations with ineffective COP governance of the financial mechanism, 
repetition of the same oversight arrangements in creation of the three new funds in 2001 
can be seen as reinforcing the institutional structure that reflected donor preferences for the 
GEF and limited the power of developing countries to influence the governance of climate 
finance flows within the UNFCCC. 
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7.6 Operationalisation of the SCCF and LDC Fund amidst further 
 criticism of the GEF 
In the years after COP-7, the LDC Fund and SCCF were the first to be operationalised, with 
the Adaptation Fund taking longer because this had to wait until the Kyoto Protocol had 
come into force. This process took place in the context of developing countries continuing 
to articulate their needs and priorities, and criticise the operation and oversight of the GEF. 
The creation of the SCCF and LDC Fund did not halt the calls for greater attention to 
adaptation funding that have been part of negotiations since they began. For example, at 
COP-8 in 2002, ‘Kenya called for increased assistance for adaptation projects and the 
development of climate policies and strategies’ (ENB-203) and at SBSTA-20 (before COP-
10), Palau ‘expressed concern that GEF encourages Parties to obtain funding for adaptation 
from [GEF funding] areas other than climate change’ (ENB-234). Developed countries took 
a different perspective, for example when ‘Canada commended the GEF on its adaptation 
strategy’ (ENB-203). At SBI-17 (before COP-9), ‘the EU, US and Canada highlighted progress 
made’ on adaptation funding, ‘including the GEF’s third replenishment, the establishment 
of the LDC Fund, and development of guidelines for NAPAs’, but ‘the G-77/China, supported 
by Saudi Arabia, AOSIS, Kuwait and Libya, said that progress to date was insufficient’ (ENB-
214).  
Finance recipients continued to raise concerns about access to funding. At COP-8 
in 2002, ‘Tuvalu noted difficulty in seeking funding for NAPAs from the GEF’, and at SBI-18 
(before COP-9), the G77/China and Ghana argued that small-scale projects should have 
expedited access to funding from the SCCF (ENB-216 & 217). At SBI-20 (before COP-10), 
‘ongoing frustrations with the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism were expressed. For 
instance, developing countries articulated the difficulties in proving the “global benefit” of 
adaptation projects to access funds from the GEF’ (ENB-242) and at COP-10, ‘Micronesia 
emphasized SIDS’ difficulties in accessing funds’ (ENB-251). At COP-11 in 2006, the G-
77/China expressed concern ‘that co-financing requirements present a barrier to LDCs and 
SIDS accessing funds’ and the introduction of the GEF’s Resource Allocation Framework 
(RAF, a policy for allocating funding to projects) ‘also drew criticism from some, ‘who noted 
that the RAF would make it more difficult for developing countries to access funding’ (ENB-
282). At COP-12, ‘Niue appealed for improved modalities to access the GEF’ (ENB-317).  
Developing countries were also vocal in this period about the lack of COP oversight 
and limitations in the guidance provided by the COP to the new funds. At COP-8 in 2002, 
the SBI Chair ‘cautioned against possible inconsistencies between COP guidance to the GEF 
and GEF decisions on modalities’ (ENB-203). At SBI-20 (before COP-10), ‘AOSIS, with others, 
cautioned that the COP’s role in providing guidance to the GEF is being “undermined” by 
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recent developments in the GEF Council’ (ENB-234). At COP-10, Samoa urged that ‘the COP, 
not the GEF, should determine eligibility criteria’ and ‘AOSIS underlined that the GEF must 
follow the guidance given by the COP’ (ENB-251). Developed countries often expressed 
support for the GEF, such as at COP-12 when ‘the EU, US and Switzerland said the GEF is 
performing effectively and welcomed its fourth replenishment’ (ENB-309), but occasionally 
developed and developing countries spoke together, such as at COP-11, when ‘the UK, 
Tuvalu and Canada noted that the COP gives direction to the GEF and not the reverse, and 
that the GEF’s responsibility is to operationalize this direction’ (ENB-265). However, such 
statements do not acknowledge the strong donor influence over the decisions and 
operations of the GEF, and thus how it operationalises COP guidance (Mace 2005). 
7.6.1  Institutional constraints on operationalisation of the LDC Fund 
Discussion about the priorities and procedures of the SCCF and LDC Fund began after COP-
7, in the context of ongoing criticism of the GEF and oversight by the COP, and with 
numerous developing countries highlighting the urgency of the COP providing guidance to 
the GEF (e.g. ENB-205). Initial guidance for the LDC Fund was produced at COP-8 in 2002, 
and developed countries quickly resisted more detailed COP guidance: Canada, Norway, the 
EU and Switzerland, ‘stressed the importance of a clear focus on NAPAs [National 
Adaptation Plans of Action] and policy level, rather than operational level, guidance to the 
GEF’ (ENB-205). In contrast, Samoa stressed language on ‘the operational guidance from the 
COP’ (ENB-206). Progress on operationalising the LDC Fund stalled at COP-10, where 
renegotiation of the terms of the LDC Fund meant ‘that progress made at COP-9 on funding 
for adaptation is essentially negligible’ (ENB-257). Consequently, ‘LDCs – some of the most 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change – failed for the second consecutive year to secure 
a decision for full-cost funding of adaptation through GEF’ (ENB-260).  
In the context of this challenging negotiating environment, developing countries 
also ‘expressed concern that the LDC Fund will be inaccessible to most LDCs’ (ENB-230). 
This stemmed partly from the GEF’s focus on global benefits from funded projects, which 
meant that the GEF required developing countries to provide or obtain some funding input 
to cover the local benefits of adaptation projects, known as co-financing (Rübbelke 2011, p. 
1478). ‘The plea from LDCs, particularly the SIDS, lies precisely on this paradox, in that even 
if funds are available in the LDC Fund, their difficulty of finding adequate co-financing, and 
the costly and cumbersome calculation of the additional costs, renders the financial 
resources in the LDC Fund, in practice, almost inaccessible’ (ENB-260). This paradox was 
directly caused by the earlier decision to place the LDC Fund under GEF management and 
the limited influence of developing countries over governing the GEF: the GEF explained at 
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COP-10 ‘that the proportion of co-financing [required the LDC Fund to approve a project] is 
due to the GEF requirement to fund only incremental costs’ (ENB-251). LDCs and SIDS 
already ‘lack the bargaining power of oil-producing countries and large greenhouse gas 
emitters’ in negotiations (ENB-260) and had struggled to achieve their policy objectives in 
prior negotiation rounds. The institutional connection with the GEF exacerbated this power 
imbalance because it meant that LDCs would have to overcome not only their bargaining 
position but also the prevailing institutional structure, which gave advantages to developed 
countries in the form of influence over GEF and LDC Fund policy determining finance rules. 
Pierson (2004, p. 150) argues that complimentary institutions and interconnected policies 
place pressure on actors to adjust to the context. In this case, power imbalances and policy 
structures meant LDCs were constrained to the extent that they would have to ‘present 
feasible proposals [for adaptation funding] that fit, however loosely, in the existing financial 
architecture’ (ENB-260). 
Guidance for the LDC Fund was adopted at COP-11 in 2005 (decision 3/CP.11), which 
addressed both co-financing and full-cost funding for adaptation. The GEF was instructed 
to ‘develop a co-financing scale for supporting activities identified in national adaptation 
programmes of action, taking into account the circumstances of least developed countries’ 
(paragraph 3). This had caused a degree of controversy in previous rounds of negotiation 
when developing countries objected to proposals put forward by the GEF (Mace 2005). 
Decision 3/CP.11 also decided ‘that full-cost funding shall be provided by the Least 
Developed Countries Fund to meet the additional costs of activities to adapt to the adverse 
effects of climate change’ identified in NAPAs (paragraph 2). While “additional costs” were 
defined in this context as costs imposed on vulnerable countries to meet their immediate 
adaptation needs, which had the potential to lead more readily to full funding than the GEF’s 
broader procedures, the guidance offered no more detail and explicitly ‘shall not set a 
precedent for other funding arrangements under the Convention’, so the improvement in 
the terms for developing countries more broadly would likely be negligible. Thus the 
governance of the LDC Fund remained largely subject to existing institutional structures 
that left significant operational authority with the GEF. Conveying the extent to which 
developing countries were constrained by these structures, the LDCs ‘noted that the final 
text was not LDCs’ preferred outcome, but that they had compromised. He said it is now up 
to the GEF to operationalize the guidance in a way that truly responds to the need to 
implement’ the national adaptation plans of action (ENB-269). 
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7.6.2  Institutional constraints on operationalisation of the SCCF 
Despite agreement to the list of SCCF funding areas when the fund was created (decision 
7/CP.7), negotiations over operational policy for the SCCF revealed significant resistance 
from donor countries to the breadth of these funding areas, while developing countries 
continued to prioritise adaptation. Very brief guidance was produced at COP-8 but broader 
disagreement led to negotiations continuing on to COP-9. North-South division was clear 
at SBI-18 (before COP-9): ‘non-Annex I countries sought to ensure that adaptation activities 
would be prioritized under the SCCF. Annex I countries, meanwhile, demanded that the 
SCCF fund mitigation projects as well as adaptation activities’ (ENB-219). Also at SBI-18, 
‘the G-77/China and others said the SCCF should finance activities currently not supported 
by existing funds, and, with Micronesia, Tanzania and Kenya, stressed the importance of 
prioritizing adaptation activities’ (ENB-215) and ‘Argentina, supported by the G-77/China 
and others, said that adaptation projects are of global benefit and should be given the 
highest priority under the SCCF’, while ‘Canada, with the EU, Norway and Japan, and 
opposed by the G-77/China, proposed that the SCCF support adaptation and mitigation 
activities’ (both ENB-217). 
Only limited guidance was agreed at COP-9, which led the GEF to convene side 
discussions with a small group of donor countries, who agreed that the SCCF should finance 
specific programmes and have distinct agreements with each donor that would allow them 
to specify which programmes their contributions could be channelled into. In November 
2004 (before COP-10), developed countries pledged US$34 million to the SCCF, but this was 
made contingent on the guidance agreed by the group of donors being accepted by the GEF 
Council that managed the SCCF. This process demonstrates the extent of donor control over 
the GEF system, even when the funds themselves are new and purportedly responding to 
developing country concerns (Mace 2005). In addition to the guidance outlined above, the 
GEF Council adopted a sliding scale of financing for the SCCF, whereby larger projects 
would receive a smaller proportion of their funding from the SCCF. Developing countries 
articulated clearly their frustrations at the limited influence they had over how the COP 
governed the GEF: at COP-10, ‘AOSIS, supported by the African Group, LDCs, Namibia, Cuba 
and Uganda, expressed concern over the interpretation of COP guidance’ by the GEF, 
‘underlining that the most vulnerable countries face difficulty in accessing GEF funds due 
to the burden of co-financing requirements, the existence of additional criteria and 
indicators not adopted by the COP, and the narrow scope of adaptation projects eligible 
under the GEF’ (ENB-251). In addition, the G-77/China ‘reiterated concerns on the GEF 
adding conditionalities to access the SCCF’ (ENB-252). 
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There was no decision concerning the SCCF at COP-11 due to continued lack of 
agreement about priority areas for the SCCF (ENB-285). At COP-12, decision 1/CP.12 noted 
‘the concerns expressed by most Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention with 
regard to the operational criteria and policies’ of the SCCF, but it reinforced the fund’s remit 
across various areas of mitigation, and did not make reference to the fund’s original 
adaptation remit, which had been the key focus of developing countries. ‘Delegates were 
surprised at the relative speed with which the SCCF issue was concluded’ during COP-12 
‘and speculated that this might be linked to progress on the Adaptation Fund. Skeptics [sic], 
however, recalled the climate process is in the habit of collecting “empty funds”’ (ENB-315), 
reference to developed countries’ ongoing ability to obstruct new funds by simply refusing 
to actually contribute money to them. This outcome suggests that, as with the LDC Fund, 
existing institutional structures added to developed countries power, enabling them to 
further reinforce these structures and preserve the GEF’s significant operational authority 
and donors’ position as the most significant influence over the COP’s governance of the 
financial mechanism. 
7.7 Explaining the policy path change in Adaptation Fund 
 governance 
The development of UNFCCC negotiations and policy has shown the successive 
reinforcement at key instances of policy creation of the role GEF and the limitations of COP 
governance of the financial mechanism. Created at the same time as the SCCF and LDC 
Fund at COP-7 in 2001 and initially designated as a GEF responsibility, the several years 
taken to ratify the Kyoto Protocol meant that the process of determining the functions and 
governance of the Adaptation Fund took place slightly later. As a result of this short but 
important delay, there was time for experience with the LDC Fund and SCCF to reinforce 
perceptions that the GEF was an unavoidable political reality within the UNFCCC system 
(Agarwal et al. 1999). This experience lead to a spike in concern when the Adaptation Fund 
was operationalised, particularly in terms of funding areas, access to funding, and the GEF’s 
Resource Allocation Framework (Müller 2006, pp. 23–24). In addition, the GEF 
replenishment before COP-11 had been something of a crisis, with developed countries, led 
by the US, imposing numerous conditions on their contributions in order to achieve greater 
scrutiny of GEF activities (Schipper and Boyd 2006, p. 82). These circumstances offered an 
opportunity and additional motivation for developing countries to pursue a governance 
arrangement that would differ from previous instances within the UNFCCC. It was clear that 
criteria for accessing future funds must be clearly articulated by the COP rather than being 
delegated to the GEF, in order to overcome the potential for replicating the same inequalities 
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and challenges that developing countries had experienced with the SCCF and LDC Fund 
(Mace 2005). 
Developing countries’ concerns about governance involving the GEF were evident 
during negotiations: at COP-11 in 2005, the G-77/China expressed concern that the new GEF 
Resource Allocation Framework ‘could make it harder to operationalize the Adaptation 
Fund, and that co-financing requirements present a barrier to LDCs and SIDS accessing 
funds’. ‘AOSIS, with others, added that the Adaptation Fund should be administered by the 
COP rather than by the GEF/World Bank’ (both ENB-282). The G-77/China ‘emphasized that 
for developing countries, having the GEF and World Bank acting as trustee would not be the 
best option for managing the Fund’, while Tuvalu and Bangladesh said the COP ‘should 
exercise its authority in administrating the Fund’ (ENB-282). ‘Namibia noted the 
cumbersome role of the GEF and called for an innovative approach to manage the 
Adaptation Fund’ (ENB-289), while Japan, in contrast, ‘stressed that the GEF should be the 
operating entity for the Adaptation Fund’ (ENB-291). 
At the subsequent SBI-24 meeting, developing countries expressed a largely 
consistent call for a new governance arrangement to be created, with an emphasis on 
governance by the COP/MOP (the term used because the Adaptation Fund sits under the 
Kyoto Protocol). The G-77/China brought a proposal for the Adaptation Fund and also 
‘referenced the need for further information from prospective institutions for managing the 
Fund, including whether the Fund would be managed separately and have autonomy from 
other funds’ (ENB-301). In addition, ‘AOSIS noted the need to avoid another fund that is 
difficult to access’ (ENB-301). At COP-12, the G-77/China ‘said the Fund’s principles, 
governance structure and modalities should be agreed before deciding on institutional 
arrangements, and stressed that the Fund should be accountable to the COP/MOP’ (ENB-
310), and ‘proposed a set of principles, including the COP/MOP’s authority and guidance’ 
and ‘accountability of the Fund to the COP/MOP’ (ENB-311). The LDCs highlighted the 
desire for independence, saying ‘the Fund should be managed by an executive body such as 
the CDM Executive Board with regional representation, including LDCs’ (ENB-310). This 
clearly highlights the push by developing countries to build a coalition of sufficient strength 
to deviate from the existing institutional structure and ensure that the COP, in which they 
have greater influence, is more able to exert its authority to govern the fund, rather than 
giving the GEF the primary role. 
In line with the initial policy from COP-7, developed countries assumed that the GEF 
would have a prominent role in the Adaptation Fund (Flåm and Skjærseth 2009, p. 110), and 
remained committed to involving the GEF, corroborating Grasso’s (2011) reports of distinct 
North-South blocs taking divergent views on institutional arrangements. At SBI-24 in 2006 
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(before COP-12), ‘the EU, Canada, Switzerland and Norway preferred that the GEF be 
designated as the operating entity for the Fund’ (ENB-301) and at COP-12 ‘Japan, Norway 
and Switzerland said the GEF is best placed to manage the Fund’ (ENB-310). Echoing the 
confidence of its donors, ‘the GEF underscored its qualifications to manage the Adaptation 
Fund’ (ENB-316). Decision 5/CMP.2 (under the Kyoto Protocol) reflected the North-South 
division more closely than previous financial mechanism policy when it determined that 
‘the Adaptation Fund should operate under the authority and guidance of and be 
accountable to’ the COP/MOP, ‘which shall decide on its overall policies’ (paragraph 1(e)), 
and that ‘membership of the governing body of the Adaptation Fund shall be from Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol, follow a one-country-one-vote rule and have a majority of Parties not 
included in Annex I to the Convention’ (paragraph 3). This opened the door within policy 
for an alternative to the GEF to be introduced with a voting structure different to the GEF 
Council, but since proposals for managing the Adaptation Fund were invited from external 
organisations, the possibility remained that the GEF would be selected. 
Developed countries continued to highlight their preference for the GEF as the 
managing entity, with Japan again stating its support at SBI-26 in 2007 (before COP-13) 
(ENB-324), and the GEF was the only organisation to submit a proposal to manage the 
Adaptation Fund (FCCC/SBI/2007/MISC.2). GEF representatives also lobbied hard at the 
beginning of COP-13 as they sought to secure a role for the organisation (ENB-354), which 
seemed inevitable as COP-13 progressed (ENB-347). However, the GEF was only given the 
role of providing interim secretariat services for the Adaptation Fund, and a new Adaptation 
Fund Board was created in decision 1/CMP.3 ‘to supervise and manage the Adaptation Fund, 
under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol’ (paragraph 4), marking a notable departure from previous 
fund management arrangements. The language used to establish the Board and COP/MOP 
oversight is equivalent to earlier decisions dealing with GEF management of the SCCF and 
LDC Fund, and the MOU with the GEF, but takes on a different implication in light of the 
independence of the Adaptation Fund Board. Decision 1/CMP.3 also gives the Adaptation 
Fund Board authority to receive applications directly from countries and their agencies and 
create relevant criteria (paragraphs 29 & 30), which heralded the more direct access to the 
fund that developing countries had called for, in contrast to the GEF system where funding 
can only be accessed via the GEF’s three implementing agencies. 
Various factors contributed to this break in the policy path prioritising the role of 
the GEF. Firstly, developing countries including the G77/China, African Group, LDCs and 
AOSIS were unified in their negotiating stance (Müller 2007, p. 10), indicating a strong 
coalition seeking institutional change. This is partly due to the Adaptation Fund receiving 
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the majority of its financial inflows from a levy on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects. As mentioned above in 5.4.1, Khan and Roberts (2013, p. 175) argue that the levy 
actually extracts money from the nations hosting the projects, which are mostly larger 
developing countries such as China, India and Brazil. As a result, developing countries 
regarded the funding from the levy ‘as their own money’ and had a particularly strong desire 
to prevent its distribution being managed by the GEF, since they perceived the GEF Council 
as undemocratic in its voting structure and the Council would allow the USA to be involved 
in Adaptation Fund governance decisions, despite it not being party to the Kyoto Protocol 
(Grasso 2011, p. 370). Developing countries also demonstrated a strong collective concern 
with the most vulnerable countries having access to the Adaptation Fund (ibid.), contributing 
further to the unity amongst developing country groups. 
Secondly, the G77/China alliance was increasing in economic and political clout 
(ENB-354) and the Adaptation Fund sits under the Kyoto Protocol. This meant that the USA, 
which had not ratified the Protocol, was excluded from relevant negotiations (Grasso 2011, 
p. 363). The absence of the USA represents a relatively “standard” example of a path 
dependence, where prior decisions taken by American politicians created a situation where 
subsequent American representatives in the UNFCCC were unable to participate in 
Adaptation Fund policy making. This shift in constituents of the developed country 
coalition, traditionally concerned with preserving the status quo, meant that European 
countries could take a more prominent role in negotiations. In advance of SBI-25/COP-12, 
the EU ‘decided to go into listening mode’ and held preliminary meetings with developing 
countries that helped both sides focus on core principles for the Adaptation Fund’s 
governance rather than the specific issue of the GEF’s role (Müller 2007, pp. 10–11). Without 
a key developed country involved, the reduced focus on reinforcing the status quo exhibited 
by the more prominent EU meant that developing countries were more able to articulate 
their preferences and gain legitimacy within the policy process, a necessary precursor to 
institutional change (Vatn 2015), and meant that the unified developing country coalition 
was able to gather sufficient political strength to secure change to existing institutional 
structures. 
Thirdly, it must be recognised that the funding model for the Adaptation Fund 
meant that developed countries would only provide a small proportion of its funding. The 
new Adaptation Fund Board would govern the distribution of finance mostly not provided 
by developed countries, meaning the disadvantages to developed countries of giving up their 
pursuit of GEF management were lower than would be the case had they been providing the 
totality of the funding. At SBI-25/COP-12, the EU referred to ‘the special features of the 
[Adaptation Fund] financed by the share of the proceeds’ of the CDM (Grasso 2011, p. 372), 
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illustrating a cognisance of the fund’s unique source. It is unlikely that this variation in 
advantage gained from institutional structure would have shaped developed countries’ 
preferences to the extent that they would have brought about institutional change 
themselves (Fioretos 2011), but under pressure from a well-organised developing country 
coalition in the absence of the USA these lower costs of change can be seen as a factor in 
the reduced resistance to change shown by the EU. 
Agreement on the Adaptation Fund Board, operating directly under COP/MOP 
governance and with a one-country-one-vote arrangement, was a significant breakthrough 
in light of the previous continued reinforcement of the GEF’s donor-led role in managing 
the financial mechanism, and can be seen as the most significant example of developing 
countries overcoming an established path dependence within the UNFCCC in relation to 
climate finance. The institutional arrangements allowed the Adaptation Fund to pioneer 
procedures that would allow more direct access (Flåm and Skjærseth 2009), which has been 
praised as an innovative development that benefits developing countries’ ownership of 
projects and the funding they receive (Bird et al. 2011) and is an unusually concrete policy 
response to longstanding concerns that developing countries have had about access to the 
GEF and, latterly, the SCCF and LDC Fund. As a result of its governance arrangements, the 
Adaptation Fund came to be seen as distinctly different to other UNFCCC funds and its 
direct access provisions went on to influence operation of other funds, such as the LDC 
Fund, illustrating the significance of the policy design (COWI and IIED 2009), and it has the 
potential to be a positive influence on the GCF after it was created at COP-15 and COP-16 
(Horstmann and Abeysinghe 2011).  
7.8 Attempts to capitalise on the break in policy path during 
 negotiations for COP-15 
Previous sections have shown that initial selection of the GEF gave weight to developed 
countries’ preferences within the policy process, constraining the policy options available 
when the GEF was made permanent and the SCCF and LDC Fund were operationalised. 
Subsequently, the LDC Fund and SCCF did have a more deliberate focus on adaptation, and 
the circumstances existing at the slightly later point when the Adaptation Fund was 
operationalised allowed developing countries to gather a coalition of sufficient strength to 
overcome institutional constraints and secure novel and more equitable governance 
arrangements. This changing landscape left the institutions and governance of the financial 
mechanism in a greater degree of flux than the aspects of UNFCCC climate finance 
examined in Chapters 5 and 6, and this timing coincided with a significant broadening of 
the negotiating remit as the policy process moved towards COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009, 
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where a comprehensive new agreement was expected to renew the climate governance 
regime from 2012 onwards. As negotiations leading up to COP-15 began, the opportunity 
existed to build on changes in the financial mechanism and push for a more significant 
new, independently-operated fund that could constitute a more significant pivot in the 
financial mechanism away from the GEF and towards the priorities and interests of 
developing countries. 
7.8.1  Attempts to build a coalition supporting further institutional change 
The road to the Copenhagen COP and the potential new governance regime was negotiated 
under the Ad Hoc Working Group for Long Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). From the 
beginning of the AWG-LCA process, developing countries sought to gather a coalition of 
sufficient weight to achieve further changes to the institutional structure through the 
introduction of new funding arrangements. Although a variety of perspectives on the key 
problems and optimal institutional arrangements were in evidence, developing countries 
focused on funding for adaptation and technology, and access to funding in particular, 
alongside the general drive to increase funding examined in Chapter 5. This is not 
unexpected, given that adaptation funding and access were the key differences achieved with 
the Adaptation Fund’s independent governance structure and the GEF, with its associated 
criticisms, remained the main funding body in the financial mechanism. 
At AWG-LCA-1 in 2008 (before COP-14), South Africa ‘proposed streamlining 
financing mechanisms and reconsidering the institutional framework’ (ENB-360), Egypt 
‘urged new funding mechanisms’, the G77/China and others ‘proposed creating an umbrella 
multilateral fund under the Convention’, and ‘Mexico, Indonesia and India suggested 
creating a multilateral fund under the Convention with foreseeable and scalable 
contributions by developed countries and a transparent and inclusive governance structure’ 
(all ENB-361). At AWG-LCA-2, AOSIS ‘proposed the establishment of a Convention 
adaptation fund’ (ENB-365) and, in what would become a key proposal, Mexico suggested ‘a 
world climate change fund, or green fund, on mitigation, adaptation and technology 
transfer, with participation of all countries and contributions according to greenhouse gas 
emissions, population and GDP’ (ENB-368). At AWG-LCA-3, AOSIS ‘underscored 
adaptation as a major priority, and proposed the establishment of an adaptation fund under 
the Convention’ (ENB-380), and at AWG-LCA-4/COP-14, ‘China proposed establishing an 
adaptation fund and adaptation committee under the Convention’ (ENB-390). At AWG-
LCA-6 in 2009 (before COP-15), AOSIS ‘highlighted the need for a Convention Adaptation 
Fund’ and ‘Tuvalu called for a multilateral climate change fund with five windows on: 
mitigation; REDD; adaptation; insurance; and technology’ (ENB-415). 
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In terms of Improved or direct access to funding, at AWG-LCA-1, ‘South Africa 
supported consolidating funding sources into one instrument that can be easily accessed’ 
(ENB-361) and later at AWG-LCA-5, ‘the LDCs said the new mechanism must provide easy 
access for LDCs’ and ‘the African Group underscored geographical representation, direct 
access, country-driven approaches…’ (ENB-404). At AWG-LCA-6, the G77/China and AOSIS 
both highlighted the need for simplified access (ENB-415). At AWG-LCA-7, ‘Bangladesh 
emphasized the need for a financial architecture under the UNFCCC, in conformity with the 
BAP, providing easy and direct access to resources especially for the most vulnerable 
countries’, and AOSIS underscored the need to ‘develop direct and simplified access to 
finance especially for SIDS and LDCs’ (ENB-424). At the intercessional meeting between 
AWG-LCA-6 and 7, South Africa, ‘with Bangladesh and others, underscored direct access 
under COP guidance’ and Barbados illustrated developing countries’ frustrations by 
likening ‘the difficulties of access to having “been given an ATM card without the pin 
number”’ (ENB-427). At AWG-LCA-7, ‘Uganda, with Malawi, noted the need for improved 
access to funding for the LDCs’ (ENB-438) and as the negotiation text continued to evolve, 
the G-77/China, ‘called for reflecting their proposals more clearly in the text’, ‘stressing the 
need for direct access to funds by developing countries’ (ENB-433). 
Initially, developed countries demonstrated opposition to further institutional 
change, and remained focused on GEF reform as they sought to reinforce its place in the 
institutional structure. At AWG-LCA-1, ‘Switzerland supported avoiding fragmentation of 
funding sources, and strengthening existing institutions, including the GEF’ (ENB-361), and 
Japan ‘supported focusing on the existing financial architecture’ with Australia at AWG-
LCA-4/COP-14 (ENB-390) and again at AWG-LCA-5 (ENB-400), with the EU at AWG-LCA-
6 (ENB-406), and at AWG-LCA-7 (ENB-434). At AWG-LCA-5, ‘Japan, Australia, Switzerland 
and others, opposed by Barbados, the Philippines and others, supported enhancing existing 
institutions’ and ‘New Zealand said new institutions would add new bureaucracy’ (ENB-404). 
However, some developing countries did also advocate reforming the GEF and the existing 
system, such as the LDCs, which said at AWG-LCA-7 that ‘the focus should be on making 
current institutions more responsive and less expensive due to limited resources. He 
expressed preference for a single fund with specific windows for mitigation, adaptation, 
technology and capacity building’ (ENB-437[6]). Such perspectives serve as a reminder that 
the GEF remained a significant feature of the financial mechanism and suggests an ongoing 
legacy of the path dependence that led some developing countries to see more potential for 
incremental institutional change and increasing finance flows by remaining within the 
boundaries of the existing institutional structure. 
  Page 181 of 265   
7.8.2  Building momentum for more significant institutional change 
Discussions continued throughout 2009 and North-South divisions over a new organisation 
persisted: at AWG-LCA-7, ‘on institutional arrangements, developing countries generally 
supported a new financial mechanism under the authority and guidance of the COP, with 
balanced geographical representation and direct access to funds, while developed countries 
called for the use of existing institutions’ (ENB-439). ‘The use of existing mechanisms was 
opposed by the Philippines, for the G-77/China, Uganda, for the LDCs, and Egypt, for the 
African Group’ (ENB-434), demonstrating considerable unity amongst three of the main 
developing country negotiating blocs. The G-77/China also ‘stressed that existing 
institutions had failed as a finance delivery system, objected to co-financing and said that 
the architecture should be concentrated in “one house”’ (ENB-434). In contrast, developed 
countries chose to raise concerns about creating a new, large and potentially bureaucratic 
fund: ‘Japan cautioned against creating new bureaucratic organizations, noting the need to 
reconsider the role and scope of the existing funds under the Convention and Protocol in 
order to avoid duplication’ and ‘Canada identified the need to further discuss the extent to 
which all funding activities could be concentrated in a single institution, cautioning against 
assuming that “bigger is less costly or more efficient”’ (ENB-437[6]). 
Developed countries even made reference explicitly to existing institutional 
structures and design, such as the US stating that ‘the Convention provides that the financial 
mechanism should be entrusted to existing institutions’ (ENB-429). This was reinforced 
when ‘the EU, supported by the US and Switzerland, expressed reservations with language 
on establishing the financial mechanism of the Convention. He highlighted the financial 
mechanism under Convention Article 11 and indicated that the emphasis was on further 
developing the financial architecture’ (ENB-430). This is evidence that after the Adaptation 
Fund’s creation, developed countries still sought to reinforce the path dependence 
underpinning GEF involvement in the financial mechanism, with developed countries keen 
to secure GEF involvement and retain the advantage they gained from this element of the 
institutional structure as the prospect of a new fund gained prominence within the AWG-
LCA. These statements are important context for the subsequent move by the USA, also at 
AWG-LCA-7, when it contributed a proposal of its own ‘for a global fund for climate. He said 
the new arrangements envisaged the continuation of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
as an operating entity of the financial mechanism’ (ENB-435) and ‘envisaged new 
arrangements and not the creation of a new institution’ (ENB-437[6]), indicating attempts at 
policy layering that would preserve rather than replace the existing institutional 
architecture. 
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Developing countries were initially critical of this move by the US, a reaction 
consistent with the longstanding North-South or donor-recipient conflict and the prospect 
that a new fund would be part of or managed by the GEF. Although it included ‘balanced 
representation of net contributors and net recipients’ and recognised the need for simplified 
access procedures, the G-77/China ‘said the US proposal does not address the problems with 
the current financial mechanism’ (ENB-435), demonstrating that developing countries 
remained focused on institutional and governance changes that would give them greater 
influence over governance of a new fund, enabling it to better meet their needs and overcome 
the problems they have experienced with the GEF. Various other proposals were put forward 
by Argentina, AOSIS, Australia and Japan, but it was the early proposal from Mexico at 
AWG-LCA-2 ‘for a green fund compatible with existing UNFCCC funds’ (ENB-366) that 
gathered the most significant traction within the negotiations, and was eventually merged 
with the US proposal to form the basis of the final GCF. Responding to these developments, 
evidence suggests that developed countries moved away from the GEF but stood firm behind 
the World Bank in order to secure some involvement for institutions over which they had 
greater influence: At COP-15, ‘developed countries generally preferred that the World Bank 
should act as the trustee’ for the new financial mechanism arrangements, ‘while many 
developing countries preferred new arrangements to overcome problems experienced with 
the current financial mechanisms’ (ENB-459). 
As mentioned previously, COP-15 ended in political failure with a brief Accord the 
only outcome from the AWG-LCA process. Nevertheless, a new, separate institution was 
created in the form of the Green Climate Fund, which the Copenhagen Accord (decision 
2/CP.15) decided ‘shall be established as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of 
the Convention’ (paragraph 10), meaning it would have an equivalent institutional status to 
the GEF rather than being part of it. In addition, the new GCF would cover the full spectrum 
of UNFCCC funding areas (paragraph 10) and have a ‘governance structure providing for 
equal representation of developed and developing countries’ (paragraph 8). These features 
indicate that the GCF would potentially reinforce the policy path initiated by creation of the 
Adaptation Fund rather than the GEF policy path, but the brevity of the Copenhagen Accord 
meant that detailed design was not created at COP-15 and negotiations on establishing the 
institutional form and operational rules of the GCF continued after COP-15. 
7.9 Operationalisation of the GCF and the legacy of institutional 
 structures 
Although the creation of the GCF was noted in the Copenhagen Accord, the lack of detail 
meant that there was significant room for subsequent proposals and debates about how it 
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would be structured and under what principles and rules it would operate. At AWG-LCA-10 
in 2010 (before COP-16), the US indicated its desire to preserve the position of the GEF, 
stating that ‘the new fund and the GEF would each play an important and complementary 
role, with the green fund focusing on large-scale investments’ (ENB-464). However, the US 
added that the GCF ‘would have its own board composed of finance experts with equal 
representation of developing and developed countries and would be accountable to the COP’ 
(ENB-464), more in line with developing country perspectives on institutional design. Other 
developed countries supported these proposals, with Australia suggesting that the GCF 
board ‘decide on how thematic areas will be funded’ and Canada advocating ‘an accountable 
body making decisions on funding, well informed by expert-level decisions’ (both ENB-464). 
US references to making the new fund accountable to the COP were ‘cautiously welcomed 
by developing countries, who have long called for a financial mechanism under the authority 
of the COP. They commented, however, that “this still leaves unanswered the question of the 
level of accountability to the COP and the wider financial framework, which are key issues 
to be resolved”’ (ENB-472). 
Developing countries demonstrated a continued push to shape the governance of 
the new fund and its board, even suggesting a “forum of entities” to perform key oversight 
and coordination functions for funds across the financial mechanism 
(FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/8, chap. III, paragraph 14). This was clearly beyond the tolerance of 
developed countries, though: ‘the EU, US and other developed countries tended to favor [sic] 
the use of existing institutions to perform these functions’ (ENB-478). Nevertheless, 
developing countries continued to push for a new board to oversee the GCF in submissions 
to the AWG-LCA (FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.6/Add.1) and in negotiating statements (e.g. 
ENB-480, 488), with disagreement ensuing about how many members of the GCF board 
should come from developed and developing countries (ENB-478, 495). The details were 
finalised at COP-16 in Cancún, where the Cancún Agreements (decision 1/CP.16) decided 
‘that the Fund shall be governed by a Board of 24 members, comprising an equal number of 
members from developing and developed country Parties’ (paragraph 103) and invited the 
World Bank to serve as the trustee of the GCF’s assets (paragraph 107), an administrative 
rather than operational role and the same given to the World Bank for the Adaptation Fund. 
A Transitional Committee was also created to design the operational aspects of the GCF, 
with mixed membership of developed and developing countries (paragraph 109). 
There are two themes from the negotiations that can offer insight into why developed 
countries became active participants in overturning the path dependence centred upon the 
role of the GEF, adding additional nuance to our understanding of how creation of the GCF 
reflected and affected North-South relations. The first theme is the move to connect 
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institutional change and the prospect of a new fund with the trend towards private and other 
sources of climate finance. Developed countries sought to ensure that private sources of 
finance were at the core of the new fund’s functioning, in contrast to the GEF’s public 
financing. For example, at AWG-LCA-4/COP-14, ‘the US, Norway and Canada highlighted 
the importance of the private sector’ in relation to the future of the financial mechanism 
(ENB-390). The EU contributed to discussion of Mexico’s proposal for a new fund by 
emphasising ‘that the “core” of the negotiation is how to mobilize effective financing and 
that parties need to discuss linkages between sources of funding to create a coherent system’ 
(ENB-434), and as the US’ influential proposal was taking shape, it explained that ‘the fund 
would utilize a variety of financial products’ (ENB-437). The GCF’s engagement with private 
investors and corporations was a key demand of developed countries, and its potential for 
mobilising private funding is seen by donors as a key benefit of the GCF in the context of 
constrained public budgets (de Sépibus 2015, pp. 310–311, Bowman and Minas 2019, p. 351); 
as discussed in Chapter 6, increasing the prominence of private finance will advantage 
developed countries by reducing the focus on public finance and its connection to normative 
arguments about their obligations to compensate developing countries. 
The second theme is the connection between institutional change the continued 
effort by the US and other developed countries to move beyond the Convention and Kyoto 
Protocol’s sharp divide in responsibility between developed and developing countries. As 
Mexico explained, 
participation in the fund would be voluntary, but that once parties had opted in, their 
contributions would be based on assessment criteria related to emissions, population and 
economy. Saying that developing countries’ contributions would be “much smaller but not 
zero,” he expressed concern that, without developing countries taking any responsibility to 
act, “the victims of today may become the culprits of tomorrow.” He highlighted, inter alia, 
that: the LDCs would be the only “accepted free-riders;” developing countries would get more 
than they contribute; and the green fund would not eliminate obligations under other 
elements of the financial architecture (ENB-434). 
With this proposal, Mexico positioned itself between developed and developing countries, 
and indeed ‘the G-77/China, Pakistan, the African Group, Saudi Arabia, China and India 
expressed reservations with the Mexican proposal’ (ENB-434). The wider participation of the 
Mexican proposal was echoed by the US when explaining its proposal for a new fund: the 
US ‘indicated that all parties, except the LDCs, would contribute to the fund in line with 
capabilities but that contributions would not be mandatory’ (ENB-435). Thus, while the 
centrality of the GEF may have been successfully overcome by developing countries, the GCF 
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offered a means to institutionalise the new regime’s dilution of differentiation between 
developed and developing countries (Brunnée and Streck 2013) and therefore a potential 
advantage to developed countries over the GEF. 
These two key shifts in the negotiating landscape are examples of developed 
countries accumulating sufficient advantage from institutional change to outweigh the 
losses associated with giving up the prior institutional structure, a threshold that historical 
institutionalists argue is required for change to occur (Fioretos 2011, p. 375). These 
calculations and choice points are shaped by the institutional context in which the relevant 
actors are operating and ‘the feedback effects that have defined the conditions within which 
specific policy and institutional choices are being made’ are a key driver of preference 
formation amongst actors within the institution (Thelen 2004, p. 288). Developed countries’ 
increasing prioritisation of private sources and their push to reduce differentiation between 
developed and developing countries as donors of climate finance resulted in a different 
calculation to in previous policy rounds such as creation of the SCCF and LDC Fund, 
meaning developed country preferences shifted away from preserving the status quo and 
towards facilitating institutional change. The structure of the GCF with its separate board 
represents an example of policy “layering”, where new institutional rules are added on top 
of existing ones to, in this case, solidify institutional change initiated with the Adaptation 
Fund’s design (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, p. 16). 
While these developments were significant for North-South relations within the 
UNFCCC, initial operationalisation of the GCF at the Cancún COP is not the end of the 
story. A Transitional Committee was initiated in Cancún, which would be responsible for 
designing the operational procedures and other details for the GCF (Müller 2011) and 
ultimately for determining the extent to which the new fund improved on the existing 
financial mechanism (Drummond 2011). The Transitional Committee was the site of 
significant North-South battles (Bracking 2015) and resulted in a more donor-dominated 
governance process, rather than consensus-based, and cemented the role of private finance 
in fulfilling the voluntary pledges that now underpin the UNFCCC regime, reinforcing the 
prominence of private finance as a key objective of developed countries (Vanderheiden 
2015). Although the GCF retains a balance between adaptation and mitigation funding 
(Fridahl and Linnér 2016), its operationalisation means that the GCF has ended up firmly 
rooted in the new bottom-up, pledge-based regime and its governance has not embedded 
the independence and North-South balance that developing countries have fought 
consistently to achieve. The circumstances of the GCF’s creation and the move by developed 
countries to participate in rather than continue obstructing the creation of a new, more 
comprehensive fund under the UNFCCC suggests that while creation of the GCF 
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constitutions an instance of institutional change, the advantages it brought to developed 
countries mean that it continues the pattern of greater influence over institutional structure 
that developed countries have derived from the prior evolution of financial mechanism 
policy. 
7.10   Conclusion 
The financial mechanism is central to developing countries’ involvement in the UNFCCC 
regime and shapes the reality of how recipients of finance obtain and use the money that 
they have consistently argued is a right, rather than an option (Müller 2008a). As the process 
of creating the UNFCCC began, the GEF, a creation of developed countries as a donor-led 
vehicle for environmental funding, was in a prominent position. Developed countries and 
the GEF itself sought to ensure that the institution would be brought into the environmental 
governance regime created at the UNCED, and their success replicated the broader North-
South power inequalities associated with the development assistance system. Developing 
countries were unable to secure a new fund that would be under their influence to a greater 
extent (via COP oversight), and this outcome set the stage for an ongoing struggle to shape 
governance arrangements to increase their influence over the functioning of the financial 
mechanism. This struggle initially focused on the role of the GEF, but other elements of the 
financial mechanism’s operations, such as access to funding and the weight given to 
adaptation funding have remained issues of concern as the institutional structure of the 
financial mechanism has evolved, demonstrating how difficult it has been for developing 
countries to achieve policy outcomes they have sought. 
There is substantial evidence that the initial selection of the GEF conferred an 
advantage that developed countries capitalised on when the institutional linkage between 
the COP and the GEF was articulated in the MOU and the GEF was subsequently made a 
permanent operating entity of the financial mechanism. Developing countries consistently 
raised concerns about how the GEF functioned and was governed, and the three new funds 
created at COP-7 in Marrakesh presented a significant opportunity for the financial 
mechanism to better reflect the needs and priorities of developing countries. However, this 
was in line with the increasing prominence and understanding of climate change 
adaptation both within and outside the UNFCCC, and developed countries were successful 
in ensuring the SCCF and LDC Fund were placed under the management of the GEF, leaving 
developing countries to face familiar inequalities of influence over their operationalisation. 
A delay in operationalising the Adaptation Fund created an opportunity for an 
emboldened G77/China, capitalising on the outcome of SCCF and LDC Fund negotiations 
and the absence of the USA, to build a coalition in support of deviating from existing 
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institutional structures to the extent that the new fund would feature an independent 
governance arrangement that would finally bring about institutional separation from the 
GEF. The Adaptation Fund Board was created and its positioning directly under the Kyoto 
Protocol’s COP/MOP signified a notable break from the path dependence that had hitherto 
constrained policy choices to those involving the GEF. Developing countries also achieved a 
new policy of direct access to the Adaptation Fund, notable since access to funding was a 
key theme of frustration with their experiences of GEF funding over the life of the financial 
mechanism and would go on to become an influential feature of the financial mechanism. 
The pivot in the trajectory of the financial mechanism, and the potential break of 
the path dependence centred on the GEF, coincided with the development process for a 
potential post-2012 climate governance regime, due to be agreed at COP-15 in Copenhagen. 
With all elements of climate policy covered within the AWG-LCA process, developing 
countries had an unprecedented forum in which to argue for creation of a new, much larger 
fund that would feature institutional independence under the authority of the COP, 
equitable representation in its governance structures, direct access and a balance between 
funding mitigation and adaptation. While developed countries initially focused on reform 
of the GEF and using existing institutions to meet the demands of developing countries, the 
numerous proposals for a new fund gained enough momentum within the negotiations that 
eventually developed countries, in particular the US, joined in with their own proposals. The 
GCF represents the end of the prominence of the GEF within the financial mechanism and 
the path dependence that constrained policy making for the first 10-15 years of UNFCCC 
operation. However, while in time the GEF may be replaced altogether by the GCF 
(Vanderheiden 2015), developed countries ensured that the new fund was consistent with 
their broader push to erode the previous distinction between developed and developing 
countries and include as much private climate finance as possible. This facilitated 
institutionalisation of the expectation that, eventually, most countries would be expected to 
contribute to the GCF and the fund had little formal connection to normative arguments 
about historical responsibility. The financial mechanism thus remains, as it has been since 
its creation, based on an institutional structure that gives considerable advantage to 
developed countries and is largely in line with their preferences. 
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8. Drawing together and discussing 
research findings 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Although the landscape of developing countries and their incomes and emissions has 
changed over the course of UNFCCC history, climate change remains defined by North-
South and rich-poor divisions (Gupta 2015, p. 142). This is particularly true for climate 
finance, where the very basis of the policy area stems from North-South histories and 
encapsulates current inequalities. Approaching climate change politics from a historical 
institutionalist perspective facilitates investigation of institutional factors not yet widely 
studied in this context. Although there is a growing body of research using historical 
institutionalism to examine state sovereignty, international political economy, and 
international security, law and governance (Fioretos et al. 2016a, p. 4), little of this research 
has addressed global environmental governance institutions based on multilateral 
environmental agreements. This thesis has extended the use of historical institutionalism 
to the UNFCCC, investigating how its institutional design reflected broader histories of 
injustice and uneven power distribution, and how this design contributed to the 
development of institutional rule structures that in turn affected actors’ ideas, priorities, 
coalitions and power, constraining policy making and shaping the nature and justice of 
outcomes. 
The preceding three chapters have scrutinised the history of key areas of North-
South contestation within the UNFCCC climate finance policy process, setting out in detail 
the examination of source material through production of temporally constructed narratives 
that trace the layering of policy over time in combination with evidence of Parties’ strategies, 
priorities, coalitions and ideas. This historical institutionalist analysis has revealed how the 
formation and evolution of the UNFCCC’s institutional structure have shaped policy 
stability and change and affected how developed and developing countries have interacted 
within negotiations. This discussion chapter will build on the temporal analysis, bringing 
together the micro-processes and institutional factors that the historical institutionalist 
approach has drawn out and showing how they have entrenched North-South division and 
constrained opportunities for developing countries to achieve climate justice as they 
perceive and define it within the climate finance policy process, and thereby why these 
factors matter to our understanding of the politics and justice of the climate finance policy 
process. The chapter will continue by linking back to broader North-South political 
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dynamics and developing countries’ struggle for political influence and just outcomes to 
discuss how the historical institutionalist analysis can expand our understanding of 
international climate justice and global politics and contribute a new dimension to existing 
understandings of policy outcomes and the longevity of North-South divisions within the 
UNFCCC. 
8.2 Drawing together the analytical findings 
The three analysis chapters in this thesis have dealt with four significant areas of policy 
contestation that reflect aspects of North-South histories and division: the underlying 
voluntary basis of climate finance, additionality rules and defining climate finance, the 
range of finance sources acceptable in the UNFCCC system, and the governance and 
configuration of the financial mechanism. The analysis in this thesis has been undertaken 
using the theoretical toolbox provided by historical institutionalism, which includes 
mechanisms such as institutional design, path dependence, increasing returns and policy 
paradigms, all of which may be present in varying degrees and have different impacts on 
how institutional rules and structures develop over time and influence actors’ power, ideas 
and behaviour within the policy process. Examining these aspects using a historical 
institutionalism approach has illuminated the ways that institutional structures have been 
forged, have shaped and constrained policy development and the actions of Parties, and, in 
limited cases, have been altered. This first section of the discussion chapter will draw out 
core findings from the analysis chapter and highlight interconnections and commonalities, 
while also summarising the prevalence and significance of mechanisms that illustrate the 
influence of institutional rules and structures. In doing so, the section will explore how the 
use of historical institutionalism can contribute to our understanding of climate change 
governance and justice, and what this case can tell us about using historical institutionalism 
to study treaty-based international governance regimes such as the UNFCCC. 
Firstly, the origins of the UNFCCC, a key element in historical institutionalist 
scholarship, are explored in the context of the findings from analysis of the subsequent 
policy process and institutional development. The following sub-sections address the extent 
to which mechanisms of institutional stability, reinforcement and change were identified in 
climate finance, and then how actors have derived and reinforced power advantages from 
the institutional design and structures, and how that power has varied and been deployed. 
The section will then discuss how coalitions of actors have formed in response to 
institutional design and ambiguity in institutional rules, and been constrained by rule 
structures and policy layers within the institution. Next, the section will address how 
institutionalisation of key ideas and policy paradigms have shaped actor behaviour and 
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played a role in reinforcing the power of actors. Lastly, the section will discuss the evidence 
and significance of path dependence as a factor in institutional reinforcement and 
influence on policy making. 
8.2.1  Initial institutional design 
This thesis has placed considerable emphasis on the creation of the UNFCCC, because 
‘political institutions do not exist nor are they developed in a vacuum. Rather, they function 
in concert with other pre-existing mechanisms’ (Farrell and Newman 2010, p. 630). Created 
in 1992 when the Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed at the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development, the UNFCCC followed in the footsteps of 
prior international environmental agreements, in particular the Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol. Discussion of environmental 
issues at the global level had been developing since the 1970s, and these early discussions 
and conferences were a key site of engagement for the emerging coalition of developing 
countries that would become the G77/China. Some of the strongest evidence of the 
significance of institutional influence has come from analysis of the Convention and the 
process leading up to its agreement; all three analysis chapters revealed the dominance of 
Northern countries in shaping the way the climate change problem was framed within 
negotiations and setting up the policy process to reflect broader political structures and the 
landscape of power distribution (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999). 
Historical institutionalism looks upon institutions ‘first and foremost as the 
political legacies of concrete historical struggles’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, p. 7). This 
perspective has helped to draw out the implications of the UNFCCC’s creation in light of 
prior environmental treaties and the history of North-South disagreement over 
development funding and global governance institutions such as the World Bank. These 
histories contributed to North-South differences in conceiving of the climate change 
problem, and to power distribution that affected which countries were more able to influence 
the conception of climate change that the UNFCCC was shaped to respond to. North-South 
divisions emerged in the policy process as developing countries became more engaged in 
global environmental politics and were influential shaping the debate over the initial 
principles and rules that would form the UNFCCC, such as ideas of liability and 
compensation replaced by presentation of climate change as an issue that developing 
countries would require assistance to tackle (Gupta 2014), and principles such as 
additionality and a compensation basis for climate finance failing to become clear 
institutional rules. 
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Central to the UNFCCC’s creation was its connection with the existing ODA system, 
which had long been perceived as dominated by donor countries and set up to give them 
control over how much funding they provided, how it was used and the institutions that 
distributed it. By resisting efforts to make UNFCCC negotiations a broader discussion of 
poverty and development, developed countries were able to frame climate finance as an 
extension of the voluntary assistance familiar from ODA (Bodansky 1993, Dasgupta 1994), 
ensuring their interests were prominent within the Convention (Immergut 1998). This 
prominence was reinforced by linking climate finance to the GEF, an institution specifically 
set up to be controlled by donor countries (Boisson de Chazournes 2005, p. 193). Building 
this institutional connection into the foundational document of the UNFCCC institution is 
evidence of “network co-ordination effects” described by (Hall 2016), where developed 
countries connected UNFCCC climate finance to the broader network of international 
governance institutions. As Pierson (2004, p. 150) suggests, this put pressure on actors within 
the UNFCCC to adapt to the new context of the institutional configuration. 
An important part of the institutionalist approach to institutions is their role in 
shaping the expectations of actors within them (Hall and Taylor 1996). Links to the 
discretionary ODA system and use of the GEF set the stage for the UNFCCC’s structural 
elements to lead developing countries to expect that climate finance would largely be 
controlled by developed countries. The analysis chapters have shown that developing 
countries’ constant resistance to this control reflected their power imbalance; the initial 
institutional design meant developing countries’ starting point for engaging in policy 
negotiations was based on developed countries’ preferred arrangements. This has been the 
case for amounts of finance, additionality policy, definitions and sources of climate finance, 
and the structure and purpose of funds within the financial mechanism; across all these 
areas, developing countries have expended an enormous amount of negotiating capital 
battling to shift policy discussions away from a default status quo, a set of options or a policy 
ambiguity shaped by initial institutional structures that were based on developed country 
preferences and the prevailing North-South power asymmetries in place at the time of 
UNFCCC creation. 
These findings are consistent with historical institutionalist expectations that the 
initial institutional design will lock in existing power asymmetries (Thelen and Steinmo 
1992, Mahoney 2000), thereby amplifying the effects of strategic actions by more powerful 
actors to maximise their interests within policy processes (Steinmo 2008). Across 
negotiations on voluntary finance, additionality and finance sources, and the role of the GEF 
in the financial mechanism, the initial institutional design largely reflected developed 
countries’ preferences, meaning that the subsequent expression of these preferences in the 
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policy process often coalesced around maintaining the status quo of institutional rules and 
structures (Hall and Taylor 1996). The few examples of notable institutional change within 
the four themes, such as creation of the SCCF, LDC Fund, Adaptation Fund and GCF, involve 
circumstances where developed countries altered the weight they applied to their 
preferences for maintaining relevant institutional rules and structures, paving the way for 
their alteration or creation of new institutions (Hall 2009). In some of these cases, such as 
operating rules for the SCCF and LDC Fund, the extent of change was limited when 
developed countries’ expectations of GEF involvement were realised in policy (Mace 2005, p. 
240), reinforcing underlying policy structures and network co-ordination effects. 
Material interests are also at the heart of North-South divisions over climate 
finance: developing countries can see that the altered development paths required to curtail 
emissions will be expensive and require funding, while developed countries know that the 
vast sums involved in responding to climate change, let alone the broader development 
agenda, are politically unpalatable to domestic voters and difficult to achieve when the 0.7% 
UN target for aid is met by only a handful of countries (Knoke and Duwe 2012). The process 
of regime building in the context of these material interests, while the global political 
community debated how to co-ordinate a global response to climate change, has similarities 
with the process of post-war international order building described by Ikenberry (2016). At 
the historical moment that was the formation of the UNFCCC, analysis in this thesis has 
shown that the countries involved pursued their material interests and more powerful 
developed countries were more able to ensure the new regime was established with rules and 
institutional links that would advance and protect their interests. 
The historical institutionalist approach has facilitated the incorporation of both 
ideas or normative perspectives and material factors into the understanding of how the 
UNFCCC was created (Fioretos et al. 2016a), and how prevailing international power 
distribution was incorporated into the institution’s initial structure and rules. This helps to 
explain why, although developing countries had been partially successful in moving climate 
change from simply an environmental, or technical issue, to one that included broader 
issues of development and poverty (Najam 2005), the initial institutional rules set out in the 
Convention reflected developed countries’ unwillingness to be bound by financial 
commitments based on historical responsibility and broader ethical considerations raised 
by development and poverty issues. This thesis’ analysis of the original institutional rules 
and norms has shown that while ideas of justice, burden sharing and development were 
included on paper, these aspects of the UNFCCC’s institutional design quickly became 
points of contention and were not institutionalised in a manner that constrained the ability 
of developed countries to dominate the evolution of climate finance policy. 
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8.2.2  Institutional stability and change 
Most historical institutionalists utilise a power-political view of institutions that focuses on 
how institutional configuration affects the distribution of resources and power, and many 
look to increasing returns to power to explain how and why institutions persist (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2009). Often increasing returns, or the delivery of benefits derived from the 
persistence of institutional configurations over time is conceived in utilitarian or material 
terms (Mahoney 2000), but this thesis has shown that material benefits related to climate 
finance must be considered alongside ideational factors that underpin influence over the 
policy process and the design of subsequent institutions within the UNFCCC climate 
finance system. Developed countries were much more successful than developing countries 
in securing initial institutional design that corresponded to their preferences and conferred 
power and distributional advantages upon them. Proceeding from the Convention, the 
climate finance policy process did not entirely reflect the reinforcement of positive 
feedbacks that favoured Northern countries, but this was certainly the most common 
manifestation of increasing returns within climate finance policy. 
These findings reflect Bennet and Elman’s (2006) argument that the key question for 
historical institutionalism in political life is for whom an institution’s rules are efficient or 
beneficial, as opposed to the evaluation of efficiency more commonly associated with the 
economic roots of institutionalism. Interpreting the continuation of the North-South 
division that characterised the creation of the UNFCCC as a division over the political 
efficiency of the institutional arrangements offers an explanation for the underlying 
similarity of the four policy areas, which all showed that developing countries challenged 
the perceived efficiency of the rules and institutional configuration of the UNFCCC with 
reference to its ongoing failure to deliver the funding promised by developed countries, let 
alone levels that they would deem adequate to meet both needs and ethical obligations. 
Developed countries, meanwhile, built on the initial institutional design features, such as 
connection with the GEF, permissibility of multiple sources and avenues of finance, to 
preserve the perceived efficiency of UNFCCC climate finance policy rooted in the control 
over how much finance would be provided by developed countries to developing countries. 
Pierson (2004) asserts that continued reinforcement of these advantageous 
institutional features makes the power imbalances within the policy process less visible, as 
a result of shifting actors’ expectations over time. However, all four analytical themes show 
that developing countries consistently voiced their frustrations with policy design that did 
not meet the justice- or material-based perspectives they held, suggesting that they remained 
acutely aware of the power imbalances within the policy process. Whether in light of the 
headline figures announced at COP-15 or the INDC system at Paris, developing countries’ 
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actions appear to be motivated by a drive to overcome the power that developed countries 
held over the institutional inertia and foundations of policy design. Even when the 
US$100bn commitment from Copenhagen became institutionalised over time, developing 
countries still challenged its adequacy, with their rhetoric indicating expectations 
unconstrained by institutional rules. As a result, the shaping of expectations is one of the 
weaker areas of historical institutionalist explanation with the four themes under analysis. 
A more promising explanation for institutional stability and change is that the 
success or lack of success experienced by developed and developing countries, respectively, 
reinforced a sense of identity amongst them as coalitions seeking to, in general, preserve or 
alter the rules and structures of the institution (Skocpol 1995, p. 105, Hall 2016). There is 
considerable evidence of the forming and manoeuvring of various coalitions of actors over 
the course of the period under analysis, mainly following a North-South split, and the 
dynamic is almost universally consistent with the characterisation of climate finance 
negotiations across all four of the policy contestations as developed countries seeking to 
preserve institutional rules and developing countries seeking to alter them. Understanding 
when coalitions were successful in changing or preserving institutional rules and 
interpretations thus links coalitions, as an explanation of actor behaviour, with reference to 
advantages gained from initial institutional design and policy paradigms as an explanation 
for the power held (or not held) by coalitions. 
There is little evidence in the historical analytical narratives for positive feedbacks 
that lower the running costs of incumbent institutional arrangements as a result of actors’ 
building up experience and information about those arrangements over time. This is a 
common feature in historical institutionalist work dealing with national bureaucracies 
where particular policies or functional arrangements can run with lower operating costs over 
time or require more significant investment to alter once in place (Woerdman 2004). 
Analysis here suggests that this form of increasing returns is not a notable part of climate 
finance policy within the UNFCCC, perhaps because the institution is relatively young and 
much of the debate has been about exactly what climate finance is and how much should be 
provided, rather than about the policy tools through which particular objectives are pursued 
or services delivered, as would be the case with a health or welfare ministry in a domestic 
government, for example. 
Arguably the most frequent criticism levelled against historical institutionalism has 
been an inability to explain changes that occur within institutions, or adequate attention 
paid to such changes (Hira and Hira 2000). Most early historical institutionalist literature 
suggested that change occurs as a result of significant exogenous shocks, which created 
opportunities for actors to overcome path dependencies and reshape or create new 
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institutions (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). More recent work has examined smaller 
developments originating within institutions in an effort to account for incremental 
institutional change (e.g. Mahoney and Thelen 2009). The four areas of historical analysis in 
this thesis demonstrate that institutional change, where it has occurred, has been more of 
an endogenous process and significant external shocks have not featured in the progression 
of climate finance policy within the UNFCCC during the period studied. While new 
institutions have been created, they have been policy instruments rather than a fundamental 
challenge to or replacement of the UNFCCC itself or the inclusion of climate finance within 
its remit, for example the creation of the SCCF and LDC Fund at COP-7 or the US$100bn 
finance commitment at COP-15. 
Viewing the UNFCCC climate finance policy process over time allows a picture to 
emerge of developed countries benefitting from institutional configuration and successive 
layers of rules and norms, and seeking to preserve their advantage by accepting or even 
initiating incremental change to institutional rules. Instances of institutional change have 
been found most significantly in the architecture of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism, 
particularly the creation of the Adaptation Fund and GCF, with their separation from the 
GEF. Both instances display evidence of policy “layering” and coalitions of actors navigating 
the calculations of advantage and disadvantage that shape actors’ preferences regarding 
institutional change (Fioretos 2011, Hall 2016). The unusual absence of the USA, a key 
developed country, from the Adaptation Fund negotiations makes this example 
unrepresentative of the broader evidence of institutional change over time in UNFCCC 
climate finance. Developed countries had relatively little to lose with the Adaptation Fund 
since it is funded from the CDM levy and developed countries gained significant new 
advantages from the creation of the GCF and its operational design, so in both cases the 
institutional structures affected how and when developed countries’ preference calculations 
led them to accept institutional change pushed for by developing country coalitions. 
8.2.3  Power 
Within climate finance, the key source of power that has emerged from the historical 
analytical narratives is the ability of developed countries to control the North-South flows 
of funding. This corroborates and adds an institutional perspective to the characterisation 
of climate politics by other scholars such as Ciplet et al. (2015, chap. 4), who describe the 
combination of developed countries’ ability to withhold funding and ability to make pledges 
when analysing power in climate negotiations. The historical institutionalist analysis has 
explained the power advantage developed countries gained from institutional structures 
that supported their control over finance flows and their consistent attempts to reinforce 
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this control and the supporting institutional structures. Sometimes this entailed frequent 
promotion of their voluntary pledges of finance to indicate the existing structure was 
working, but on rare occasions developed countries went as far as making explicit threats to 
reduce, cut off or hold back funding, particularly at COP-15 and COP-21. This builds on 
attention to how the design of the UNFCCC locked in this power asymmetry from its 
beginning, with the Convention offering no institutional rules or mechanisms to impose 
requirements on developed countries and reinforcing the voluntary development assistance 
paradigm present in the ODA sector. Even when policy changes or new institutional 
arrangements such as the Adaptation Fund brought minor alterations, the institutional 
structures underpinning the power held by developed countries were left largely unchanged. 
These findings are a reminder of the context in which the UNFCCC was created, 
more specifically the legacy of global response to the ozone layer problem. Various scholars 
have detailed the progression of international environmental agreements and the influence 
of the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol on the design of the UNFCCC (Cumberlege 
2009, Green 2009, Hale et al. 2013). Despite a similar expectation that developed countries 
would take responsibility for the climate change problem and co-operate to facilitate a global 
response (Wirth and Lashof 1990), the UNFCCC has not replicated the success of the ozone 
regime in bringing about its intended outcomes. In the climate finance area, this thesis has 
shown that although the UNFCCC regime adopted principles such as CBDR, which were 
drawn from previous environmental agreements and expected to shape subsequent 
behaviour, the ambiguity of corresponding principles and stipulations in the Convention 
did not link ideas about general responsibility to any specific obligations, measures or 
outcomes. This contributed to the power that developed countries gained from the 
Convention, over interpretation and fulfilment ideas about their “responsibility” to provide 
finance. 
While the Convention was relatively vague and developed countries rarely explicit 
in exerting their power to withhold climate finance flows, developed countries nevertheless 
often appeared one step ahead of developing countries, accepting or even initiating 
relatively minor changes to institutional rules almost as appeasement to the consistent 
demands of developing countries. As a result, changes such as creation of new funds or the 
headline finance figures from Copenhagen have built on previous layers of policy and rules 
to bring about gradual change that has actually protected developed countries’ power to 
shape finance policy and obligations. In other areas, such as additionality rules or criteria 
for finance sources, developed countries have been able to preserve the initial landscape of 
institutional rules that granted them control and underpinned their power from the outset. 
As a result, it appears that the advantageous position derived from the initial institutional 
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configuration allowed developed countries to repeatedly reinforce the favourable rules and 
paradigms; since their material power was largely aligned with existing institutional rules 
(Hanrieder 2014), a more blunt exercise of their power to refuse funding was rarely required 
to achieve policy outcomes that they deemed satisfactory. 
At this point, the obvious response would be to suggest that developed countries 
could never fully cut off funding, since the established normative basis of the UNFCCC, 
including CBDR and the objective to prevent harmful climate change, has shaped 
expectations of all Parties that North-South funding is an integral part of the global 
governance regime. In addition, climate finance is only one of the UNFCCC’s policy areas, 
and crude threats to exercise the full extent of developed countries’ power in this area were 
wrapped up in wide-ranging negotiations on mitigation, adaptation and so on. The nature 
of North-South interaction has made it difficult to tell how material this power is in reality 
since, at least in the realm of climate finance, developing countries do not appear to have 
responded to it in kind, and instead made consistent use of normative and justice claims as 
they strived to build coalitions of actors that could bring about institutional change and 
achieve their desired outcomes within the policy process. Nevertheless, this thesis has added 
an institutional perspective to existing scholarship by showing that developed countries 
have been very successful in preventing the introduction of institutional rules or norms that 
would actually compel them to provide funding, and as a result their control over finance 
flows has remained as a lever of power influencing North-South interaction over climate 
policy. 
8.2.4  Coalitions of actors 
Another area of strong evidence of institutional influence on actor behaviour within the 
UNFCCC is in the interplay between coalitions of actors and components of the institutional 
structure. Hall (2016) argues that such coalitions are key to preserving institutional stability, 
and that significant institutional change requires stronger coalitions than are necessary for 
smaller-scale, incremental changes. This thesis has identified considerable evidence that 
coalitions of actors sought to gather strength to alter or preserve existing institutional rules 
and arrangements. While Hall suggests the components of these coalitions may change over 
time, within UNFCCC climate finance negotiations the North-South divide has been highly 
prominent in the dynamics of these coalitions, although it cannot be said that every 
developing or developed country has always been included in such coalitions or fully in 
agreement with the other countries involved. The ENB record and submissions from Parties 
to the UNFCCC are not completely comprehensive in recording every single opinion 
expressed by a Party, nor does every Party speak up to state the support they are lending to 
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a particular coalition or drive for policy stability or change. Nevertheless, the empirical 
analysis has shown waves of coalition building, leading up to key negotiations at COP-3 
(Kyoto, 1997), COP-7 (Marrakesh, 2001), COP-15 (Copenhagen, 2009) and COP-21 (Paris, 
2015). 
The analysis in this thesis has shown that many of the changes pursued by coalitions 
can be understood as challenges to the prevailing interpretation of ambiguous rules and 
principles from the Convention, rather than changes to the rules themselves. Development 
of coalitions of actors within the institution, who jointly seek ‘particular interpretations of 
the ambiguous or contested rules of a given institution’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2009, p. 11), 
is stimulated by the lack of clarity. Such instances include a definition of climate finance, 
the appropriate mix of public and private sources, the relationship between finance needs 
and obligations, what “new and additional” requires, and the interpretation of CBDR in 
terms of how finance burdens are distributed amongst different countries. In general, the 
drive for change has come from developing countries, who have consistently battled to 
clarify these institutional ambiguities, although in most of these cases the efforts of 
developing country coalitions have not led to notable clarification of policies in line with 
their perspectives. The operation and influence of coalitions can be seen in the ongoing 
prominence of the G77/China, AOSIS and the African Group in particular (discussed further 
in section 8.3 below), and characterises developing countries’ frequent use of normative 
arguments. 
While developing countries have had very few significant successes in terms of 
altering institutional rules or design in their favour, it cannot be ignored that at times 
developing countries have been able to initiate some change to institutional rules or policies 
even when there is some evidence of path dependence and consistent evidence of developed 
countries benefitting from initial institutional design and subsequent increasing returns to 
power. This is consistent with historical institutionalist arguments that cohesion amongst 
coalitions of actors, based on a set of ideas that contradict the established institutional rules, 
can be at the root of a challenge to existing policy paths by forming “micro-foundations” of 
gradual change (Blyth et al. 2016). However, the Adaptation Fund’s governance 
arrangements, which this thesis has argued are the most significant example of a developing 
country coalition successfully achieving a break from an established policy path within 
UNFCCC climate finance, was potentially only achieved because the USA was not part of the 
developed country coalition and developed countries had fewer advantages to lose since they 
were only minor contributors to the fund, so the developing country coalition had a lower 
threshold to reach to achieve change. The US$100bn finance targets, another key policy, 
actually reinforced developed countries’ control over funding flows. The absence of clear 
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successes in securing policy change in line with developing countries’ preferences and 
contrary to developed countries interests suggests there are not examples within the analysis 
of actors forming a “united subordinate group”, which results in an increase to the power 
these actors might normally possess and allows them to bring about change to prevailing 
institutional arrangements according to their preferences (Mahoney and Thelen 2009).  
This thesis has also shown that the most significant institutional changes, such as 
agreement of the US$100bn finance commitments or the creation of the Adaptation Fund 
and GCF, came about when a sufficient number of developed countries joined a developing 
country coalition, permitting change to established rules and structures that had been 
initiated by developing countries. This ties into Vatn’s (2015) assertions that institutional 
structures constrain the ability of actors to have their concerns accepted as legitimate within 
the institution. Institutional rules across additionality, sources and assessed contributions 
meant that developing countries’ repeated references to the moral basis for climate finance 
and developed countries’ ethical obligations to provide adequate amounts of new and 
additional public finance gained little legitimacy in terms of how the UNFCCC functions 
and how its policies were organised. Effective control over legitimacy of ideas and rule 
interpretations has usually rested with developed countries, which has been a prominent 
manifestation of the increasing returns to power that developed countries gained from the 
Convention and its initial policies, another key element to historical institutionalist analysis 
of institutional constraint over actor behaviour (Pierson 2004). 
8.2.5  Ideas and policy paradigms 
The analysis in this thesis has shown that UNFCCC climate finance has been shaped by the 
underlying paradigm of voluntary contributions, rooted in the same histories of 
development funding and control of international financial institutions that characterised 
numerous areas of the Convention. With developed countries more amenable to voluntarily 
assisting developing countries with the challenge of responding to climate change than 
being bound by defined moral obligations, institutionalisation of a voluntary paradigm 
conferred an important advantage to developed countries by framing the goals of policy; 
UNFCCC climate finance has largely been created according to what developed countries 
are willing to provide, rather than by any measure of what developing countries require. As 
negotiations developed, particularly leading up to COP-15 in Copenhagen and beyond, the 
effect of the paradigm was evident in the move towards conception of the climate finance 
problem as one of “mobilising” sufficient finance in challenging economic conditions and 
as it became “unavoidable” that public finance from developed countries would be 
insufficient. This tied in with development of the broader bottom-up climate governance 
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regime, which gave the voluntary paradigm in climate finance a stronger institutional 
foundation. 
While the voluntary paradigm appears to have shaped policy outcomes, it has been 
challenged consistently by developing countries, who have sought to raise the profile of 
ethical obligations and various normative motivations for policy. As a result, it cannot be 
said that the voluntary paradigm has comprehensively influenced all policymakers’ beliefs 
about what climate finance policy will or is intended to achieve (May 1992). Although this 
may lead us to question the influence of the voluntary paradigm on developing countries, 
the policy history of UNFCCC climate finance has remained consistent with it throughout. 
There is evidence that developing countries were aware that they were operating under a 
particular paradigm and were consciously or deliberately trying to alter it or weaken it, but 
(sometimes simultaneously) also reinforced the paradigm by asking developed countries 
what they were willing to provide. This suggests that the voluntary paradigm has become part 
of the institutional structure (Greener 2002), giving advantages to developed countries by 
shaping which ideas mattered within the policy process (Fioretos 2011). 
If developing countries have been successful in laying ideational micro-foundations 
through sustained battling over rule ambiguities, this may have played a role in stimulating 
responses from developed countries in the form of either ceding a small amount of ground 
or initiating the appeasement-like actions described above. This explanation seems 
plausible in light of the cohesion and longevity of coalitions of developing countries and 
their consistent use of normative arguments, but the temporal analysis has shown that their 
limited success, such as securing the series of new funds from the SCCF and LDC Fund 
through to the GCF, all remained within the voluntary paradigm. Overall, then, rather than 
bringing about notable institutional change or shifting the balance of power, these 
ideational processes actually point to developed countries’ very successful reinforcement of 
key institutional structures and rules, limiting the effects of the incremental policy layering 
or drift that developing countries may have sought with the aim of leading to more 
fundamental shifts in their favour (Thelen 2004, Béland 2007). 
The historical analysis has also demonstrated that by far the most frequent lines of 
argument used by developing countries have been normative or moral in nature. Often this 
has involved mention of the harms developed countries have caused through climate 
change, and their responsibility for rectifying these harms and providing funds for 
developing countries to deal with the effects of the harms, and highlighting the rights of 
finance recipients to have a more significant role in the governance process. Framing policy 
debates in terms of ethical obligations and procedural justice contrasts markedly with 
developed countries, who refer consistently to what is feasible, realistic and effective when 
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debating policy options and institutional design. In this kind of language are the key links 
to established institutional configuration and policy paths, since it shows that developed 
countries repeatedly base policy debates on the status quo and, by extension, the 
institutional arrangements that provide them with advantages they seek to protect and 
reinforce. To counteract the influence of these “sticky” policies and institutional structures, 
developing countries employ justice-based normative arguments, which this thesis has 
demonstrated are rarely sufficient to overcome developed countries’ material power 
underpinned by the increasing returns they derive from the institutional structures 
themselves. 
8.2.6  Path dependence 
Path dependence is a key mechanism that historical institutionalists seek to identify when 
assessing the role of institutions in shaping political life. This is one area where the 
historical analysis was less conclusive, with only limited evidence of true path dependence. 
Numerous clear policy paths were in evidence, and there is considerable evidence 
throughout all the areas of analysis that developed countries had a strong incentive to 
reinforce advantageous paths initiated in the original institutional design (Fioretos 2011), 
be that in prioritising the GEF, avoiding a defined link between needs assessments and 
finance requirements, or preventing adoption of additionality criteria or public finance 
requirements. However, there was less clarity that any of these policy areas had met the 
relatively high threshold required for true path dependence, where the policies become self-
reinforcing, deeply entrenched and difficult for all actors to deviate from (Pierson 2000). In 
a similar manner to the voluntary paradigm, developed countries continuously vocalised 
their frustrations with and challenges to many of the policy areas that followed relatively 
stable paths, from lack of adequate funding to frustrations with the GEF and opaque 
additionality reporting. This suggests that developed countries were benefitting from 
structural advantages and positive feedbacks, since the policy positions they advocated were 
repeatedly the ones that ended up being reflected in stable policy output, but also that the 
policies themselves had not become so embedded as to lead all actors to be influenced by 
path dependence.  
These findings may be due to the nature of the UNFCCC, with multiple meetings 
and a new round of policy every year, which made it more difficult to identify true policy 
stability, particularly since policy discussions broadened to include almost all elements 
within the UNFCCC’s remit in the run up to milestone COP meetings. It appears that the 
mechanics of the UNFCCC allowed greater scope for repeated reinforcement of policies, 
which constitute the micro-processes contributing to institutional stability. These have been 
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documented in all of the areas of analysis, but often constitute the lack of policy, as with 
additionality, or continued ambiguity of policy, as with public/private sources. In these 
circumstances, historical institutionalist attention to the interpretation of policy and how 
coalitions group around different interpretations gives greater insight than path 
dependence, since developed countries have been able across these areas to lean on 
institutional rule structures to control the way they interpret established policies. Developed 
countries have repeatedly shown they will band together into a coalition to drive particular 
interpretations that favour their underlying interests (Mahoney and Thelen 2009), even if 
they have demonstrated a degree of variation in the positions they take within the policy 
process. 
8.3 Wider context of North-South global politics 
The analysis in this thesis has shown how institutional design and development has been 
influenced by and contributed to perpetuation of North-South divisions within the 
UNFCCC climate finance policy process. This section takes these findings from the 
institutional analysis and the detailed study of actor behaviour within climate finance policy 
since 1992, and places them in the broader context of North-South global politics and 
unequal power and economic relationships. This discussion will show how historical 
institutionalist analysis can expand our understanding of international climate justice and 
global politics and bring valuable new insight to broader scholarship on North-South 
divisions and histories, the pursuit of global climate justice, and the politics of 
environmental governance. Firstly, this section will explain the history and identities 
associated with North-South divides and interaction, illuminating factors and features such 
as negotiating coalitions that are enriched by analysis of the events and behaviour in the 
UNFCCC climate finance policy process. Secondly, the section will discuss how the findings 
from climate finance are connected to and can contribute to our broader understanding of 
climate justice issues and developing countries’ participation in global governance 
processes. Thirdly, the section will relate the findings from UNFCCC climate finance to the 
broader climate finance landscape and political and justice outcomes in other governance 
institutions based on multilateral environmental agreements. Lastly, the section steps back 
to look at how this historical institutionalist analysis relates and adds to scholarship on the 
global political economy and systemic context of North-South relations and hegemonic 
structures from which the UNFCCC emerged and of which it remains a component. 
8.3.1  Developing country identity and coalitions 
Williams (2005, p. 53) asserts that ‘the Third World coalition is a reaction to the dominance 
of the industrialized states in world politics’ and to a lack of access to and participation in 
  Page 206 of 265   
decision making processes’. These global power structures contribute to the shared identity 
that connects developing countries in opposition to existing power structures, and these 
connections have contributed to a fragile but lasting connection between a large and diverse 
number of developing countries, with groupings such as the G77/China forming to increase 
influence in the international sphere (Ciplet and Roberts 2017). This drive for greater 
participation has a basis in an underlying quest for a more legitimate global order, shaped 
by the collective identity and shared perspectives of developing countries (Najam 2005). 
Although it is important to avoid seeing North-South political confrontations in climate 
change or other policy areas solely in terms of a sustained and deliberate challenge to the 
developed world or the prevailing liberal order (Hurrell and Narkilar 2006, Chan 2013), the 
findings of this thesis reinforce the notion that North-South identity is an essential 
component of understanding the way climate politics has functioned within the UNFCCC. 
Within the climate finance policy area, this thesis has shown that the prevailing 
international order has been strengthened by the institutional design of the UNFCCC and 
the rules, norms and positive feedbacks that have been reinforced over time by developed 
countries and the policy output. 
The global south and the G77/China coalition were rejuvenated at the UNCED 
conference that created the UNFCCC (Najam 2005) and the Convention institutionalised 
the concept or categorisation of developing countries, and although it used the much-
derided annexes for organisational purposes, the category was left as self-defining (Williams 
2005). Most developing countries continue to negotiate under the collective banner of the 
“South” (Najam 2005) and, despite considerable variation amongst its member countries, 
the bloc’s negotiators make a conscious and prolonged effort to ‘negotiate as a unified group 
in order to resist pressure from the developed countries’ (Gupta 1999, p. 200), with the 
G77/China playing a coordinating role as the main vehicle for setting policy positions. This 
sense of shared identity is borne out by findings of this thesis, with evidence throughout all 
the analysed policy areas of both variations amongst developing countries and their general 
unity pushing collectively against developed countries and institutional rule structures.  
The increasing divergence of interests and economic and political power among 
developing countries (Hochstetler 2012, Ciplet and Roberts 2017) might suggest that large 
developing countries would be increasingly divergent from the G77. Notable occasions of 
such as at COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 when the BASIC group of Brazil, South Africa, 
India and China was pivotal in formulating the final, very limited Copenhagen Accord with 
the USA that the G77 (and several other countries) refused to accept, indicate this 
fragmentation amongst developing country groups (Ciplet 2015, p. 247). However, while the 
BASIC narrative that ‘the increasing risk of climate change is thus caused by a lack of action 
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from developed countries, which continue to side-step their UNFCCC commitments’ has 
had to evolve as China in particular increases its emissions so significantly, large developing 
countries have retained the narrative in relation to the necessity of finance from developed 
countries (Blaxekjær and Nielsen 2015, pp. 756, 761). This can be seen in the BASIC 
members (BASIC as a bloc has been a minor player in finance negotiations) exerting 
continued pressure for developed countries to fulfil their finance commitments throughout 
Chapter 5 and push for additionality in Chapter 6. Large developing countries have 
continued to gain legitimacy from the alignment of this position with other developing 
countries’ perspectives on climate finance (Ciplet and Roberts 2017, p. 389). The G77 
remained aligned with China and India on finance at COP-21 in Paris as large developing 
countries sought to resist moves by developed countries to bring BASIC and other 
developing countries into the finance donor base (Dimitrov 2016, pp. 4–5, Okereke and 
Coventry 2016); such overlapping objectives help to explain the comparative lack of 
disagreement amongst developing countries and lasting prominence of the G77/China 
throughout most of the climate finance policy contestations examined in the thesis. 
It was in negotiations about the role and proportion of private finance sources 
within the UNFCCC examined in Section 6.4 that the most significant variation and 
contradiction was evident in developing countries’ priorities and approach to the issue, as 
they struggled to balance increasing acceptance of the need for a mix of public and 
private/innovative sources with concern that this would reduce levels of public funding. 
However, there was no obvious pattern of divergence between large and small or other 
groups of developing countries and the fragmented Southern perspectives obscured 
collective unity over the importance of developed countries fulfilling their commitments. 
This constrained the South as an overall coalition while the North remained relatively 
unified, so Northern preferences dominated policy making in this area through to the Paris 
Agreement, building on existing openness to private sources initiated in the Convention. 
Overall, this thesis has found that the G77/China in particular has remained prominent as 
a negotiating counterweight to developed countries and the institutional design that has 
underpinned power inequality in the policy process, suggesting that climate finance is one 
of the elements slower to change as ‘the North–South divide is only evolving, not 
disappearing’ (Gupta 2015, p. 151). Even as blocs such as AILAC break with G77 solidarity to 
push for low-carbon development at home and globally (Ciplet and Roberts 2017, p. 382), 
they are unlikely to disagree with broader G77 efforts to hold developed countries to account 
for the commitments they have made. 
As discussed above, all four analytical themes show that within climate finance the 
institutional rules and structures brought many advantages for developed countries; despite 
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grouping together to increase their negotiating power, developing countries have largely 
been ineffective in counteracting these power inequalities and achieving policies that align 
with their needs and perspective of fairness. Developing countries have demonstrated a 
pattern of using normative arguments within climate finance policy negotiations, which 
reflects the centrality of the normative dimension to the origins and narratives of the broad 
coalition of developing countries across global politics, and the institutionalisation of 
finance as a North-South issue in the Convention (Williams 2005). Richards’ (2001) argues 
that it is the negotiation process and lack of resources that led developing countries to focus 
on justice and North-South issues rather than material interests in a “realist” fashion, and 
that this has led to weak negotiating by developing countries and outcomes that favour the 
interests of developed countries (2003). While various studies have examined new 
developing country coalitions and mixed blocs that cross the North-South divide and which 
may lead to new bargaining dynamics (Blaxekjær and Nielsen 2015, Costantini et al. 2016), 
this thesis emphasises the role of institutional design and its effect on power distribution 
in disadvantaging developing countries in material terms. The continued relevance of the 
North-South divide in finance negotiations indicates the lasting contribution of 
institutional design and development to the shared identity and history of developing 
countries and the prominence of the G77/China in this area. Since the policy contestations 
and associated institutional structures examined in this thesis are far from resolved 
(Sharma 2017, Alexandraki 2019), institutional factors are likely to continue to shape 
negotiating dynamics within the institutional policy process and constrain developing 
countries’ achievement of outcomes in line with their conception of climate justice and 
should not be discounted as coalitions shift within climate politics more broadly. 
8.3.2  Matters of justice 
Developing country participation in global political processes is constrained by a lack of 
delegates and other procedural justice issues (Grasso and Saachi 2011, Okereke 2018). The 
numerous COP and GEF meetings every year offer greater opportunity for developing 
country participation than many other governance regimes (Engberg-Pedersen 2011). At the 
same time, this schedule places great demands on developing country resources and this 
thesis has shown that on-paper influence within the policy process does not, in the case of 
the UNFCCC, translate into concrete, material influence over policy outcomes and 
institutional design. The “Southern” identity is in part borne out of a collective desire for 
greater influence and participation in political decisions, and the long history of injustice 
associated with Northern domination of global political systems alongside Southern 
exclusion and unequal economic relationships (Najam 2005, Parks and Roberts 2010). Their 
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consistent lack of delegates constrains developing countries’ ability to use proactive 
negotiating strategies (Richards 2001) and overcome the weaker bargaining position that the 
institutional form and rules reinforce. 
Various scholars have discussed how perceptions of fairness and worldviews affect 
a country’s behaviour within a policy process (Roberts and Parks 2007, Pittel and Rübbelke 
2013), building our understanding of developing countries’ shared identity and the actions 
seen within political institutions. When these perspectives are examined, climate policy 
negotiations can be seen as ‘the site for sorting out the claims of vulnerable developing 
countries for restitution for climate change impacts from rich, high-emitting, developed 
countries’, and ‘insufficient sensitivity to this normative basis can lead to rejection of 
knowledge claims by some parties (typically the developing countries), as well as stalemate, 
discord, and distrust’ (Moore 2012, p. 173). The three historical analytical chapters in this 
thesis have found considerable evidence of this stalemate, discord and distrust, with 
institutional design, policy paradigms and positive feedbacks reinforcing unequal power 
and influence. This has perpetuated North-South divisions over the life of the UNFCCC 
rather than leading to policy outcomes that unify countries behind common climate finance 
goals and mutually-satisfactory burden-sharing arrangements. 
Part of these divisions can be attributed to the nature of climate finance, since even 
as mitigation has been accepted as more of a sliding scale of effort with the Paris Agreement, 
having moved on from the Convention and Kyoto Protocol’s annex split (Okereke and 
Coventry 2016), finance remains much more divided with a stronger expectation that 
funding should be provided by developed countries rather than developing countries, even 
if the lively debate surrounding the extent to which such flows are supplemented by private 
sources is ongoing. The norms that frame climate change adaptation and associated funding 
as restitution for climate harms are counteracted by donor-led, development assistance 
norms and since developing countries have the most to gain materially from the former 
framing, justice-based claims have often been dismissed as self-interest (Moore 2012). This 
has been substantiated by the findings of this thesis, with the temporally constructed 
narratives adding new insight to constructivist claims about how more powerful actors resist 
the institutionalisation of fairness or restitution norms. This is consistent with trends across 
other multilateral environmental agreements, where action in response to environmental 
problems has been pushed southwards (Najam 2002), and with understanding of ongoing 
unity amongst developing countries, which remains underpinned by a sense of injustice 
despite disagreements discussed above and the changing role of larger developing countries 
such as the BRICS nations (Engberg-Pedersen 2011). 
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8.3.3  Broader climate finance landscape and other multilateral 
environmental agreements 
While climate finance is a prominent pillar of the UNFCCC regime, finance channelled 
through UNFCCC funds only makes up a minor proportion of overall global climate finance 
flows (Buchner et al. 2017). Confusion and controversy around the definition of climate 
finance and how to determine what should be counted when seeking to monitor and 
evaluate flows and contributions is a feature of the broad landscape of public, private, 
bilateral and multilateral climate finance (Buchner et al. 2015). Likewise, the trend towards 
voluntary and private finance seen within the UNFCCC is replicated in other fora, such as 
the Rio+20 conference in 2012, where governments, stakeholders, networks and partnerships 
pledged US$636bn collectively (Bernstein and van der Ven 2017). In their Gramscian 
analysis, Ciplet et al. (2015, chap. 4) suggest that the pledges made by developed countries 
represent limited concessions designed to reinforce prevailing hegemonic global structures, 
echoing the pattern of institutional change this thesis has identified. Engberg-Pedersen 
(2011, p. 28) argues that the proliferation of multilateral and bilateral funds across the 
climate finance landscape seems likely to replicate the donor-recipient tradition, echoing 
what this thesis has found with UNFCCC funds, and he notes that even in this broader 
landscape the Adaptation Fund stands out as an anomaly and may become simply a 
‘footnote in history’. The findings in this thesis reinforce this broader research, suggesting 
that what developing countries have experienced within the UNFCCC is symptomatic of the 
wider climate finance landscape, and attention to institutional structures has shown that 
the UNFCCC has reinforced these wider inequalities rather than providing a more level 
playing field. 
The North-South dynamic is by no means unique to climate change or climate 
finance negotiations, and the shared identity amongst developing countries that is strongly 
in evidence throughout the UNFCCC climate finance negotiations is also a factor in other 
areas of negotiation. This can be seen in policy struggles that echo those that this thesis has 
examined within UNFCCC climate finance. For example, the findings in this thesis echo 
Falkner’s assertion that in the closely-related UNFCCC loss and damage negotiations, ‘as so 
often in the protracted climate negotiations, success for the Global South came at the cost 
of legal ambiguity and weak commitments’ (Falkner 2019, p. 140). In the Montreal Protocol 
ozone regime, the Multilateral Fund created to compensate developing countries is based 
on incremental costs, in a similar way to most UNFCCC climate finance, but the Fund was 
created with a governance system that requires majorities from both donors and recipients 
for decision making, allowing both sides to block. In addition, contributions to the fund are 
determined by the assessment scale used for the UN; while this did not entirely resolve the 
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question of voluntary vs obligatory contributions, the scale allowed for greater predictability 
and the implication of commitment that has been lacking from UNFCCC climate finance 
(Joffe et al. 2013). 
The Multilateral Fund from the ozone regime is the most prominent independent 
fund created for a MEA and often seen as a model by developing countries (Ackerman 2009), 
but the Convention on Biological Diversity (also agreed at UNCED) and the 2001 Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) mirror the UNFCCC by making use of 
the GEF (Oberthür 2002). Kohler and Ashton (2010) outline the negotiation process for the 
POPs treaty, which involved a similar expectation amongst developing countries that 
additional funding would be forthcoming, due to the higher costs involved in using non-
polluting chemicals. North-South conflict emerged over financing, not least due to 
developed countries’ efforts to designate the GEF as the financial mechanism for the POPs 
convention, in contrast to developing countries’ preference for a new fund in the style of the 
Montreal Protocol. Agreement for the POPs convention to engage the GEF was only reached 
due to use of the word “interim”, which parallels the negotiations leading to selection of the 
GEF as interim operating entity for the UNFCCC financial mechanism. 
Najam (2002) reports that the additionality principle that was part of the original 
“Rio bargain” across the three treaties agreed at the UNCED in 1992 was quickly abandoned 
for the desertification regime and it was made clear that no new funds would be made 
available by donor countries. This caused similar controversy to that seen in this thesis’ 
findings from the voluntary paradigm, prominence of the GEF replenishment process and 
lack of detailed additionality rules in the climate finance policy process, and echoes the lack 
of trust that developing countries have in developed countries’ willingness and ability to 
keep their funding promises. Additionality has since been increasingly replaced with market 
forces and efficiency as means to deliver finance promises across all of the Rio multilateral 
environmental agreements (Najam 2002, p. 47), which this thesis has corroborated in the 
case of UNFCCC finance by illuminating how institutional design and development has 
contributed to developed countries’ influence over finance flows and rules. 
With similar experiences and outcomes in a variety of other policy areas and 
governance regimes, it is evident that the strategies and priorities of developed countries 
seen throughout the history of UNFCCC climate finance are not unique to this policy area. 
However, this thesis has added to broader understanding of these experiences and outcomes 
by using a novel institutional perspective to establish how the institutional design of the 
UNFCCC, which has proven so influential in shaping climate policy and North-South 
negotiating dynamics, was a product of a landscape of power inequalities across global 
governance and contributed to developed countries consistently and successfully 
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reinforcing their interests by capitalising on advantageous policy paths, rule ambiguity and 
policy paradigms. 
8.3.4  Political economy – power, colonialism and resistance 
Scholars of international political economy have asserted that climate governance is rooted 
in causation and dependency, involving the institutions set up to manage the contradictions 
of capitalism and ideas of green growth, for example, which shapes governance and policy 
options (Newell 2015). It follows then that the design of global governance institutions and 
the power dynamics within them are at least partly a symptom of this broader context of 
capitalism and globalisation, but this thesis has shown how the institution itself can 
exacerbate or have an effect beyond the initial conditions and prevailing power dynamics of 
which the institution is a product. Certainly the historical analytical narratives have 
identified consistent evidence that the institutional design, with positive feedbacks and 
layering of rules, has contributed to developing countries giving their consent to a finance 
regime that largely preserves developed country control and thus fails to achieve significant 
alteration to the existing donor-dominated development sector and governance systems. 
This is consistent with broader analyses of power and consent within climate governance 
and the reinforcement of hegemony through the negotiation of weak rules that are seen by 
developing countries as more favourable to no rules at all (Ciplet 2015). 
These findings are underpinned by a general resistance amongst developed 
countries to reshaping the incumbent global system and its institutions (Rayner and 
Okereke 2007), with global elites manoeuvring around challenges to the existing carbon-
based economic and development system and opposing ‘demands for policies that would 
more profoundly upset the existing order’ (Newell 2015, pp. 31–32). These characteristics of 
the wider political economy of global governance are reflected in the resistance that 
developed countries have demonstrated throughout the climate finance policy process, 
identified within this thesis and by other scholars such as Ciplet et al. (2015, chap. 4). In turn, 
this resistance to change has contributed to developing countries’ long-held distrust of the 
motivations and promises of the Global North and reinforcement of the North-South divide 
that stretches back to colonialism and the origins of global power inequalities (Ghosh and 
Woods 2009, Gupta 2015). Resistance is also seen in developing countries’ frustration with 
the voluntary ODA system and their consistent drive to separate climate finance, with an 
ethical basis highlighted by developing countries, from existing ODA flows related to the 
0.7% of GDP commitment under the UN. This thesis has shown that developing countries 
have tried, but failed, to achieve institutional rules that would enforce this separation and 
additionality effectively, rather than just in principle, and as a result UNFCCC climate 
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finance remains deeply affected by the lack of trust that developing countries have in 
pledges made by developed countries. 
Findings in this thesis are therefore consistent with broader conceptualisations of 
global governance as a site for challenge to or reinforcement of existing economic structures, 
such as Carrapatoso and Kürtzinger (2014), and reinforces their pessimism that substantial 
systemic change is not realistic when consensus over policy in the UNFCCC is intertwined 
with preservation of existing economic and development paradigms. Rather than being 
integrated successfully into the broader sustainable development agenda, as developing 
countries had intended in advance of the UNCED in 1992 (Ciplet and Roberts 2017, p. 373), 
climate finance remains largely subject to the will of developed countries and is consistent 
with general trends in global governance that find that institutionalisation of restitutive 
norms is a rare occurrence (Moore 2012). This thesis has shown that the climate finance 
policy process has contributed to, rather than diffused, the broader lack of trust in climate 
governance, which can be seen as impeding potential future global governance co-operation 
and reform (Engberg-Pedersen 2011). 
8.4 Conclusion 
This thesis has addressed a gap between climate justice and climate politics research by 
asking how the design and institutional rule structures of the UNFCCC have shaped and 
constrained the politics and policymaking that have taken place within it. The analysis has 
extended the use of historical institutionalism and shown that it can offer useful insight 
into the significance and influence of institutional structures on the outcomes experienced 
by different groups of actors within the policy process. Even though the UNFCCC’s treaty-
based format with annual negotiations meant that the policy process was more open and 
rapidly-evolving than domestic bureaucratic institutions, historical institutionalism has 
been valuable for explaining how developed countries gained significant advantages from 
the Convention that incentivised them to reinforce institutional rules and structures, and 
illuminating the positive feedbacks and policy paradigms that underpinned their power to 
do this. The historical institutionalist analysis has shown how North-South division often 
manifests itself in coalitions pushing for or against change to existing institutional rules 
and structures that are aligned with Northern interests and rule interpretations, such as the 
prominence of the GEF. Rooted in the Convention, the voluntary paradigm and vague 
policies concerning additionality and finance sources allowed developed countries to 
dominate the policy process as they often approached negotiations from a position of 
seeking to maintain the institutional status quo. 
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Developing countries were immediately disadvantaged by the manner in which the 
creation and content of the initial institutional design reflected and institutionalised North-
South power imbalances and the prevailing landscape of international development 
finance. Lacking material power, developing countries most frequently used normative and 
ethical language in attempts to alter institutional rules and structures, contributing to their 
shared identity as challengers of institutional structures both within and beyond the 
UNFCCC. This position of usually having to challenge the established status quo 
constrained developing countries when seeking policy in line with their preferences and 
interests, since it meant that their arguments for normative or needs-based climate finance 
and alternative funding mechanisms often failed to gain legitimacy. While the continuous 
challenge demonstrated by developing countries suggests true path dependence was not 
part of UNFCCC climate finance policy, the advantage gained by developed countries from 
the Convention and rule interpretation is an important factor in the ongoing policy stability. 
Developed countries have accepted certain changes to institutional structures and policies 
in line with developing country preferences, but analysis of these structures and developed 
countries’ changing incentives has shown that it is only in the case of the Adaptation Fund’s 
governance that developed countries did not obtain some form of benefit from agreeing to 
the changes. 
Historical institutionalism has offered valuable insight into the structural factors 
that have underpinned the North-South split that has characterised climate finance 
negotiations and strengthened the power that northern countries have held and exercised 
consistently within the policy process. Developing countries’ shared normative ideas and 
justice claims shaped both their identities and collective negotiating strategies, while the 
lack of institutionalisation of these normative claims was an important factor in developed 
countries retaining greater material power within the institutional boundaries. This thesis 
has shown how institutional factors such as the voluntary paradigm and prominence of the 
GEF have exacerbated Southern distrust of global governance processes and Northern 
countries’ willingness to live up to their commitments, let alone achieve justice as perceived 
by Southern countries. While UNFCCC climate finance can be seen as a site of Southern 
challenge to broader North-South power structures, this thesis has shown that institutional 
design and development have replicated and reinforced the advantageous position of 
Northern countries. Consequently, little fundamental change has been seen in climate 
finance policy and the institutional structure remains as beneficial for developed countries 
as the Convention, reinforcing wider North-South inequalities and the exclusion and unjust 
policy that developing countries have experienced in other governance institutions and 
multilateral environmental agreements. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
9.1 Thesis overview and key findings 
This thesis has identified a gap in the existing climate justice and governance literature 
concerning the influence of institutional factors in shaping the behaviour of actors within 
and the policy emerging from the UNFCCC climate finance policy process. The thesis has 
added valuable new insight to that gap by using a historical institutionalist approach to 
examine in detail the creation of the UNFCCC and the progression of climate finance policy 
making, investigating how the original institutional design reflected broader landscapes of 
injustice and unequal power distribution, and how this design influenced the subsequent 
development of policy layers and rule structures that in turn affected actors’ power, interests, 
ideas and coalitions, constraining policy making and shaping the nature and justice of 
outcomes. Motivated by the injustices that characterise the problem of climate change and 
the North-South divisions and power imbalances that characterise climate change politics 
and climate finance, the thesis adds new institutional factors to broader understanding of 
how countries from the Global South have experienced and participated in climate 
governance and helps to explain the substance and justice of outcomes from the climate 
finance policy process in relation to broader North-South histories and politics. 
Part I of the thesis situated the project within existing literature and introduced the 
theoretical approach and research design. Chapter 2 introduced the core injustices of 
climate change and argued that climate finance is central to understanding how justice is at 
the heart of disagreement over how to formulate a co-ordinated global response to climate 
change. These injustices stem from North-South inequalities and divisions within global 
economic structures and political relationships, and have been widely studied in the politics 
of global climate change governance processes. The chapter also argued that injustice and 
the North-South split are at the core of climate finance, both in terms of why it is needed 
and the progression of negotiations over what is required and which countries should 
provide it. The key contestations of climate finance policy and the progression of 
negotiations were summarised in the chapter and placed in the context of the broader 
landscape of climate finance. This landscape extends beyond the UNFCCC and has 
important links to the development assistance sector that has been a strong influence in the 
North-South politics of UNFCCC climate finance. 
Chapter 3 introduced institutions, reviewing existing international relations and 
international political economy literature on how international institutions are created and 
the role they play within global politics and environmental governance. The chapter argued 
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that there is an important gap in the literature concerning the design and development of 
institutions and their influence on actors within them over time. Having explained the form 
and broader context of the UNFCCC as a governance regime based on a multilateral 
environmental agreement, the chapter argued that historical institutionalism is uniquely 
placed to balance the focus on rational self-interest and material power on the one hand, 
and ideas and norms on the other, which characterise key theoretical schools within 
international relations. The history and development of historical institutionalism was 
outlined, and the chapter continued by arguing that historical institutionalism’s attention 
to institutional design, power, stability, change, coalitions and ideas make it ideal for 
assessing the institutional development of the UNFCCC and its influence on North-South 
politics and policy outcomes. Chapter 4 presented the methodology, sources and research 
design for the project, explaining how themes and mechanisms from historical 
institutionalism would be employed to facilitate working with such a large amount of source 
data from policy documents and negotiation commentary. 
Part II of the thesis presented four temporally constructed narratives in three 
chapters, which were the result of detailed and systematic processing of the data outlined in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 focused on the voluntary paradigm that was a direct carry-over from 
the development assistance sector. The chapter argued that vague rules in the Convention 
left developed countries able to act according to their expectation of control over the 
amounts of finance they provided and the timescales and monitoring of finance flows. 
Developing countries were put in the position of having to overcome this initial institutional 
design, which was reinforced by subsequent institutional links with the GEF, meaning the 
institutional structure enhanced developed countries’ power within negotiations and 
contributed to developing countries’ failure to overcome developed countries’ advantageous 
position and secure funding related to their needs or based on a calculation underpinned 
by a clear and agreed normative principle. The chapter further argued that policy that may 
be viewed externally a success for developing countries within the policy process, such as 
the US$100bn commitment at Copenhagen, actually represents incremental institutional 
change that developed countries facilitated to protect the underlying advantageous 
institutional structure. 
Chapter 6 examined two of the key contested areas within climate finance, both of 
which are directly linked to normative claims made by developing countries. An expectation 
of additionality was featured in the Convention, whereas the Convention was explicitly open 
to all sources of finance, but in both cases vague initial clauses gave a structural advantage 
to developed countries that enhanced their resistance to the clearer rules and procedures 
demanded by developing countries. Additionality was already a prominent concern from the 
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development assistance system, and developed countries prevented consensus on a baseline 
from which to calculate additionality or a definition of climate finance that would enhance 
tracking of climate finance by the UNFCCC. In contrast, the chapter argued that the 
increasing prominence of private sources over the course of UNFCCC negotiations 
demonstrates how the initial configuration of the institutional structure acted as a 
constraint on developing countries’ efforts to gather a coalition strong enough to secure new 
rules, which would quantify the proportion of public funding that developed countries 
should provide and prevent the restitutive element of climate finance being passed on to the 
private sector. With both additionality and sources, the chapter found very little institutional 
change and clear, sustained advantage for developed countries from the institutional 
structure. 
Chapter 7 focused on the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, in terms of the 
initial selection of the GEF and creation of subsequent funds. The chapter found that 
institutional links with the GEF were significant in shaping the UNFCCC’s funding 
mechanisms according to the priorities of developed countries, since the GEF was created 
and largely controlled by them. The prominence of the GEF made it more difficult for 
developing countries to capitalise on the opportunity for more balance governance of the 
SCCF and LDC Fund. In contrast, the chapter argued that the governance structure of the 
Adaptation Fund was the most significant example of developing countries succeeding in 
gathering a coalition strong enough to implement new institutional rules that at least partly 
matched their priorities. This was explained by the absence of the USA from the policy 
process and the relatively minor proportion of funding that would come from developed 
countries, which reduced the threshold for change that the developing country coalition 
needed to reach. Other developments in the financial mechanism were consistent with 
findings from the voluntary paradigm in the way that incremental institutional change was 
facilitated by developed countries and consistently reinforced underlying advantageous 
structures, preventing developing countries actually securing meaningful achievement of 
their policy priorities and objectives. 
Part III of the thesis summarised and discussed the project’s findings and includes 
this concluding chapter. Chapter 8 began by drawing together the four policy areas examined 
in Part II, arguing that analysis of initial institutional design in the Convention has been 
one of the most fruitful parts of the project. All four of the examined policy areas found 
evidence of institutional creation reflecting broader power dynamics and North-South 
divisions in the institutional structure. Developed countries derived numerous advantages 
from the institutional structure that enhanced their power and influence in subsequent 
negotiations, helping them to limit changes to policy paths and rule structures, and 
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influence the timing and substance of alterations when they did take place. The chapter 
argued that the ongoing struggle by developing countries to change institutional structures 
according to their interests and normative perspectives can be characterised according to 
the view of coalitions of actors seeking to gather strength to overcome the constraints of 
existing institutional structures put forward by Hall (2016), putting developing countries at 
a consistent power disadvantage as developed countries usually sought to reinforce their 
advantageous position derived from initial institutional design and subsequent policy 
paths. 
There was less evidence of true path dependence in the four policy areas than might 
have been expected, but this may be a product of the continuous nature of the UNFCCC 
policy process with new layers added each year and several periods of expansive negotiation 
leading up to milestones COPs. Finally, Chapter 8 placed these findings and insight into the 
broader context of North-South politics and global governance studies, arguing that the 
research has provided a new lens through which to understand the longevity and strength of 
developing country coalitions within negotiations and why notions of justice advocated by 
developing countries have not been integrated effectively into climate policy. Although the 
rise of large developing countries and new negotiating coalitions has altered the 
perspectives and co-ordination of developing countries in the UNFCCC policy process, 
climate finance has seen less of this evolution and the North-South dynamic remains 
prominent. This reflects the broader climate finance landscape and global macro-level 
systems in which the UNFCCC sits, and the thesis has shown that institutional factors are 
important in understanding how these broader systems influenced the internal politics of 
the UNFCCC policy process. 
9.2 Value and implications of research outcomes 
This thesis has successfully met its research objectives by undertaking detailed analysis of 
the historical progression of climate finance negotiations and policy and assessing the 
presence and influence of institutional factors on actor behaviour within the policy process. 
The original contributions of the thesis are found, firstly, in its extension of the use of 
historical institutionalism to analyse the UNFCCC, an international governance institution 
so far overlooked as an object of systematic research of this nature. Secondly, the thesis 
contributes original insight into the role and influence of institutional design, structure and 
development on the climate finance policy process, in particular the perpetuation of North-
South power imbalances and the challenges developing countries have faced shaping their 
policy in line with their material interests and notions of climate justice. Overall, the 
historical institutionalist analysis has shown that the institutional design and development 
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of the UNFCCC should be considered an important factor in explaining subsequent policy 
outcomes and the interaction between countries as they negotiated in pursuit of priorities 
and justice. 
The thesis has extended the application of historical institutionalism to governance 
institutions at the international level, following encouragement by Fioretos (2011) and 
Hanrieder (2014) amongst others, and focusing on precisely the sort of non-standard 
institutional context that Farrell and Finnemore (2016, p. 576) suggest will ‘help establish 
the scope conditions of historical institutionalism’s existing toolbox’. The data sources 
proved rich and extensive, facilitating the detailed study of how countries behaved within 
negotiations and of the evolution of policy that are required for the temporal analysis central 
to historical institutionalism. While this enabled production of the temporally constructed 
narratives and the analysis central to the thesis, the volume of material was so large that 
processing it adequately acted as a constraint on a broader search for data and thus building 
an even more accurate picture of events. This should be taken into consideration by scholars 
seeking to investigate the institutional design and development of other areas of UNFCCC 
policy or other regimes based on multilateral environmental treaties, which also have 
multiple rounds of negotiation each year and are similarly well-documented. 
The multilateral environmental treaty basis of the UNFCCC, which involves a 
negotiating forum with almost continuous meetings and policy making in annual cycles, 
also presented some challenges for the application of historical institutionalism, but overall 
the thesis has shown that historical institutionalist tools are useful when considering 
governance institutions based on multilateral environmental agreements. Opening up 
broad swathes of policy during key negotiation periods such as the AWG-LCA process before 
Copenhagen and ADP process before Paris created scope for debate over policy and 
challenge to the status quo that is likely to be unusual in comparison to domestic policy 
institutions and principal/agent intergovernmental organisations. While these regular 
opportunities to re-negotiate existing policies made it difficult to clearly identify true path 
dependence, where all parties are constrained by the layers of policy on a particular path 
(Mahoney 2000, pp. 508–509), the thesis has shown that policy layering and the 
reinforcement of positive feedbacks has made it more difficult for actors to alter these paths. 
In addition, the concept of coalitions of actors trying to build momentum of sufficient 
strength to alter institutional rule structures (Thelen 2004, Hall 2016) was particularly 
fruitful in explaining the consistent interplay between developed and developing countries 
seeking to either change or reinforce policies rooted in the Convention. This is of particular 
relevance to the UNFCCC’s one-country-one-vote negotiating forum with almost 200 Parties 
and similar fora in comparable governance regimes, showing that historical institutionalism 
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is well-suited to offer useful insight into ‘institutional friction between formal rules and 
material power’ in these institutional contexts, as Hanrieder suggests (2014, pp. 324 & 326). 
The thesis has also shown that historical institutionalism’s temporal perspective and 
focus on initial institutional design has considerable potential for adding to our 
understanding of how international environmental governance regimes distil aspects of 
global political systems and inequalities, as put forward by Thelen and Steinmo (1992). The 
thesis found strong evidence that the Convention’s rules and, in several cases, rule 
ambiguities, conferred advantages on developed countries that reflected inequalities in 
participation and power from the development assistance system and global economic 
governance as a whole. Historical institutionalist analysis helped to illuminate how these 
initial institutional features became structural, to a greater or lesser extent, and how they 
contributed to the enduring prominence of North-South division over time. As a result, the 
analysis confirmed broader characterisations of climate politics and added a new 
institutional angle to existing international political economy and international relations 
research. 
This project also makes a significant contribution in its systematic and detailed 
explanation of how developing countries faced an uphill struggle from creation of the 
UNFCCC onwards. In all the contested policy areas under examination, key clauses in the 
Convention were aligned with developed countries’ preferences. This had a lasting impact 
by creating institutional rules structures that developed countries usually sought to reinforce 
and developing countries sought to change or clarify, which added to developed countries’ 
already greater material power. The exercise of power in line with institutional structures 
and the lack of traction within the policy process for ideas held by developing countries are 
useful additions to existing international relations and global environmental governance 
studies of UNFCCC negotiation dynamics (Brenton 2013, Brunnée and Streck 2013). These 
findings were part of the success of this thesis in showing that historical institutionalism 
can be used to bridge the rationalist and constructivist perspectives from international 
relations theory when investigating the role of an international institution, since this thesis 
has shown that actors’ power, interests and ideas have all been influenced by institutional 
design and development over time, and likewise have shaped how that design and 
development took place. 
In summary, the findings of this thesis add a constructive new institutional angle to 
explanations of why climate governance as a whole, and climate finance in particular, 
remain heavily criticised for failure to generate a response to climate change and levels of 
climate finance that can be widely deemed adequate. In identifying various institutional 
mechanisms that contributed to the broader North-South features of the climate finance 
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policy process, this thesis offers a valuable contribution to existing scholarship on this 
aspect of global climate politics and ongoing contestation over climate justice within the 
UNFCCC (Roberts and Parks 2007, Friman and Linnér 2008, Gupta 2015). With the contested 
policy areas examined in the thesis remaining unresolved at the time of writing (Weikmans 
and Roberts 2019) and key justice concerns and burden sharing debates still a central feature 
of climate change politics (Falkner 2019), the research presented here is a timely and 
valuable addition to broader scholarly efforts to understand and engage with climate 
finance, governance and North-South divisions. On the basis of this original contribution, 
the next section will set out suggestions for future research and building on the historical 
institutionalist analysis in this thesis. 
9.3 Opportunities for future research 
This thesis has successfully extended the use of historical institutionalism to an 
international governance institution based on a multilateral environmental agreement, but 
is only a starting point in this endeavour and both its findings and limitations prompt 
further investigation and refinement. In terms of the UNFCCC, the obvious next step would 
be to conduct a similar form of analysis for other policy areas, principally mitigation and 
adaptation but also including capacity building, technology transfer and loss and damage. 
Each of these areas has its own origins, evolution and contestations, but all are 
interconnected so agreement on policy in one area is often likely to be linked to bargaining 
in another. A comprehensive understanding of the institutional influence on North-South 
dynamics and policy outcomes would necessarily include all areas within the UNFCCC remit 
and the implications of concurrent negotiations in these different areas. Such a 
comprehensive project would be extremely large and lengthy, but would facilitate a greater 
understanding of how institutional influence varies across these areas and how they are 
interconnected within the overall process of bargaining and compromise that produces 
policy over time. 
With issues such as additionality and defining climate finance unresolved as of 
COP-24 in December 2018, as well as a relative lack of ambition on finance transparency 
that means the Paris Agreement is not being fully implemented and ongoing disconnect 
between finance targets, roadmaps for delivery of the US$100bn annual target and little 
progress on increasing the target, the contested areas of policy examined in this thesis 
remain very much unresolved. The thesis has engaged relatively briefly with the changing 
dynamics of coalitions within the negotiations (Blaxekjær and Nielsen 2015, Ciplet and 
Roberts 2017), particularly in terms of the rise of large developing countries such as the 
BASIC bloc and new negotiating groups that bridge the North-South divide, but also the 
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changing nature of the North-South split under the NDC regime that replaced the clear 
annex-based separation between developed and developing countries within policy. Future 
research could build on the institutional perspective central to this thesis to examine how 
structures, policy paths and their impact on power distribution and legitimacy of ideas are 
affecting and will continue to affect policy making as countries keep pursuing their material 
normative aims within the context of the NDC system, while the landscape of developing 
countries and blocs continues to evolve and potentially become more significant within 
climate finance. 
In terms of comparison and North-South dynamics, historical institutionalist 
analysis could also be applied to other multilateral environmental treaty regimes, notably 
the ozone regime based on the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol, which has been 
considered an influential forerunner to the UNFCCC regime but also more successful in its 
policy outcomes (Bodansky and Rajamani 2018). Many environmental problems have roots 
in North-South relationships and economic histories, and the governance regimes are 
similarly affected by these origins and have subsequent influence on how developing 
countries are able to pursue their interests and realisation of environmental justice. 
Research into more regimes would allow comparison between their institutional influence, 
and would bring the potential to produce recommendations for the design of future 
multilateral environmental agreements and measures or strategies that could help 
developing countries alter institutional structures in the pursuit of more adequate and just 
policy outcomes. 
This thesis placed its design and findings in the context of broader research on 
macro-level economic and political systems, in particular the development assistance 
system, and sought to show how features of these systems were distilled into the design of 
the Convention. Future research could focus on this more directly, perhaps in the form of a 
systematic comparison of how institutional design of different governance regimes reflected 
the macro-level context in which they originated. Likewise, the implications of the findings 
in this thesis, and similar historical institutionalist research into other regimes, could be 
taken further by seeking to reverse the focus of study and show how the development of an 
institution over time, and the way it affects relationships and interaction between states 
within it, can inform specific theoretical perspectives on macro-level systems. Each global 
governance institution operates with its own internal structure and development on the one 
hand, and on the other hand is part of an interconnected world with a multiplicity of 
governance regimes and state relationships and power imbalances. Using historical 
institutionalism to open up the role of the institution itself can add to our broader 
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understanding of how macro-level systems and the network of governance regimes 
functions and shapes political behaviour and outcomes. 
Overall, this thesis adds to the growing use of historical institutionalism to assess 
governance institutions at the international level (Castro et al. 2014, Prys-Hansen and Franz 
2015, Nasiritousi and Linnér 2016), and to existing perspectives on North-South 
relationships and the realisation of climate justice in the global governance regime 
(Mickelson 2009, Okereke 2010, Okereke and Coventry 2016). The thesis has illuminated 
mechanisms that have reinforced injustice and inequality in institutional design and shown 
how these features of the institutional structure have affected the way countries have 
interacted in the policy process and the output from that process. Climate justice and greater 
equality between the Global North and South in both participation in and outcomes from 
global governance regimes remain vital elements in the broader pursuit of global justice, 
sustainable development, and protection of vulnerable communities and the natural 
environmental itself. This thesis has made a valuable new contribution to this pursuit and 
our understanding of international institutions and climate change politics, and points to 
ways in which scholars can continue to research features and failures of governance regimes 
and encourage positive change and just outcomes. 
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Appendix I: UNFCCC documentation 
 
 
UNFCCC documents can be retrieved from this portal by searching for the relevant 
“document symbol”: https://unfccc.int/documents   
 
The list below records all the UNFCCC documents referenced or actively used in the thesis; 
others were consulted and not deemed to provide relevant information. 
 
Document Symbol Title/Meeting 
 
FCCC/INFORMAL/84 
 
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
 
Reports of the Conference of the Parties, Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties 
 (COP decisions are reported in Part Two of these reports) 
 
• FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 
• FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 
• FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 
• FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 
• FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1 
• FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.2 
 
• FCCC/CP/2001/5/Add.1 & 
Add.2 
• FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 
Add.2 & Add.3 
• FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1, Add.2 
& Add.3 
• FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.1 & 
Add.2 
• FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.1 & 
Add.2 
• FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1 & 
Add.2 
• FCCC/CP/2006/5/Add.1 
• FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 
• FCCC/CP/2008/7/Add.1 
• FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 
• FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 & 
Add.2 
• FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 & 
Add.2 
• FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, Add.2 
& Add.3 
• FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, 
Add.2 & Add.3 
• FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1, 
Add.2 & Add.3 
 
• COP-1, Berlin, 28 March to 7 April 1995 
• COP-2, Geneva, 8 to 19 July 1996 
• COP-3, Kyoto, 1 to 11 December 1997 
• COP-4, Buenos Aires, 2 to 14 November 1998 
• COP-5, Bonn, 25 October to 5 November 1999 
• COP-6 part I, The Hague, 13 to 25 November 
2000 
• COP-6 part II (COP-6.bis), Bonn, 16 to 27 July 
2001 
• COP-7, Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 
2001 
• COP-8, New Delhi, 23 October to 1 November 
2002 
• COP-9, Milan, 1 to 12 December 2003 
 
• COP-10, Buenos Aires, 6 to 18 December 2004 
 
• COP-11, Montreal from 28 November to 10 
December 2005 
• COP-12, Nairobi, 6 to 17 November 2006 
• COP-13, Bali, 3 to 15 December 2007 
• COP-14, Poznan, 1 to 12 December 2008 
• COP-15, Copenhagen, 7 to 19 December 2009 
• COP-16, Cancún, 29 November to 10 December 
2010 
• COP-17, Durban, 28 November to 11 December 
2011 
• COP-18, Doha, 26 November to 8 December 
2012 
• COP-19, Warsaw, 11 to 23 November 2013 
 
• COP-20, Lima, 1 to 14 December 2014 
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• FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 
Add.2 & Add.3 
• COP-21, Paris, 30 November to 13 December 
2015 
 
Reports of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
 (CMP decisions are reported in Part Two of these reports) 
 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 
Add.2 & Add.3 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10/Add.1 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.1 
& Add.2 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/21/Add.1 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1 
& Add.2 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 
& Add.2 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1, 
Add.2 & Add.2/Corr.1 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2013/9/Add.1 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2014/9/Add.1 
• FCCC/KP/CMP/2015/8/Add.1 
& Add.2 
 
 
• CMP-1, Montreal, 28 November to 10 
December 2005  
• CMP-2, Nairobi, 6 to 17 November 2006 
• CMP-3, Bali, 3 to 15 December 2007 
• CMP.4, Poznan, 1 to 12 December 2008 
 
• CMP-5, Copenhagen, 7 to 19 December 2009 
• CMP-6, Cancún, 29 November to 10 December 
2010 
• CMP.7, Durban, 28 November to 11 December 
2011 
• CMP-8, Doha, 26 November to 8 December 
2012 
• CMP-9, Warsaw, 11 to 23 November 2013 
• CMP-10, Lima, 1 to 14 December 2014 
• CMP-11, Paris, 30 November to 13 December 
2015 
Submissions from Parties and other documents 
 
• FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1 
 
 
• FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/8 
• FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.6/ 
• Add.1 
 
 
 
 
• FCCC/CP/2001/MISC.4 
 
 
 
• FCCC/SBI/1996/MISC.1 
 
 
 
 
 
• FCCC/SBI/1996/14 
 
 
 
 
• Views regarding the work programme of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention 
• Text to facilitate negotiations among Parties 
• Preparation of an outcome to be presented to 
the Conference of the Parties for adoption at its 
sixteenth session to enable the full, effective 
and sustained implementation of the 
Convention through long-term cooperative 
action now, up to and beyond 2012 
• Statements made in connection with the 
approval of The Bonn Agreements on the 
implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action (decision 5/CP.6) 
• Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Conference of the Parties and the Council of 
the Global Environment Facility: annex on the 
determination of funding necessary and 
available for the implementation of the 
Convention: comments from Parties 
• Report of the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation on the work of its Fourth 
Session, Geneva, 10-11 December 1996 
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• FCCC/SBI/1998/CRP.1 
 
 
 
• FCCC/SBI/2004/6 
 
 
 
• FCCC/SBI/2004/10 
 
 
• FCCC/SBI/2004/18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• FCCC/SBI/2005/INF.7 
 
 
 
 
• FCCC/SBI/2007/MISC.2 
 
 
• FCCC/SBI/2011/INF.1/Add.2 
 
 
• Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 
9 of the Convention (Decision 3/CP.3 and 
Articles 2.3 and 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol): 
Note by the secretariat 
• Implementation of decisions 12/CP.2 and 
12/CP.3: determination of funding for the 
implementation of the Convention: Note by the 
secretariat 
• Report of the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation on its twentieth session, held 
at Bonn from 16 to 25 June 2004 
• Report on the assessment of funding necessary 
to assist developing countries in fulfilling their 
commitments under the Convention prepared 
in the context of the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Conference of the 
Parties and the Council of the Global 
Environment Facility 
• Experience of international funds and 
multilateral financial institutions relevant to 
the investment needs of developing countries 
in meeting their commitments under the 
Convention 
• Views from interested institutions on how they 
would operationalize decision 5/CMP.2: 
Submissions from institutions 
• Compilation and synthesis of fifth national 
communications Note by the secretariat 
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Appendix II: ENB documentation 
 
 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin documentation for the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in 1992, where the UNFCCC was created, can be found here: 
http://enb.iisd.org/vol02/  
 
There are 13 reports from the UNCED and two preparatory meetings, under vol. 2. In-text 
references to these in the thesis are indicated as “vol. 2 no. x” to differentiate them from the 
subsequent UNFCCC reports, which are all under vol. 12. In addition, one ENB report from 
the Commission for Sustainable Development concerning GEF reform has been referenced 
in the thesis, indicated as “vol. 5 no. 13”. 
 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin reports relevant to the UNFCCC can be obtained from this web 
page: http://enb.iisd.org/enb/vol12/   
 
There are 663 reports relevant to the UNFCCC covering the period from 6 February 1995, 
when the reporting begins, to 15 December 2015, the summary of COP-15. Of these, the 
relevant meetings are: 
 
• The INC for the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
• Conferences of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
• Sessions of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate 
• Sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and 
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), later these become Sessions of the 
Subsidiary Bodies of the UNFCCC 
• Technical Workshop on Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 
• UNFCCC Workshops on Convention Article 4.8 and 4.9 (Adverse Effects) 
• UNFCCC workshop on the preparation of national communications from non-Annex I 
Parties 
• Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
• Sessions of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG) and related meetings 
• Sessions of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention (AWG-LCA) 
• Climate Change Talks/Conferences [interim meetings held in various cities] 
 
Of the 663, 61 were excluded from analysis because they were not relevant to the climate 
finance policy process, i.e. meetings not listed above, including IPCC meetings and various 
UNFCCC workshops. The excluded document numbers are listed below: 
 
25 
111 
124 
126 
138-141 
164 
177 
190 
191 
210 
 
220 
243-248 
261 
271-279 
292-295 
319-321 
340-342 
355 
356 
363 
 
376 
384 
396 
408 
409 
440 
441 
486 
500 
501 
 
522 
547 
581 
582 
596 
606 
607 
627 
645 
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